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INTRODUCTION
In a recent referendum, the citizens of Oklahoma overwhelmingly approved a State constitutional amendment providing that the
courts of the State “shall not consider international law or Sharia law”
in rendering their decisions.1 The amendment’s exclusion of Sharia
law has garnered most of the media attention,2 but more consequent1 State Question No. 755, Legislative Referendum No. 355 (amending OKLA.
CONST. art. 7, § 1.), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.
pdf; see Jess Bravin, Oklahoma Shariah Ban Halted, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2010, at A6;
Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures, ASIL
INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110526.pdf.
2 See Jess Bravin, Oklahoma Is Sued over Shariah Ban, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2010, at
A5; Carla Hinton, Measure Keeps Courts from Considering Sharia Law, OKLAHOMAN, Nov.
5, 2010, at 1A; Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY, Dec. 9,
2010, at 3A; James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A12; Darla Slipke, English-Only, Health Care, Sharia Law Measures Pass, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 3, 2010, at 5A. This aspect of the amendment has been
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ial by far is the measure’s directive to the State courts to disregard
international law. Similar measures have been proposed in other
States, some of them merely barring consideration of Sharia law or
foreign law,3 but others barring consideration of international law as
well.4 These measures are clearly unconstitutional insofar as they
would prohibit the State courts from enforcing one of the two main
forms of international law—treaties—as the U.S. Constitution by its
terms requires State courts to give effect to the nation’s treaties, “any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”5 But the federal Constitution does not expressly
address the status of the other principal form of international law—
customary international law, or the unwritten law that governs the
relations among states and “results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”6
These proposed State laws thus starkly raise the question whether the
States may prohibit their courts from giving effect to the United
States’ obligations under customary international law.7
The answer provided by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law is a clear “no.” Reflecting the settled view regarding the status of
customary international law in the U.S. legal system at the time that it
was approved in 1987, the Restatement asserts that such law has the
status of federal law.8 As such, it preempts inconsistent State law;
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, see Complaint Seeking a Temporary
Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 6, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298
(W.D. Okla. 2010), and a federal court has stayed its enforcement, see Awad, 754 F.
Supp. 2d at 1308 (issuing a preliminary injunction). An appeal is pending before the
Tenth Circuit. See Fellmeth, supra note 1, at 3 & 6 n.27.
3 See Bill Raftery, An Examination of 2011 Sharia Law & International Law Bans
Before State Legislatures, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg,
Va.), Jan. 27, 2011, http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/01/27/an-examination-of-2011sharia-law-international-law-bans-before-state-legislatures (discussing proposed legislation in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas).
4 See id. (discussing proposed constitutional amendments in Wyoming, Arizona,
and South Dakota, proposed legislation in Nebraska that would expressly prohibit
consideration of international law, and proposed legislation in Louisiana and Alaska
that would prohibit the consideration of “foreign law,” defining that term in a way
that appears to include international law).
5 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102(1)(c)(2) (1987).
7 The term “state,” as used in international law, refers to a nation, such as the
United States or France. In this Article, the term will be used in its international
sense when it is not capitalized. When capitalized, it will refer to a State of the Union,
such as New York or California.
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) & cmt. d
(1987).
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State courts must follow federal court interpretations of it; and State
court interpretations of it are reviewable in the federal courts. A decade later, however, Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith published a critique of the Restatement view, which they denominated the
“modern position.”9 While acknowledging that the modern position
was “well-entrenched,” that almost every court that had considered
the question in the previous twenty years had endorsed it, and that the
view was widely regarded as “settled,”10 Bradley and Goldsmith argued
that the modern position should now be rejected because it is based
on a misinterpretation of pre-Erie11 decisions and is inconsistent with
“well-accepted notions of American representative democracy, federal
common law, separation of powers, and federalism,”12 and because
modern customary international law is problematic in a number of
respects.13 For most of the nation’s history, they argued, customary
international law was regarded as “general common law,” not federal
law.14 After Erie rejected the concept of general common law, customary international law could have the status of domestic law only if it
was given such status by the federal political branches or by the
States.15 Thus, according to the Bradley-Goldsmith critique, the
Oklahoma amendment would not only validly bar the Oklahoma
courts from considering customary international law that has not
been incorporated as federal law, it would bar the federal courts from
doing so as well.
In response to the revisionist challenge to the modern position,
numerous scholars have defended the Restatement view.16 Other schol9 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique]; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III,
The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319
(1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy] (expanding upon their
critique of the modern position); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Commentary, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260
(1998) (responding to critics of their revisionist position).
10 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 816–17.
11 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 821.
13 Id.
14 See id. at 850.
15 See id. at 863, 868, 870.
16 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harold
Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law:
A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66
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ars have advanced what they have characterized as intermediate positions, arguing that customary international law is properly understood
to have a status in between federal and State law. Professor Michael
Ramsey has argued that customary international law should be
regarded as a form of nonpreemptive federal law.17 Professor Ernest
Young, expanding upon an argument by Professor Arthur Weisburd,18
has argued that customary international law should continue to be
understood as general law.19 He has proposed the use of choice-oflaw rules to determine the applicability of customary international law
in our courts. Dean Alexander Aleinikoff has argued that customary
international law should be regarded as “nonpreemptive, nonfederal
law” applicable in the federal courts but not the State courts.20
More recently, Professors A.J. Bellia and Bradford Clark have
advanced a different sort of intermediate proposal.21 Rather than
propose an intermediate status for customary international law, Bellia
and Clark argue that some categories of customary international law preempt State law and others do not.22 Their conclusion that State law is
sometimes preempted by customary international law is particularly
noteworthy because revisionists rely heavily on a textual and structural
argument closely identified with Professor Clark23—the view that the
Supremacy Clause’s list of the categories of preemptive federal law is
FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997). Other scholars have sided with the revisionists. See, e.g.,
Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2001)
[hereinafter Ku, State Courts]; Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the
States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004); Julian Ku &
John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort
Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153.
17 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 348–55
(2007); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 555, 577, 584 (2002).
18 See A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 29–35, 51 (1995).
19 Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 365, 370 (2002). The idea that customary international law can continue to
be regarded as general law seems to have been endorsed by Judge William A.
Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 653, 672 (2007).
20 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91,
97–100 (2004).
21 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
22 See id. at 5–6.
23 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 855–59; Young, supra note
19, at 413.
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exhaustive.24 Bellia and Clark argue that the Constitution itself—specifically, its allocation of the war and foreign relations powers to the
federal government—implicitly preempts State laws that conflict with
a subset of customary international law.25 They find support in nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions for the claim that State law is
preempted if it violates the “perfect rights” of foreign sovereigns
under international law. Violation of perfect rights was regarded
under international law as a justification for going to war.26 State violation of such rights thus interfered with the federal government’s
exclusive power to declare war and to conduct the nation’s foreign
relations. The preemptive force of (some) customary international
law, on this analysis, is an inference from the constitutional structure—specifically, the Constitution’s allocation of power over war and
foreign affairs to the federal government.
Finally, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith themselves have
advanced what might be regarded as an intermediate position. In
their original critique, they insisted that customary international law
lacked the status of federal law unless incorporated as such by the
federal political branches.27 The implication was that an act of federal
lawmaking—a federal statute or a treaty—was required. Portions of
their critique suggested that this was indeed what they contemplated.28 Elsewhere, however, they stated that, “to some extent, the
President [has] the authority to incorporate [customary international] law into domestic law,”29 and they noted but did not endorse
the possibility that the relevant authorization may be inferred from a
jurisdictional statute.30 More recently, writing after the Supreme
24 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1323–24, 1429 (2001),
25 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 8.
26 See id. at 5.
27 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 868, 870.
28 See id. at 825–26 (stating that “[t]he Constitution ensured federal control over
[customary international law] through two means,” both involving congressional
action); id. at 858 (“There is . . . no mention of [customary international law] in the
menu of supreme federal law in Article VI.”); id. at 868 (relying on “the thesis that the
Constitution, by providing for the representation of [S]tate interests in Congress,
entrusts the maintenance of the federal balance to ‘the internal safeguards of the
political process’ ” (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
531 (1985)).
29 Id. at 871. But cf. id. at 868 (recognizing that the argument for a presidential
power to incorporate customary international law is “less forceful[ ]” than for a congressional power).
30 See id. at 872–73.
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Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain31 endorsed the judicial creation of
federal common law rights of action for damages for violations of
some norms of customary international law,32 they embraced and
elaborated on these earlier suggestions. Their post-Sosa article, written with Professor David Moore, endorses the propriety of reading
jurisdictional statutes under certain circumstances as authorization for
the incorporation of customary international law as federal law, and
expands upon their earlier acceptance of a presidential power to
incorporate customary international law as federal law.33
This Article offers a critique of the intermediate positions and, in
the process, explicates and defends the modern position. Critics of
the modern position often describe it as the claim that customary
international law has the force of federal law always and for all purposes. But this uncompromising conception of the modern position
is a phantom. Adherents of the modern position have always accepted
that not all of customary international law binds foreign states or the
federal Executive as a matter of U.S. domestic law. The heart of the
modern position is that customary international law binds State actors
and thus preempts State law applicable to State officials and private
parties. The basic case for the modern position relies on an inference
from the constitutional structure very similar to the one advanced by
Bellia and Clark: Violations of customary international law risk retaliation against the nation as a whole. Permitting States to violate it
allows States to externalize the costs of such violations, thus likely producing excessive violations.
Part I explicates and offers a preliminary defense of the modern
position. It sets forth the affirmative case for the modern position
based on constitutional structure, original intent, and pre- and postErie doctrine, responding to arguments put forward in the initial wave
of revisionist scholarship, but deferring to Part II responses to criticisms raised by scholars advancing intermediate positions. Part I
shows that the basic structural case for the modern position was well
understood by the Founders. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the revisionist view, the evidence of original intent and the pre-Erie
cases reflect two contending positions. The first is that the Constitution itself preempts State conduct that violates the state-to-state portion of the law of nations. The other is that customary international
31 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
32 See id. at 732.
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 919–24
(2007).
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law had the status of general common law. Before Erie, the general
common law was understood as different from either federal or State
law, but was closer in operation to modern-day federal law than to
modern-day State law. No one claimed that customary international
law had a status comparable to modern-day State law.
Part II examines the intermediate positions and concludes that
all but that of Bellia and Clark suffer from fundamental flaws. Ramsey’s concept of “nonpreemptive federal law” is another name for
State law. Thus, Ramsey’s approach would replicate one of the
problems that most concerned the Founders—the lack of federal judicial power to prevent or remedy violations of customary international
law by the States. Young’s proposal to employ choice-of-law rules to
determine the applicability of customary international law satisfies
Erie’s requirement that all law applied in this country’s courts be
either State or federal, but only because choice-of-law rules are themselves creatures of either State or federal law. To the extent that
Young would relegate the applicability of customary international law
to State choice-of-law rules, his proposal would present severe difficulties stemming from the indeterminacy and inappositeness of such
rules, and, like Ramsey’s approach, would reproduce the problem
that most concerned the Founders.34 Young’s approach would alleviate these problems by allowing for the use of federal choice-of-law
rules in some contexts, but he emphasizes that such rules would be
applicable very rarely. Aleinikoff’s approach would violate the one
principle that all agree Erie establishes: that the substantive law
applied in the State and federal courts must be the same. The intermediate position of Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore is problematic
because it would place inapposite limits on the judiciary’s ability to
enforce customary international law as federal law.
The intermediate approach proposed by Bellia and Clark is thoroughly convincing, but it is not really intermediate. Their structural
argument for according preemptive force to some customary interna34 Because the “intermediate” positions of Ramsey and Young turn out to be
quite close to the revisionist position, I include those authors among the revisionists
when I refer to the latter group (except when I distinguish revisionist scholars from
those who purport to espouse intermediate views). Cf. Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the
Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28, 28 (2007), http://
www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/young.pdf (“I consider myself at least a fellow
traveler [with the revisionists].”); Michael D. Ramsey, Customary International Law in
the Supreme Court, 1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 225,
253 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) (recognizing
that his position “resembles” the revisionist position and “is open to many of the same
objections,” including the objection that “it would allow deliberate [S]tate violations
or misinterpretations of customary international law to be unredressed”).
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tional law is basically the same as the strongest argument for the modern position. The flaw in their argument is that they do not take it far
enough. Their structural argument actually provides substantial support for most of the modern position.
Part III reconsiders the modern position in the light of the revisionists’ argument that the customary international law of today differs in important respects from the state-to-state branch of the law of
nations as known to the Founders and as it existed before Erie. The
revisionists’ concerns about the indeterminacy of customary international law and the loosening of the requirements for recognizing such
law have some validity and relevance, but these concerns can be adequately addressed by restricting the range of customary norms having
preemptive force to those that satisfy a heightened standard of clarity
and acceptance. The revisionists’ concerns about the new subjects
addressed by customary international law—in particular, the fact that
such law now addresses how a nation treats its own citizens—does not
warrant any additional restriction.
The final Part of the Article addresses a seldom-analyzed aspect of
the revisionist position—the claim that norms of customary international law that lack the force of preemptive federal law may be given
the force of State law through incorporation by State legislatures or
courts. I argue that, for straightforward reasons, the States lack the
power to make norms of customary international law applicable to foreign states or officials or federal officials. A State’s incorporation of
such norms against its own officials or against private parties would
pose a less obvious structural problem: because customary international law evolves through the accumulation of state practice and
opinio juris, State court decisions regarding the content of such law
could, in combination with the acts of other States and foreign states,
eventually result in the crystallization of norms of customary international law that the federal government does not support, or the erosion of norms that the federal government does support. State court
decisions regarding the content of customary international law thus
interfere with the federal executive branch’s recognized power to
speak for the United States at the international plane regarding the
content of such law. This structural problem can be addressed either
by denying the States the power to incorporate norms of customary
international law or by recognizing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
to review decisions of the State courts regarding the content of customary international law even when such law is relevant to the case
only because it has been incorporated as State law. I conclude that
the latter solution is preferable and that such review would be consistent with Article III.
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Before proceeding, a few explanations and clarifications are in
order. First, unlike much revisionist scholarship, my analysis will not
focus on litigation under the alien tort provision of the First Judiciary
Act. This provision, currently codified as § 1350 of Title 28, and
known variously as the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute, confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts over “any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”35 Although it lay dormant
for much of our history, the statute was invigorated in 1980 by the
Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,36 which held that
the provision conferred jurisdiction over a claim brought by a
Paraguayan citizen against a Paraguayan official based on torture that
occurred in Paraguay.37 Since then, § 1350 has served as the jurisdictional basis for much human rights litigation, most of it alleging violations of customary international law committed abroad by foreign
officials.38
Cases under § 1350 do not shed much light on the status of customary international law as federal law because a conclusion that customary international law is federal law is neither necessary nor
sufficient to resolve the issues that arise in such cases. Most of these
cases seek damages from the individual officials who committed the
violation, and the most contested legal issue in these cases has been
the source of the right of action for damages. A showing that customary international law is federal law is insufficient to establish a right of
action in the typical § 1350 case because international law generally
does not establish a right to recover damages against individuals who
violate international law. In general, international law applies to the
conduct of state actors, and, when violated, it typically places responsibility on the state, not the individual state official.39 In some circumstances, international law does impose individual responsibility, but
this is almost always in the form of criminal responsibility.40 Thus,
35 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
36 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
37 Id. at 878–79, 889.
38 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karad_ic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25
F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 207 (1987).
40 See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1037–45 (2009) (listing criminal sanctions against individuals, but not civil damages,
as a human rights compliance mechanism under international law). There is a sense
in which international law may be said to require that the victim be compensated. If
conduct of an individual attributable to the state has caused injury to a citizen of
another state, then the other state’s right to pursue a claim against the first state at
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when the question is the existence of a cause of action for damages,
the issue is not whether international law is to be accorded the force
of federal law, but, rather, whether international law is to be supplemented with a cause of action for damages under domestic law.41 A
conclusion that a cause of action for damages does not exist under
U.S. law for violation of a norm of customary international law does
not establish that the norm lacks the status of federal law any more
than the lack of a private right of action to enforce a federal statute42
means that the federal statute lacks the force of federal law.
Nor is it necessary to establish that customary international law has
the status of federal law in order to prevail in these cases. The Second
Circuit in Filartiga relied on the federal status of customary international law in finding § 1350’s grant of jurisdiction to be within the
scope of Article III.43 Since Article III does not authorize diversity
jurisdiction in suits between aliens, the court had to find that the
action “arose under” federal law. But § 1350 could be upheld under
Article III’s Arising Under Clause even if customary international law
were not considered federal law. First, federal jurisdiction would be
consistent with Article III if the cause of action were created by federal

the international plane is sometimes subject to the precondition that the individual
have sought and been denied remedies through procedures available in the organs of
the first state (including its courts). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 713 cmt. f. Thus, to avoid potential international responsibility, the offending
state is required to provide the individual with a remedy. But the remedy need not be
in the form of a damage judgment against the individual who inflicted the injury. For
example, a direct payment by the state to the injured party might suffice. See id. § 901
cmts. d, e; id. § 902 cmts. d–i. Thus, even if one understood international law to
require the offending state to provide to the victim the compensation that would avert
its international responsibility to the state of the victim’s nationality, it could not be
said that international law of its own force entitled the victim to damages from the the
individual whose actions gave rise to the violation. In any event, this theory for finding
a right of action for damages in international law would support a damage action only
for suits challenging conduct that would be attributable to the United States. The
conduct giving rise to the claim in Filartiga was not attributable to the United States.
41 But cf. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011) (arguing that, at the time of the enactment of § 1350, the law of nations required nations to remedy injuries caused by their
citizens to citizens of other nations and that, therefore, a U.S. citizen’s tortious injury
to an alien would have been a “tort . . . in violation of the law of nations”). Compare
the similar argument discussed supra note 40 that international law under certain
circumstances indirectly obligates persons who have injured an alien to compensate
the alien.
42 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
43 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
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statute or treaty or federal common law.44 Second, jurisdiction could
satisfy Article III even if the cause of action were not conferred by
federal law (for example, if it came from the law of the forum State or
of the state in which the conduct took place). The Supreme Court
interpreted Article III’s “arising under” provision very broadly in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States,45 which has been read to permit
grants of jurisdiction over cases in which there is even a remote possibility that an issue of federal law might arise.46 The possibility that an
issue of federal law will arise in a suit involving customary international law (even assuming that customary international law is not itself
federal)—for example, issues about the allocation of powers relating
to foreign relations47—is hardly remote.
It is true that the Court has distanced itself from this broad reading of Osborn,48 and scholars have challenged it.49 But § 1350 could
be upheld under narrower interpretations of Article III’s Arising
Under Clause even without recognizing a federal common law cause
of action. Professor Wechsler argued that Congress may confer jurisdiction under this clause over a category of cases if it has the power to
legislate substantively over that category, even without actually legislating substantively.50 This test is easily satisfied by § 1350, since Article I
gives Congress the power to legislate with respect to customary inter44 See American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). The Supreme Court
eventually held that the cause of action in cases within the scope of § 1350 comes
from federal common law. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004),
45 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 759–63 (1824).
46 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1983); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 481–82 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47 Bellia and Clark argue, and I agree, that the preemptive force of at least some
norms of customary international law derives from the constitutional allocation of
powers regarding foreign relations. See infra Part II.D. My point here is that, even if
this argument were rejected, the likelihood that a case involving customary international law will raise constitutional questions is enough to validate § 1350 under the
Osborn interpretation of Article III.
48 See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1989); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
492–93; see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 481–82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57
DUKE L.J. 263, 334–37 (2007); Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction,
Foreign Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1820 (2007).
50 See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25 (1948). For a defense of Wechsler’s reasoning,
see Carlos M. Vázquez, The Federal “Claim” in the District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden,
and Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1731 (2007).
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national law.51 Even more narrowly, Professor Mishkin has argued
that Congress may grant jurisdiction over all cases arising in an area of
the law in which the federal government has an “articulated and active
. . . policy.”52 This standard too is easily satisfied by § 1350.53
Although scholars have rejected even these narrower theories of protective jurisdiction,54 Supreme Court decisions upholding certain
grants of jurisdiction are hard to explain without resort to them,55 and
the Court itself has never rejected them.56 In short, even without a
federal cause of action, the Article III question would turn on the status of customary international law as federal law (a) only with respect
to a subset of § 1350 cases (those between aliens) and (b) only if the
Court were to reject a range of theories of Article III “arising under”
jurisdiction proffered by jurists of the caliber of John Marshall, Herbert Wechsler, and Paul Mishkin. The relevance of the status of customary international law to the Article III question in litigation under
§ 1350 thus has always had a distinctly hypothetical cast.
In sum, because the status of customary international law as federal law is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve the key issues in
cases under § 1350, a focus on this statute is unhelpful. I will focus
instead on cases that present the status issue more directly. Perhaps
the best test case is a claim under State law against an individual who
claims an immunity under international law. Some international law
immunities are now addressed by statute57 or treaty,58 but the immu-

51 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”).
52 Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 192 (1953).
53 See Carlos M. Vazquez, Comment, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria:
Federal Jurisdiction over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1057,
1081 (1982).
54 See Young, supra note 49, at 1779–81. But see Vázquez, supra note 50 (defending protective jurisdiction).
55 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 765–68 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing bankruptcy cases) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
56 Cf. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 460
(1957) (Burton, J., concurring) (endorsing protective jurisdiction).
57 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
58 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations arts. 29–40, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 41, 43,
53, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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nity of heads of state and foreign state officials is not.59 When an
immunity applies, international law itself requires domestic courts to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Customary international law does
all of the necessary work, and the only questions are whether international law has the status of domestic law, and, if so, whether it is federal or State law.60
Second, for related reasons, I shall not address what revisionists
regard as one of the key tenets of the modern position: that customary
international law is self-executing federal law for purposes of the federal courts’ “arising under” jurisdiction.61 The jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is itself always non-self-executing in the sense that
Congress must confer it by statute. As we have seen, under current
doctrine, the Arising Under Clause permits Congress to confer such
jurisdiction over cases involving customary international law even if
such law is not federal.62 Whether customary international law has
the status of federal law might determine whether a lower federal
court possesses jurisdiction under the current general federal question statute, but that statute would deny jurisdiction over many cases
implicating customary international law even if such law were deemed
federal,63 and it would authorize jurisdiction in certain circumstances
even if such law were not deemed federal.64 The more important
59 See Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or
Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 666–73
(2002).
60 Of course, as discussed below, the answers to these questions may be quite
complex. See infra text accompanying notes 195–205, 538–557.
61 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 858.
62 Bradley and Goldsmith recognize this possibility. See id. at 873 & n.354.
63 Since international law rarely establishes a remedy except against the state
itself, which will often be immune, customary international law will usually enter the
case as a defense, or as a basis for a particular construction of a State or federal statute. In such circumstances, federal jurisdiction cannot be based on the existence of
an issue of customary international law because of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–54 (1908).
64 For example, jurisdiction would exist if the cause of action were conferred by
federal statute, or by federal common law. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
732 (2004) (recognizing a federal common law cause of action for violation of some
norms of customary international law). The Court in Sosa denied that its holding
implied that § 1331 could support the creation of federal common law in the same
way that § 1350 can. See id. at 731 n.19. This does not mean, however, that jurisdiction under § 1331 would be lacking over the federal common law cause of action that
the Court recognized in Sosa. It is well established that § 1331 confers jurisdiction
over federal common law causes of action. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 100 (1972) (“We . . . conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded
upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”); 13D CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3563 (3d ed. 2008) (“[C]laims
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question is whether the Supreme Court may review the State courts’
interpretations of customary international law. But here, again, the
answer does not turn on Article III. The Supreme Court may be given
appellate jurisdiction over some cases involving customary international law under the diversity clauses of Article III,65 and perhaps over
all such cases under a protective jurisdiction interpretation of the
“arising under” clause, but that does not tell us whether the Court
may review and reverse a State court’s application of such law. The
latter question is governed by Article VI, not Article III. If customary
international law were purely a matter of State law, the federal courts
(including the Supreme Court) would presumably have to treat the
State courts’ interpretations of it as authoritative.66 My analysis
accordingly focuses on whether, and to what extent, federal law limits
State discretion to violate or depart from customary international law.
Third, unlike revisionists and defenders of the modern position
alike, I shall not refer to the modern position as the claim that customary international law has the status of federal common law, as I
think that that label is unhelpful and potentially misleading. Instead,
I shall describe the modern position as according to customary international law (or some subset thereof) the status of preemptive federal
law. The canonical definition of federal common law is found in Hart
& Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, which defines it as
based upon federal common law invoke federal-question jurisdiction under
[§ 1331].”). For the same reason, I disagree with scholars who have read Justice Souter’s opinion in Sosa as denying that customary international law is federal law for
purposes of § 1331. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 41, at 549; David J. Bederman, Law
of the Land, Law of the Sea: The Lost Link Between Customary International Law and General
Maritime Law, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 299, 345 (2010).
65 See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2003); Clark, supra note 24, at 1333–34.
66 Under current doctrine, the Supreme Court would be able to review a State
court’s application of State law to determine if it had “fair or substantial support,” but
only if the State court’s interpretation of such law was antecedent to the court’s denial
of a federal right. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 462–63. The general rule
barring Supreme Court review of State law reflects a constitutional recognition of the
State courts as the authoritative interpreters of their own laws. See, e.g., Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“This Court . . . repeatedly has held that [S]tate
courts are the ultimate expositors of [S]tate law, and that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances . . . .” (citations omitted)). The limited
exception for antecedent State law grounds is based on the Supremacy Clause and
ensures that the State courts are not manipulating their laws to defeat federal rights.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 462–63. But cf. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitutional Avoidance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1335 (2010) (arguing that Article III permits broader Supreme Court review of State
court judgments based on State law).
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“federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced directly by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands.”67 If customary international law were accorded
the status of federal law, then it would qualify as federal common law
under this definition because the content of its norms would not be
directly traceable to the Constitution or federal statutes or treaties.
But, as Hart and Wechsler’s successors recognize, federal common law
is not a unitary category.68 Norms might be accorded the force of
federal common law for different reasons, and the effect of norms
given that label may well differ. The concept of federal common law
is thus unhelpful in justifying the federal status of any given set of
norms. Use of the “federal common law” label in examining the status of customary international law invites unreflective and inappropriate application to customary international law of doctrine developed
for quite different sorts of “federal common law.” For example, Bradley, Goldsmith, Young, and others criticize the modern position as
inconsistent with the established notion that federal common law is
proper only if applied in an interstitial way and hews closely to legislatively articulated policy.69 But, while the application of such limits in
other areas may be warranted, these limits are inapposite to the structural constitutional rationale defended here for according preemptive
force to customary international law.
The term “federal common law” is also misleading in that it suggests a more creative role for the courts than the modern position
contemplates. The term “federal common law” evokes the role that
State courts are now understood to play in elaborating the common
law of their respective States—a creative process in which the substance of the law evolves based on the courts’ views of sound policy.
Revisionists’ frequent description of the modern position as contemplating “federal common lawmaking”70 suggests that courts applying
customary international law are similarly making the law up as they go
along. But that is not what the Restatement and its defenders envision.
International law contains its own rules about how to identify customary international law. Under these rules, the content of such law is a
result of the consistent practice of states performed out of a sense of

67 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 607.
68 See id. (noting the topic of federal common law “has a miscellaneous quality”).
69 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 902, 926; Ramsey, supra
note 17, at 558; Young, supra note 19, at 413–14.
70 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 857, 872 & n.352 (emphasis
added); Young, supra note 19, at 413 (emphasis added).
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legal obligation (opinio juris).71 The role of U.S. courts applying customary international law is to ascertain those norms based on state
practice and opinio juris, not to elaborate the norms on the basis of
their views of good policy.
Bradley and Goldsmith deride the claim that the courts would be
“finding” or “discovering” the norms of customary international law,
rather than “making” them, as hopelessly naı̈ve. “This argument,”
they say in rejecting a point by Professor Henkin similar to mine here,
“assumes a sharp distinction between law-interpretation and lawmaking that cannot survive even the mildest of legal realist critiques.”72
But the point is not that customary international law is highly determinate; the point is that the courts will be resolving the indeterminacies
by reference to the actions and statements of others, not their own
views of good policy. In fact, as Young reminds us, Erie itself calls for
such a process to be followed by the federal courts in applying State
law.73 As we do not regard the federal courts’ role in applying State

71 For a recent study on this topic by the International Law Association, see
COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) [hereinafter ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES], available at http://
www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30 (follow “Conference Report
London 2000” hyperlink).
72 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 855. They continue:
More importantly, it ignores the character of [customary international law]
lawmaking: [Customary international law] is often unwritten, the necessary
scope and appropriate sources of “state practice” are unsettled, and the
requirement that states follow customary norms from a “sense of legal obligation” is difficult to verify. Given what Professor Henkin himself refers to as
[customary international law]’s “soft, indeterminate character,” it makes no
sense to say that judges “discover” an objectively identifiable [customary
international law]. In fact, the process of identifying and applying [customary international law] is at least as subjective as the domestic common law
process. This is particularly true of the new [customary international law],
which is less tied than traditional [customary international law] to “objective” evidence of state practice.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND
VALUES 29 (1995)).
73 Additionally, as discussed in Part III, if the indeterminacy of customary international law were a concern, the problem could be addressed by according the force of
preemptive federal law only to norms of customary international law that satisfy a
higher standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance. The Court has taken this
approach in two discrete areas, see infra notes 184–204, 237–242 and accompanying
text, and it could defensibly extend it to other contexts, see infra notes 558-587 and
accompanying text.
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law as “lawmaking,” neither should we view their role in applying customary international law that way.74
Even if the norms themselves are not “made” by the courts that
apply them, one might say that the decision to accord customary international law the force of preemptive federal law is itself an act of judicial lawmaking. But, as explained by Bellia and Clark, and elaborated
herein, the preemptive force of (at least some) customary international law can be understood as a valid implication from the constitutional structure.75 Revisionists might reject the inference on the
merits, but presumably they do not deny that inference from structure
is a valid approach to constitutional interpretation.76 If the decision
to accord norms of international law the status of federal law were
made at retail, as Young proposes,77 the resulting regime would in fact
resemble one of judicial lawmaking. In theory, a retail approach
could turn on the factors made relevant by the structural approach
defended here, such as the danger of interference with the political
branches’ conduct of foreign relations likely to result from the States’
violation of particular norms. But, because courts lack the relevant
norm-specific information and expertise, a retail approach would
likely degenerate into ad hoc decisionmaking reflecting the particular
judges’ views of the merits of particular norms.78 Concerns about
74 This is not to deny that indeterminacy of norms leaves judges with wider interpretive discretion. Cf. infra Part III (discussing possible responses to increased indeterminacy of customary international law).
75 Some defenders of the modern position advance originalist arguments regarding the meaning of the term “laws of the United States” in Article III and/or Article
VI. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of
Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2005) (“[V]arious Founders,
Supreme Court Justices, and other federal judges have long recognized more generally that . . . the phrase ‘laws of the United States,’ encompasses the law of nations or
what we term ‘customary international law.’ ”). I do not pursue those arguments here.
Although I argue below that the constitutional text does not establish the revisionist
position, see infra text accompanying notes 324–342, I also do not think that the text
alone clinches the modern position, given the possibility that some Founders may
have understood the law of nations to have the status of general common law. I do,
however, advance an originalist argument regarding the constitutional structure,
which I think provides stronger support for the modern position. See infra text
accompanying notes 117, 341–352 (discussing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796) and Rutgers v. Waddington). And structural arguments are necessary to support
the argument that, to the extent that customary international law was understood as
pre-Erie general common law, it should now be regarded as preemptive federal law.
76 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 7–32 (1969).
77 See Young, supra note 34, at 29–30.
78 Note that we are assuming here that the norm exists under international law
and that the court is deciding whether to accord it the status of U.S. law.
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judicial lawmaking thus cut in favor of an approach that reads the
Constitution as according federal status to customary international law
as a whole, or to some substantial subset determined by generally
applicable standards, such as the degree of clarity or the breadth of its
acceptance as a norm of customary international law. That, in any
event, is the version of the modern position that I shall defend here.
Under such a scheme, the norms themselves are not made by the
courts,79 and the determination whether the norms have the force of
federal law is no more an act of judicial lawmaking than is the resolution of any other constitutional question on structural grounds.80
Finally, even though the status of customary international law is a
constitutional question in important respects, it is proper to place a
heavy burden of persuasion on those seeking to depart from the “wellentrenched”81 modern position. It is true that the Supreme Court
applies a weaker version of stare decisis to constitutional questions.82
But the reason for the Court’s greater (though still limited83) willingness to reject settled law on constitutional questions is that the courts’
errors cannot be corrected by Congress.84 For stare decisis purposes,
the status of customary international law should be treated as a sub79 As discussed in Part IV, decisions of domestic courts interpreting customary
international law do, over time and in conjunction with the acts of many others, contribute to the formation of new rules or the dissolution of old rules of customary
international law. But this phenomenon hardly rises to the level of “lawmaking” by
those courts. In any event, it is not the sort of lawmaking that concerns the
revisionists.
80 For related reasons, I quibble with the locution of some revisionists and
defenders of the modern position who say that, under the modern position, the courts
incorporate customary international law as U.S. law, either at retail or wholesale. See,
e.g., Koh, supra note 16, at 1827. As I defend the modern position here, the courts do
not incorporate such norms into U.S. law; rather, they read the Constitution as
according such norms (or some subset thereof) the force of preemptive federal law.
Again, I do not suggest that the act of constitutional interpretation is mechanical, but
I do think it is useful to distinguish the courts’ exercise of judgment from their exercise of will.
81 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 816.
82 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Christopher P. Banks, The
Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 263 tbl.1 (1992) (showing that 60.5 percent of overturned precedent from
1789 to 1991 was constitutional and 27 percent statutory); David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183, 220–21 (2010).
83 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 860–61
(1992).
84 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command . . .
particularly . . . in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through
legislative action is practically impossible.’ ” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
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constitutional issue. Both the modern and the revisionist positions
are merely default rules. With limited exceptions, whichever rule
were adopted would be subject to revision, either at retail or wholesale, by statute or treaty or even sometimes by the Executive alone.85
Since the issue is within the control of the federal political branches,
the stronger version of stare decisis that is applied to statutory issues is
the pertinent one.86
85 One possible exception would be where the federal government’s power to act
turns on customary international law, as may be the case when Congress legislates
under the Offenses Clause. Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power
to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1808 (2009) (arguing that the
Offenses Clause empowers Congress to enact its own interpretation of international
law as a matter of federal law), with Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 295, 299 & n.27
(2010) (arguing that customary international law functions as a limit on Congress’s
power to legislate pursuant to the Offenses Clause). A possible exception to Congress’s power to repeal customary international law would be where such repeal
would constitute an unconstitutional interference with the President’s exclusive powers. See Lewis Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author) (arguing on this ground that
Congress would lack the power to repeal the customary international law of head-ofstate immunity).
86 I have made this point with respect to the related doctrine relating to the dormant foreign affairs power. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1259, 1308 (2001) [hereinafter Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?]. Because Congress retains control, the question discussed herein might be regarded as one of constitutional common law, rather than of constitutional law proper. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975); see
also Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967).
A brief word on the Court’s recent decision in Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008), is also warranted. The Court in Medellı́n found that the treaty before it was
not self-executing and accordingly did not preempt an inconsistent State law. Exactly
why the Court found that the treaty was not self-executing has been the subject of
much debate. According to some commentators, the Court found that the treaty
imposed a firm obligation on the United States but was non-self-executing because it
did not clearly and affirmatively state that it was intended to have the force of domestic law. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Medellı́n’s Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 609 (2008). If this is what the Court held,
then Medellı́n may be thought to have rejected the modern position by implication. If
a treaty that imposes a firm international obligation does not preempt inconsistent
State law unless it also affirmatively provides that it has the force of domestic law, even
though the Constitution declares treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S.
CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, then it may follow that customary international law does not
preempt State law in the absence of an act of domestic lawmaking giving it preemptive effect. This reading of Medellı́n, however, is highly contested. Even scholars who
agree with the Court’s holding do not read Medellı́n to have held that treaties that are
silent as to their domestic effect are for that reason alone non-self-executing. See Cur-
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Critics of the modern position describe it as the claim that “customary international law is always federal law,”87 or that “all of [customary international law], ‘whatever [it] requires,’ is automatically
incorporated wholesale into post-Erie federal common law.”88 As discussed more fully below, the modern position has never been so
uncompromising.89 Specifically, the modern position has never maintained that all of customary international law is federal law insofar as it
is sought to be applied to invalidate the acts of foreign states or of the
federal government. Adherents of the modern position take varying
positions regarding the circumstances in which customary international law is federal law binding on such actors. What unites them is
the claim that customary international law is binding upon the States
and that State laws and conduct that would violate customary international law are thus invalid. The version of the modern position that I
defend here is that customary international law preempts State law
insofar as it imposes obligations on State officials and private parties.
Insofar as it is preemptive federal law, moreover, the lower federal
courts may be given jurisdiction over cases “arising under” it, and the

tis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 178–79; David
H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV.
L. REV. F. 32, 46–47 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/moore.
pdf; Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 118, 123 (2009;
see also John T. Parry, Response, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 65 (2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/
vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso65.pdf (noting that very few defenders of Medellı́n
adopt the broad reading noted above). I have offered two alternative readings of
Medellı́n. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 662–63 (2008) (arguing that
Medellı́n is best read to have interpreted the relevant treaty as not imposing a firm
obligation under international law) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land];
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 572 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Less than Zero?] (arguing that Medellı́n could be read to hold that treaties
are non-self-executing only if they affirmatively provide that they are subject to legislative implementation). Either reading is consistent with the modern position. Rather
than read Medellı́n as ruling out the modern position, I regard the authorities cited in
this Article for treating customary international law as preemptive of State law as additional reasons for rejecting the broad reading of Medellı́n described above.
87 Young, supra note 19, at 437.
88 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 902 (second alteration in original) (quoting Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 324).
89 See infra text accompanying notes 206–233.
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Supreme Court may be given jurisdiction to review State court applications and interpretations of it.90
A. The Basic Case for the Modern Position
The canonical expression of the modern position is the statement
in The Paquete Habana91 that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”92 Revisionists dismiss this and many similar statements by the Supreme Court in its
many cases applying customary international law93 as merely reflecting
a pre-Erie consensus that customary international law was part of the
general common law. Since Erie overthrew the concept of general
common law, this status is no longer available. Like the rest of the
common law, they contend, customary international law should now
be regarded as, at best, State law.
This subpart sets forth the basic case for treating customary international law, post-Erie, as preemptive of State law. I respond here to
some of the arguments advanced by the first wave of revisionists, but I
defer to Part II my responses to the arguments of the proponents of
the intermediate positions. In this Part, I defend the broad view that
all of customary international law is binding on State actors as the
better modern translation of the constitutional structure as understood by the Founders, as well as of pre-Erie doctrine. In Part III, I
consider whether recent developments in the nature or content of
customary international law justify a shift in our approach to such law.
90 The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is conferred directly by Article III of the
Constitution, but Congress has the power to make “exceptions and regulations” with
respect to such jurisdiction, and Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 has been
interpreted to exclude from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction any cases not
authorized by that section. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512–13 (1868).
“The principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of
all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus established, it was an almost necessary consequence that acts of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction,
should come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making
exceptions to the constitutional grant of it.” Id. at 513.
91 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
92 Id. at 700.
93 See generally David J. Bederman, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court,
1861–1900, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 34, at 89;
William S. Dodge, Customary International Law in the Supreme Court, 1946–2000, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 34, at 353; Ramsey, supra
note 34.
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1. Constitutional Structure and Original Intent
The structural reason for treating customary international law as
federal law is straightforward. Violations of international law by the
States are attributable to the nation as a whole.94 Such violations thus
justify nations harmed by them to take retaliatory action against the
United States as a whole. At the time of the Founding, retaliation
could take the form of military action.95 Today, military action in
response to violations of international law is itself a violation of international law, except for defensive action in response to another
nation’s unlawful use of force or military action taken pursuant to
authorization by the U.N. Security Council or, perhaps, in other limited circumstances.96 Still, nations may respond to another nation’s
violation of international law by taking countermeasures not involving
the use of force.97 Countermeasures can and usually will be directed
at the nation as a whole, or States other than the one that committed
the violation.98 In addition to risking countermeasures against the
nation, a State’s violation of international law can be expected to produce international friction and an unfriendly attitude toward the
United States on the part of injured or otherwise offended nations,
which in turn can be expected to complicate the federal government’s
efforts to achieve the nation’s foreign relations goals.
While the costs of a State’s violations of customary international
law will be borne by the nation as a whole, the benefits will usually be
enjoyed by that State alone. Were States free to violate international
law, therefore, one would expect excessive violations, as the States
would be able to externalize the costs of the violations to their sister
States. To put it differently, the rest of the nation would be subsidizing individual States’ decisions to violate international law. The
structural reason for denying States the power to violate customary
international law is well captured in Hamilton’s statement that “the

94 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
art. 4(1) & cmt. 9, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter Responsibility of States], reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
95 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 6.
96 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
97 Responsibility of States, supra note 94, art. 22 & cmt.1.
98 Cf. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223,
1261–62 (1999) (arguing that foreign states now sometimes retaliate against the specific State that committed the violation).
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peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART.”99
A recent episode concerning the execution of Angel Breard illustrates the structural problem.100 Breard was a Paraguayan national
who was convicted of attempted rape and murder in Virginia and sentenced to death.101 Paraguay initiated proceedings against the United
States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that
Breard’s execution would violate the United States’ obligations under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.102 The ICJ, in turn,
ordered that Breard’s execution be stayed pending its resolution of
Paraguay’s claims.103 While Breard and Paraguay pursued relief in the
U.S. courts, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote a letter to
Virginia Governor James Gilmore urging him to stay the execution.104
Albright told Gilmore that compliance with the ICJ’s order was important to the nation’s foreign relations and to the safety of American
citizens abroad whose rights depended on the Vienna Convention.105
In response, the Governor issued a statement denying the Secretary of
State’s request because, “[a]s Governor of Virginia my first duty is to
ensure that those who reside within [Virginia’s] borders . . . may conduct their lives free from the fear of crime.”106 The U.S. courts eventually denied relief on dubious grounds107 and Breard was executed
in defiance of the ICJ’s order.108 Governor Gilmore behaved perfectly
rationally. He was elected by the citizens of Virginia, not the citizens
of New York or California or the forty-seven other States whose
residents may have been traveling abroad and whose interests the Secretary of State believed would be harmed by Gilmore’s defiance of the

99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
100 This illustration involves obligations under treaties rather than customary
international law, but the structural problem is the same in the two contexts.
101 Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
666, 666 (1998).
102 Id. at 669.
103 Id. at 671.
104 Id. at 671–72.
105 Id. at 684.
106 Id. at 674 (quoting Gov. Gilmore).
107 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam); see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 51 (1998).
108 Id. at 6.
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ICJ. The structural problem with leaving the interests of the rest of
the nation in Gilmore’s hands requires no elaboration.109
The Founders recognized this structural problem. The inability
of the federal government to prevent or remedy State violations of the
law of nations during the period of the Articles of Confederation was
cited at the Convention as an important reason for adopting a new
constitution.110 Such violations during the period of the Articles of
Confederation troubled the Founders because they complicated the
national government’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals and,
indeed, threatened to plunge the nation into destructive wars.111 The
Founders were virtually unanimous in the view that the power over
international law should be given to the federal government.
Revisionists do not deny this, but they argue that the constitutional text shows that the Founders’ solution to the problem, insofar
as customary international law was concerned, was to give the power
to require compliance with such law to the lawmakers, who were
empowered to “define and punish offenses against the law of
nations,”112 and the treaty-makers, who were given the power to codify
norms of the law of nations in self-executing treaties.113 The Founders’ failure to include the law of nations in the Supremacy Clause,
however, shows that they did not regard such law as self-executing federal law.114 Thus, the revisionists claim, the States remain free to violate such law in the absence of laws or treaties providing otherwise.
I consider the constitutional text’s conformity with the modern
position in Part II, as Ramsey advances the textual arguments most
forcefully, and I conclude that the text neither establishes nor rebuts
109 On why the Supreme Court’s decision in the Breard case deserves little, if any,
weight as precedent, see id. at 66–68.
110 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (“[Edmund Randolph] then proceeded to enumerate the defects:
. . . that particular [S]tates might by their conduct provoke war without controul
. . . .”); id. at 24–25 (“[Randolph] observed that . . . [i]f a state acts against a foreign
power contrary to the laws of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot
punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty. . . . It therefore cannot prevent a war.”); JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES,
(1787) reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 35, 35–36 (Ralph Ketcham
ed., 2006).
111 See Stephens, supra note 16, at 402–03, 403 n.44.
112 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 856; see RAMSEY, supra note 17,
at 348–55.
113 See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 347–48; Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note
9, at 819–20.
114 See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 348–55; Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy,
supra note 9, at 321.
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the modern position.115 Here, I merely note that treating the law of
nations as non-self-executing presents its own structural problem, a
problem emanating from another feature of our constitutional system
that the revisionists themselves often invoke in objecting to federal
common law. In order to protect the States from having their law
preempted too casually, the Constitution imposes daunting requirements for the enactment of federal law.116 Lawmaking requires the
agreement of majorities of two differently constituted houses of the
legislature plus the agreement of a third independently elected official (the President), or, if the President does not agree, a two-thirds
vote of the two legislative bodies. Treaty-making requires the agreement of the President and two-thirds of one of the houses of the legislature. These requirements were imposed to place a heavy weight on
the scales in favor of the legal status quo. Given the Founders’ recognition of the clear structural problem that would result if States were
free to violate international law, it would be surprising if they
regarded the successful completion of the legislative or treaty-making
gauntlet as a predicate for federal enforcement of the law of nations
against the States.
And, in fact, the evidence shows that the Founders did not regard
such enforcement to be subject to affirmative incorporation of customary international law in a statute or treaty. Some Founders understood that national control over compliance with international law was
a necessary implication of the constitutional structure. Indeed, even
before the adoption of the Constitution, State courts expressed the
view that, in any federal system, the States must lack the power to violate international law. For example, in Rutgers v. Waddington, decided
during the period of the Articles of Confederation, the Mayor’s Court
of New York wrote that it would be “contrary to the very nature of the
[U.S.] confederacy” for a single state like New York “to abrogate or
alter one of the known laws or usages of nations.”117
115 See infra notes 323–40 and accompanying text.
116 For the propositions in this paragraph, see Clark, supra note 24, and discussion
infra note 474 and accompanying text. Clark argues that the procedural obstacles to
federal lawmaking were designed to protect the States from having their law preempted. Once State law has been preempted by federal law, however, the daunting
requirements for enacting federal legislation actually make it difficult to devolve
power back to the States. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the daunting requirements for enacting federal legislation operate to protect the status quo. See Carlos
Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1601 (2008). In the beginning, however, the status quo was that State law (or
general common law) governed most legal matters.
117 SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR’S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 1674–1784, at 316
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1935).
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It is true that some statements of the Founders are consistent with
a belief that the law of nations was part of the common law.118 But
these statements do not support the claim that the Founders viewed
customary international law as anything resembling modern-day State
law. First, at the time of the Founding, the law of nations was thought
to include not just the law addressing the mutual rights and obligations of states, but also the law merchant and general commercial
law.119 Only the state-to-state branch of the law of nations included
rules whose violation justified resort to war or other countermeasures.120 Thus, only this subset of the law of nations implicated the
structural rationale for treating customary international law as preemptive of State law. The other branches of the law of nations, by
contrast, were understood to be subject to local variation.121 They
correspond to modern-day conflict of laws or simply domestic law.
Adherents of the modern position do not claim that the modern-day
counterparts of the latter branches of the law of nations have the
force of preemptive federal law. In referring to the law of nations
generally as part of the common law, the Founders likely did not
mean to deny that a subset of it was preemptive of State law for structural constitutional reasons.
Second, as recounted by Bellia and Clark, in the early days of the
Republic, it was widely believed that the common law had been incorporated wholesale as national law.122 Although this position was ultimately rejected,123 the fact that it was widely held shows that at least
some Founders who regarded the law of nations as common law
viewed it as federal law.
Third, even if some Founders regarded all of the law of nations as
having common law status and did not regard the common law as
federal law, it does not follow that they understood the status of the
118 Attorney General Randolph stated, when deciding whether the arrest of a public minister’s servant could be punished under common law, that the law of nations
was incorporated into the “law of the land.” 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 27 (1792). In Henfield’s
Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360), Justice James Wilson wrote that
“though there has been no exercise of the power conferred upon congress by the
constitution ‘to define and punish offences against the laws of nations,’ the federal
judiciary has jurisdiction of an offence against the laws of nations, and may proceed to
punish the offender according to the forms of the common law.” Id. at 1120 n.6. For
other statements by the Founders to this effect, see Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of
Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 825–27 (1989).
119 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 19–20.
120 See id. at 11.
121 See id. at 20–22.
122 See id. at 46–48.
123 See id. at 55–56.
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law of nations as anything like modern-day State law. The characteristics of the general law of the early Republic were very different from
those of today’s State law. “[I]n early nineteenth century usage, ‘common law’ was a general common law shared by the American states
rather than a local common law of a particular state.”124 Before Erie,
the federal courts “exercised their independent judgment on what
that law required.”125 Thus, by giving the federal courts constitutional
and statutory jurisdiction over the types of cases most likely to raise
issues under the law of nations,126 even Founders who believed that
the law of nations merely had the status of the common law were able
to give effect to their “clear[ ] inten[t] that customary international
law should have application in our courts,”127 as well as their “welldocumented desire to ensure that [S]tates complied with international law.”128 By contrast, federal courts today must follow the State
courts’ decisions regarding what State law requires.
2. Pre-Erie Doctrine
Revisionists contend that, before Erie, customary international
law was understood to have the status of Swift-era general law. As
such, States were understood to have the power to depart from such
law, and thus to place the United States in breach of it, and the
Supreme Court lacked the power to review State court interpretations
and applications of it.129 But the cases cited by the revisionists do not
establish that States were thought to be free to violate international
law, and they are at best equivocal regarding the availability of
Supreme Court review. Moreover, as Bellia and Clark have shown,
there were also cases during this era that articulated an allocation-ofpowers rationale for treating a subset of the law of nations as preemptive federal law. As discussed in subpart II.D, this subset of the law of
nations appears to have comprised the state-to-state branch of the law
of nations, which is what we regard as customary international law
today. Even some of the cases cited by revisionists as denying the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review State court applications of customary international law recognize that such law was nevertheless
binding on the States. Revisionists make much of the absence of cases
124
1789:
125
126
127
128
129

William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1515 n.9 (1984).
Id. at 1515.
Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 6.
Young, supra note 19, at 390.
Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 883.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 824.
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holding State laws invalid on the ground that they violate customary
international law,130 but it is equally noteworthy that there appear to
be no cases upholding the States’ ability to depart from such law, and
much dicta denying their power to do so.
Furthermore, even if the pre-Erie cases did regard customary
international law as Swift-era general common law, the general common law was very different from today’s State law. The pre-Erie
regime of general common law, in operation, resembled present-day
federal law more than present-day State law. To put the matter most
favorably to the revisionist position, pre-Erie doctrine reflected two
contending positions regarding the state-to-state branch of the law of
nations—some believed it to be preemptive federal law and others
believed it to be part of the general law. If the latter category is no
longer available, then pre-Erie doctrine supports a post-Erie status of
customary international law as federal law, not a State law status that
had never been in play.
a. State Authority to Depart from Customary International
Law
Bradley and Goldsmith cite several early cases involving the
immunities of foreign officials as establishing that it was then understood that “one consequence of [customary international law]’s status
as general common law was that a [S]tate of the Union had the ability,
in the absence of a constitutional provision or federal enactment to
the contrary, to violate international law and thereby implicate the
international responsibility of the United States.”131 But the cases do
not establish that the States were understood to have the power to
depart from customary international law.
The “most notorious . . . example”132 that they discuss was New
York’s prosecution of a British national, Alexander McLeod, in connection with the destruction of the American steamer, The Caroline.
The British government claimed that McLeod was entitled to immunity from prosecution under international law.133 Bradley and Goldsmith assert that “Secretary of State Daniel Webster disclaimed the
constitutional power to release McLeod but accepted responsibility
for any violation of the law of nations.”134 But, in fact, Webster only
130
131
132
133
134
Orders

See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 352; Young, supra note 19, at 383.
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 825.
Id. at 825 n.56.
Id.
Id. (citing David J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior
and the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515, 515–20 (1992)).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

1524

unknown

Seq: 30

notre dame law review

4-OCT-11

12:26

[vol. 86:4

denied that the Executive had the power to release McLeod. Webster
maintained that the State courts would apply the law of nations and
that, if they misapplied it, review would be available in the Supreme
Court.135 When McLeod sought habeas relief in the New York courts,
the court did apply the law of nations, but found McLeod not to be
entitled to immunity and denied him habeas relief.136 McLeod was
then advised to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, but he declined to
do so because of the delay involved.137 Instead, he submitted to a jury
trial and was acquitted.
The other cases cited by Bradley and Goldsmith for the proposition that States were understood to have the power to depart from
customary international law are similarly consistent with the obligation of State courts to apply such law and the power of the Supreme
Court to review State court applications of such law.138 These exam135 See Bederman, supra note 134, at 520 (citing Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr.
Crittenden (Mar. 15, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS
1840–1841, at 1139, 1141–42 (London, Ridgway & Sons 1857)); see also Caperton v.
Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 225–26 (1871) (argument of counsel for plaintiff in
error) (“That the understanding of the administration and of well-informed persons
at the time [regarding the McLeod case] was, that this, the Supreme Court of the
United States, had jurisdiction of the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, is
clear from a notice of the trial of McLeod in the National Intelligencer of May 22d,
1841. The editors alluding to this trial there say: ‘Whatever the decision, whether for
releasing or remanding the prisoner, an appeal will probably be taken to the Court of
Errors, from which a further appeal lies, in cases of this nature, to the Supreme Court
of the United States.’ Mr. Choate, in a speech delivered on the 11th of June, 1841, in
the United States Senate, maintains the same position. He says: ‘The clear course of
the government, therefore, was to do what it did, to have McLeod’s case fairly tried,
and if needful, to have his case brought into the National tribunals.’ ” (footnote omitted) (citing NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, June 17, 1841)); cf. infra note 164 (addressing the
response of counsel for defendant in error in Caperton). The Supreme Court in
Caperton did not reach the issue.
136 See Bederman, supra note 134, at 521–26.
137 See id. at 526; R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L.
82, 95 (1938).
138 Bradley and Goldsmith cite the cases of General Collot and Don Joseph de
Cabrera, as recounted by Bederman, supra note 134, at 526–27. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 825 n.56. The case of General Collot establishes only
that the Executive cannot set a State prisoner free. See Bederman, supra note 134, at
526. Like McLeod, Collot was able to raise his defense under the law of nations in the
State courts and prevailed without the need for Supreme Court review. Id. Don
Joseph de Cabrera was denied federal habeas relief on the ground that no statute
authorized such relief for persons held in the custody of the States, id. at 527, a holding with no implications for the modern position, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 93–94, 97–98 (1807). Nor can one draw any relevant inferences from
cases in which States “failed to prosecute the perpetrators of mob violence” even
though prosecution was allegedly required by customary international law. Bradley &
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ples do show that the federal government was not given unlimited
power to force States to comply with customary international law. But
adherents of the modern position do not contend that the federal
Executive may unilaterally release a State prisoner in order to comply
with customary international law,139 or that a lower federal court may
grant habeas relief to State prisoners without statutory authorization.140 Adherents of the modern position maintain, and revisionists
deny, that customary international law is binding on State actors and
reviewable in the Supreme Court. The cases cited by Bradley and
Goldsmith are, if anything, more supportive of the modern position
than of the revisionist position.
b. Supreme Court Review of Customary International Law
Revisionists also maintain that, before Erie, the law was clear that
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review State court decisions
regarding the law of nations because such law was regarded as
nonfederal law. But, as suggested by the McLeod incident just discussed, the law on this point does not support the revisionists as
clearly as they contend. In fact, the cases are at best equivocal and,
indeed, contain support for the view that customary international law
is binding on the States. The cases as a whole show, at most, that
there were two contending positions during this era: that the state-toGoldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 825. Indeed, the federal courts lack the power to
order the States to prosecute individuals even when the failure to prosecute violates
the Constitution. Cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 & n.6 (1973) (citing
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973)) (finding a lack of standing for a private citizen
to have criminal law enforced). Without such prosecutions there would of course be
no case for the Supreme Court to review.
139 For an argument that a treaty should be construed to grant the President the
power to order the stay of an execution of a State prisoner when the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) orders such a stay as a provisional measure, see Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional
Measures, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 683 (1998). See also Vázquez, Less than Zero?, supra note
86, at 564–65 (discussing the President’s authority to require compliance with a final
judgment of the ICJ). But see Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527 (2008) (holding
that the President lacked power to order Texas to comply with ICJ final judgment).
140 See Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93–94. But cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 744–45 (2008) (finding congressional preclusion of habeas jurisdiction for persons held in executive detention unconstitutional). After the McLeod incident, Congress gave the lower federal courts the power to grant habeas relief to persons
restrained of their liberty by federal or State officials in violation of the law of nations.
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(4) (2006)). See generally Bederman, supra note 134, at 527–31 (presenting
a history of the grant and the controversies behind it).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

1526

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

4-OCT-11

12:26

[vol. 86:4

state branch of customary international law had the force of preemptive federal law and that it had the status of general common law.
Of the five cases typically cited for the proposition that State
court interpretations of customary international law were understood
not to be reviewable by the Supreme Court,141 Huntington v. Attrill142
is inapposite because it involved the law merchant.143 Although the
law merchant was once considered a branch of the law of nations, it
differed from the state-to-state branch of the law of nations in that it
was recognized to be subject to local variation.144 Today, the law
merchant, or general commercial law, is not regarded as a part of customary international law. Adherents of the modern position do not
contend that this law is preemptive of State law.
A second case cited by revisionists as establishing the lack of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over customary international
law, Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico,145 is inapposite because it
involved an entirely distinct question. The issue in Oliver American
Trading was whether the district court had properly certified a question of foreign sovereign immunity for direct review by the Supreme
Court. Section 238 of the Judicial Code authorized the direct review
by writ of error of questions of jurisdiction,146 which the Court construed to authorize review of “the question of jurisdiction of the district court as a federal court.”147 Although the Court did describe the
immunity question as one of “general law,” its decision was not based
on the view that a denial of this immunity by the State courts would
not be reviewable in the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court held that
the certificate was not proper because the district court’s jurisdiction
141 The five cases discussed here are the ones cited by Bradley and Goldsmith. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 9, at 331 & n.64; Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 824 & n.48; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note
33, at 913 & n.232; see also Ku, State Courts, supra note 16, at 277 n.52; Ku & Yoo, supra
note 16, at 202–03 & nn.182–84.
142 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
143 See id. at 673–74; see also Roth v. Ehman, 107 U.S. 319, 319 (1883) (granting
motion to dismiss because the Court had no jurisdiction to review a State court ruling
on the validity of a foreign marriage), cited in Attrill, 146 U.S. at 683.
144 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 20–22.
145 264 U.S. 440 (1924).
146 Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 238, 36 Stat. 1087, 1157, amended
by Act of Jan. 28, 1915, Pub. L. No. 63-241, § 2, 38 Stat. 803, 804 (“Appeals and writs of
error may be taken from the district courts . . . direct to the Supreme Court in the
following cases: In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue, in which
case the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from
the court below for decision . . . .”).
147 Oliver Am. Trading Co., 264 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
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as a federal court was not based on the presence of the question of
immunity. Federal jurisdiction in the case was based on diversity of
citizenship.148 According to the Supreme Court, the sovereign immunity question did not concern the federal court’s jurisdiction as a federal court, but was a question “of general law applicable alike to
actions brought in other tribunals.”149 Oliver American Trading thus
held that jurisdiction was lacking because federal jurisdiction was not
premised on Mexico’s sovereign immunity defense, not because the
sovereign immunity defense did not arise under federal law.150 In this
light, the most relevant point of Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the
Court is one that cuts in favor of the modern position—namely, its
recognition that the immunity question was “applicable as fully to suits
in the [S]tate courts as to those prosecuted in the courts of the United
States.”151

148 See Transcript of Record at 5–6, Oliver Am. Trading Co., 264 U.S. 440 (No. 662)
(Removal Petition) (noting that the amount in dispute exceeds $3000 and that the
defendant is an alien and a nonresident of New York and the plaintiff is a resident of
Delaware); id. at 78 (Opinion Dismissing for Lack of Jurisdiction) (“On November 11,
1922 the Mexican Government . . . and the National Railways of Mexico (Government
Administration) . . . removed the action to this court, it being alleged that the suit was
between plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, and aliens, to wit: The Government of the
United States of Mexico, a sovereign State, and National Railways of Mexico, a corporation organized under the laws of that country.”).
149 Oliver Am. Trading Co., 264 U.S. at 442. The Court may have regarded foreign
sovereign immunity as an immunity from jurisdiction over the person of the foreign
state, cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002) (arguing that sovereign immunity bears on personal jurisdiction), or it may have regarded it as an immunity from liability, cf. Vázquez, supra
note 53, at 1084 n.132 (arguing that foreign sovereign immunity is in part an immunity from liability). When it enacted the FSIA in 1976, Congress made the absence of
sovereign immunity a condition of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts
over suits against foreign states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006).
150 Had Mexico sought to remove on the ground that its sovereign immunity
defense presented a federal question, its petition would have run afoul of the wellpleaded complaint rule. See supra note 63.
151 Oliver Am. Trading Co., 264 U.S. at 443. The subsequent decision in Transportes
Maritimos do Estado v. Almeida, 265 U.S. 104 (1924), cited by Weisburd for the proposition that the question of immunity was not regarded as a federal question subject to
review in the federal courts, see Weisburd, supra note 18, at 40, actually confirms that
Oliver American Trading held merely that “the claim of sovereign immunity does not
present a question of federal jurisdiction within the meaning of § 238,” Almeida, 265
U.S. at 105 (emphasis added). The Court in Almeida dismissed the writ of error on
the same ground. Id.; see also id. (distinguishing other cases that did involve the
“question . . . of the jurisdiction of the court as a federal court”).
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The third case relied upon by revisionists, Wulfsohn v. Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic,152 is a brief memorandum decision
that raises more questions than it answers. The State court of appeals
in Wulfsohn had dismissed claims against the Soviet Union on the
ground of sovereign immunity.153 The plaintiff in error appealed to
the Supreme Court raising constitutional objections, namely, that the
New York court’s decision according immunity to an unrecognized
government contravened the Executive’s exclusive power over recognition of foreign sovereigns and that the dismissal of the suit was a
taking of the plaintiff’s property without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 The plaintiff in error did not
argue that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction because the
question of sovereign immunity was one of federal law. The statute
governing writs of error to the Supreme Court, Section 25 of the First
Judiciary Act, extended jurisdiction (in relevant part) only to cases
“where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the
constitution, or any treaty or statute of or commission held or authority exercised under the United States” and the decision is against the
party claiming such right, title, privilege, or immunity.155 Because the State
court’s decision was in favor of the claimed right to immunity, the
Supreme Court would have lacked jurisdiction by writ of error
whether or not the defendant’s right to sovereign immunity had been
regarded as a matter of federal law. The Supreme Court summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.156 The Court did not explain why it
believed it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff in error’s constitutional claims. Presumably the Court agreed with the defendant in
error’s argument that the State court decision rested on independent
and adequate state grounds.157 It is true that the defendant in error
152 266 U.S. 580 (1924) (per curiam), cited in Ku, State Courts, supra note 16, at
318–19, 335 & n.338, and Weisburd, supra note 18, at 39–40.
153 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 26 (N.Y.
1923).
154 Brief in Behalf of Plaintiffs in Error at 4–5 Wulfsohn, 266 U.S. 580 (No. 65).
155 Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 727 (1916). The plaintiff in
error could have sought a (discretionary) writ of certiorari asking the Court to review
the State court’s immunity decision, as the Supreme Court had recently been given
the power to review by certiorari State court decisions upholding claims of federal
right, see id., but he instead pursued his appeal as of right through writ of error.
156 The opinion of the Supreme Court provides in its entirety as follows: “Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction upon the authority of the Act of September 6,
1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726; Oliver American Trading Co., v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440.”
Wulfsohn, 266 U.S. at 580.
157 See Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or to Affirm for Want of Substantial Issues at 6–7, Wulfsohn, 266 U.S. 580 (No. 65).
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also cited Oliver American Trading for the proposition that the
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over the immunity issue because it is
a matter of “general law.”158 The Supreme Court’s citation of Oliver
American Trading may suggest that it was endorsing this over-reading of
Oliver American Trading. But, even if that was the Court’s intention,
the cursory memorandum opinion in Wulfsohn is a slim reed on which
to base the claim that the Supreme Court was thought to lack the
power to review State court decisions interpreting customary international law, given that appellate jurisdiction over the sovereign immunity issue was lacking anyway and that such a reading would in any
event fail to explain why the Court lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional claims.
The fourth case cited by revisionists, New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Hendren,159 is similarly vague. Hendren involved a writ of error to
review the effect of the outbreak of the Civil War on the obligations of
a private insurance contract between a New York insurance company
and a citizen of Virginia. The Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction,160 and revisionists argue that the Court did so because it
regarded the laws of war as a matter of general law rather than one of
federal law.161 This reading of Hendren derives some surface plausibility from the fact that Justice Bradley, in dissent, put forth a strong
structural argument for treating the state-to-state branch of the law of
nations as preemptive federal law reviewable in the Supreme Court.
Bradley wrote:
[T]he laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in
regard to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at
war are laws of the United States. These laws will be the unwritten
international law, if nothing be adopted or announced to the contrary; or the express regulations of the government, when it sees fit
to make them. But in both cases it is the law of the United States for
the time being, whether written or unwritten.162

In Bradley’s view, the case fell within the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 25, for reasons similar to
those set forth in the cases discussed by Bellia and Clark: “The power
given by the Constitution to Congress to declare war, and the author-

158 Id. at 5, 9–10, 12.
159 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
160 See id. at 286–87.
161 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 824 & n.53; Weisburd, supra
note 18, at 39.
162 Hendren, 92 U.S. at 288 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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ity of the general government in carrying on the same, are the
grounds on which the exemption or immunity is claimed.”163
Bradley’s opinion in Hendren shows that one of the contending
pre-Erie positions was that the state-to-state portion of customary international law had the status of federal law. The fact that Bradley was a
lone dissenter, on the other hand, does not necessarily show that the
majority was rejecting the structural constitutional case for treating
this portion of the law of nations as preemptive of State law. The
majority may have believed instead that the structural argument for
treating the laws of war as preemptive was inapplicable to a “sectional
civil war.”164 Moreover, the majority’s holding that jurisdiction was
lacking appears to have been based on a reading of Section 25 of the
First Judiciary Act that is no longer good law. As noted, Section 25 at
the time extended jurisdiction (in relevant part) only to cases “where
any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the constitution, or any treaty or statute of or commission held or authority exercised under the United States.”165 The majority concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction because it “nowhere appear[ed] that the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States
were necessarily involved in the decision” of the State court.166 The
majority in Hendren thus may have understood the general law of war
to be binding on the States and potentially reviewable in the Supreme
Court, yet not to be “the constitution” or a “treaty or statute . . . or
commission” within the meaning of Section 25. To the extent the
Court was resting on the wording of Section 25, its interpretation of
the statute is no longer good law, as the Supreme Court has subsequently made clear that State court applications of federal common
law are reviewable by the Supreme Court, despite the fact that § 1257
(the successor to Section 25) continues to refer to cases presenting
163 Id.
164 Id. at 286 (majority opinion); cf. Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216,
228–29 (1871) (argument of counsel for defendant in error) (“It is true that the
courts of the United States, like the courts of the States, and of all other civilized
countries, recognize the law of nations as binding upon them; and it is argued that as
the government of the United States is charged with the management and control of
our foreign relations, the courts of the United States ought to have the power of
deciding in the last resort, all questions of international law, otherwise difficulties may
arise with foreign nations on account of erroneous decisions by the State courts which
the government of the United States could not provide against. But whatever force
the argument of convenience might have in a case arising between the United States
and a foreign nation, it has very little in a case arising out of a defunct rebellion.”).
165 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 83, 85–87, amended by Act of Feb.
5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
166 Hendren, 92 U.S. at 287.
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rights or immunities under the Constitution, treaties, statutes, and
commissions of the United States.167 It is difficult to know the majority’s reasoning in Hendren, as the opinion contained very little analysis
of the jurisdictional question.168

167 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006); see, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499–500, 508 (2001). I recognize, of course, that, “the modern
conception of federal common law . . . did not exist circa 1788,” or, indeed, before
Erie. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
741 (2010). My point is that the Court’s reading of Section 25 in Hendren as permitting review only of the specified types of federal law has since been rejected. The
Court’s literal interpretation of Section 25 in Hendren pretermitted any question of
whether the law of nations was binding on the States or whether State court applications of such law were reviewable in the Supreme Court as a constitutional matter.
The decision in City & County of San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U.S. 768 (1884), cited
by Weisburd, supra note 18, at 39 & nn.235–37, may have rested on the same statutory
ground. See Scott, 111 U.S. at 769 (“[The question submitted to the Court] does not
depend on any legislation of Congress, or on the terms of the treaty . . . .” (citing
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286). The precise nature of the issue of “general public law” that the
Court was asked to review in Scott is unclear from the opinion, so it is difficult to say
whether it implicated the state-to state portion of the law of nations. Cf. infra note
168 (noting that the “law of war” issue in Hendren may not have been part of the stateto-state portion of the law of nations).
168 It is worth noting, additionally, that the legal principle involved in Hendren
likely did not belong to the portion of the law of nations that corresponds to today’s
public international law. It is true that, in 1875, the laws of war were understood to
include a rule suspending private contracts between citizens of belligerent states. See
2 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1209 (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 2d rev. ed. 1896) (1886) (stating that the law of war creates a strict rule of
nonintercourse between the populations of the warring parties, and that “existing
contracts and pecuniary obligations are suspended”). But, as noted, the law of
nations was then thought to encompass areas of the law that we do not regard as part
of public international law today. It appears that the effect of war on a private contract is today regarded as within the province of domestic contract law, not the laws of
war. Thus, in a 1959 treatise on the modern law of war, the chapter on “Intercourse
Between Belligerents” discusses intercourse between the belligerent governments and
armies. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 376–99 (1959).
With respect to individuals, it says merely that, as a matter of national law, “the contending states usually forbid as a serious crime unauthorized communications, even
though innocent in nature, between persons under their control and those in enemy
territory.” Id. at 378 (citing Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (2006);
Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939, c. 39 (Eng.)). By contrast, the 1934 Restatement of
Contracts did address the effect of war on a private contract, specifying that “[w]ar
supervening after the formation of contracts between citizens of the United States
and citizens of the enemy country” has the effect of rendering the contract illegal if its
performance “involves communication across the line of hostilities, or . . . will aid the
enemy or diminish the power of the United States to carry on war effectively.”
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 596(b) (1934).
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The final case often cited as establishing that the Supreme Court
was thought to lack jurisdiction to review the State courts’ application
of customary international law is Ker v. Illinois,169 which presented the
question whether the State court’s jurisdiction in a criminal case was
vitiated by the fact that the defendant had been brought to the jurisdiction against his will from Peru by a private party.170 The defendant
raised arguments based on the Due Process Clause, a federal statute,
and a treaty, but not customary international law. After rejecting each
of the defendant’s claims, the Court commented that the defendant
likely had no claim under customary international law either, but that,
even if he had had one, the issue would not be within the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction to review.171 As in Hendren, that proposition
(stated without citation in Ker) might have been based on the idea
that, even if the defendant enjoyed immunity under customary international law, the immunity was not conferred by the Constitution or a
statute, treaty, or commission within the meaning of Section 25. In
any event, the precedential force of this statement is diminished by
the fact that Ker did not rely on customary international law at all, and
the Court thought that such a claim would have been frivolous in any
event.172 More noteworthy is the Court’s statement that the State
courts are “bound to take notice” of customary international law.173
This dictum in Ker shows that, whatever the reason for its view that
appellate jurisdiction over the customary international law issue was
lacking, the Court did not equate the lack of Supreme Court review
with a freedom of the States to disregard customary international law.
In sum, there is substantial support for the proposition that,
before Erie, the portion of the law of nations that corresponded to
present-day customary international law was understood to be binding
on the States. The cases cited by revisionists for the claim that States
were free to violate such law do not establish that point. As for the
169 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
170 Id. at 443 (“[I]t was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru,
without any pretence of authority . . . from the government of the United States.”).
171 See id. at 444.
172 The Court may have believed that a private abduction does not violate international law. But cf. Bellia & Clark, supra note 41, at 448–49 (noting that in 1789, injuries to aliens by U.S. citizens were thought to violate the law of nations if not
remedied). Or the Court may have believed that the law of nations required the
extradition or punishment of the abductor or the payment of damages but not the
relinquishment of jurisdiction. But cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1158 (1992) (arguing that modern
international law requires the repatriation of a persons abducted from foreign territory in violation of international law).
173 Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
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Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review State court applications of customary international law, the cases are equivocal at best insofar as they
concern public international law norms, and may just have rested on a
reading of the statute regulating the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction that has since been rejected.174 In any event, these opinions
did not equate lack of reviewability with State freedom to depart from
customary international law. Even the cases that most strongly support the claim that customary international law was not reviewable by
the Supreme Court insisted that the States were bound by such law,
even though States were understood to have the power to depart from
other aspects of the general law. Though there appear to be no federal cases invalidating State laws on the ground of conflict with customary international law, this appears to be a result of the absence of
any such State laws, as there also appear to be no federal cases upholding State laws that purport to alter or depart from customary international law.
c. The General Law as an Intermediate Status
The pre-Erie doctrinal landscape strongly supports the claim that
customary international law was understood to be binding on the
States, whether or not the State courts’ applications of such law were
reviewable in the Supreme Court. Even if such law had been viewed
as “general law” in all respects, however, the pre-Erie approach to such
law would not provide much of a historical antecedent for treating
customary international law as modern-day State law. Given the mindset of judges of that era, the pre-Erie general law regime, as it operated, resembled present-day federal law more than present-day State
law.
The Founders sought to ensure that cases possibly implicating the
law of nations would be decided in the federal courts, and so they
extended the federal judicial power to cases involving ambassadors,
foreign states, aliens, and admiralty.175 The Judiciary Act of 1789, in
174 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 126; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999) (“Under the national government, treaties [and] the laws of
nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner—
whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen States, or in three
or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from
the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent
governments as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 99, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve
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turn, granted federal courts jurisdiction in these cases,176 thus diminishing the need for Supreme Court review of these questions from the
State courts. The lower federal courts, for their part, used their own
independent judgment regarding the content of this law.177 Moreover, even when State courts decided issues of customary international
law, they could be expected to arrive at interpretations that accorded
with those of the federal courts. During this era, federal and State
courts alike understood that, in applying the general common law,
they were discovering a set of norms that had an existence apart from
what the courts said about them. As Professor (now-Judge) Fletcher
has documented, because of their sense of common enterprise, federal and State courts frequently relied on one another’s decisions in
cases involving the general common law, and the result was a remarkable degree of uniformity in the interpretation of this law.178 The possible threat to this uniformity posed by the State legislatures’
recognized power to depart from the common law never materialized
with respect to the state-to-state portion of the law of nations, perhaps
because the States did not understand themselves to be free to depart
from the latter.
Post-Erie common law, however, exhibits none of these characteristics. States understand that they have the power to depart from the
approach of other States and of the federal courts, not just legislatively, but also through judicial decision. The result has been a great
diversity of approaches to common law matters among the States.
This diversity has not extended to customary international law, presumably because of the “well-entrenched” view that such law is federal.179 Were the revisionist approach to be adopted, however, the
States would know that they are free to adhere to such law or not, or
national questions that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in
which they are concerned to the national tribunals.”).
176 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (granting district courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases and concurrent jurisdiction over alien tort suits); id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 (granting circuit courts concurrent
jurisdiction over suits in diversity); id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81 (granting the Supreme
Court exclusive jurisdiction over cases brought against ambassadors and original, but
not exclusive, jurisdiction over suits brought by ambassadors).
177 See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892) (“[I]t is one of those
questions of general jurisprudence which [the federal] court must decide for itself,
uncontrolled by local decisions.”).
178 See Fletcher, supra note 124, at 1554, 1562–64, 1572–75. Fletcher’s analysis
focused on the law merchant, but his analysis is a fortiori applicable to the state-to-state
branch of the law of nations, which was understood to be binding on States as a matter of international law.
179 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 816.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 41

customary international law as u.s. law

4-OCT-11

12:26

1535

to depart or alter it as they wish or as instructed by their legislatures or
their citizens through referenda such as Oklahoma’s. Such an
approach to customary international law would be radically different
from the approach that prevailed before Erie, whether its status then
was federal law or general law.
3. Post-Erie Doctrine
The post-Erie decision most often cited by proponents of the
modern position is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.180 As revisionists often note, relying on Sabbatino as support for the modern position is ironic, since the Court’s holding was that customary
international law could not be applied to question the validity of certain acts of foreign states.181 As discussed below, Sabbatino actually
shows that not all of customary international law is federal law for all
purposes.182 But the portion of the Court’s opinion holding that the
act-of-state doctrine itself has the status of federal law does strongly
support the modern position, albeit in dictum.183
The Court in Sabbatino explained that the act-of-state doctrine—
which generally prohibits courts from questioning the validity of an
act of a foreign state within its own territory—is based on separationof-powers principles. The Constitution assigns to the President the
responsibility for conducting the nation’s foreign relations, and the
courts’ failure to give effect to certain acts of state would hinder the
performance of this function. Because the State courts’ failure to give
effect to such acts would be just as harmful as the federal courts’ failure to do so, the Court held, the act-of-state doctrine is equally applicable in State courts.184 In reaching the conclusion that the act-ofstate doctrine thus preempted any contrary State law or policy, the
Court relied on an article by Professor (later Judge) Philip Jessup,
written shortly after Erie was decided. Jessup addressed the applicability of Erie to customary international law and concluded that Erie did
180 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
181 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 860; Young, supra note 19, at
440–41.
182 See infra text accompanying notes 208–22.
183 Bellia and Clark argue that Sabbatino directly supports their claim that a subset
of customary international law is preemptive federal law. I consider this claim in subpart II.D, below.
184 The Court left open whether State courts could decide to give effect to foreign
acts of state even if the act-of-state doctrine did not require them to do so, Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 425 n.23, but it held that State courts must give effect to such acts when
the act-of-state doctrine applies.
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not require that customary international law be treated as State law.185
The Supreme Court agreed with his analysis and found it equally
applicable to the act-of-state doctrine:
It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act
of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.
Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, recognized the potential dangers were
Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations.
He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to
divergent and perhaps parochial [S]tate interpretations. His basic
rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine.186

The Court’s endorsement of Jessup’s view that customary international law is federal law is admittedly dictum, as the Court noted that
the act-of-state doctrine was not itself required by international law.187
But it was well-considered dictum.188 Indeed, the Court seemed to
regard Jessup’s view concerning customary international law and its
own view concerning the act-of-state doctrine as instantiations of a
broader principle that it appeared to regard as self-evident: that Erie
was inapplicable “to legal problems affecting international relations.”189 The Restatement was thus well justified in regarding Sabbatino
as strong support for the modern position.190
Revisionists, for their part, claim Chief Judge Hand’s opinion in
Bergman v. De Sieyes191 as support.192 In this post-Erie, pre-Sabbatino
case, Hand stated that New York law was applicable to the question of
185 See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939).
186 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (footnote omitted).
187 Id. at 421.
188 The Court itself noted that it could have avoided the Erie question, since New
York law did not conflict with federal law, but it felt “constrained to make it clear that
an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the
Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.” Id. at 425.
189 See id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 507–508 (arguing that preemptive
force of customary international law may be regarded as a doctrinal manifestation of a
broader preemption of State action that unduly interferes with the federal government’s conduct of foreign relations).
190 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 n.3 (1987).
191 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
192 Young claims that Bergman is an “unequivocal” rejection of the modern position. Young, supra note 19, at 458 n.479; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra
note 9, at 828 (noting that Chief Judge Hand “reached a conclusion contrary to Jessup’s”); Ku & Yoo, supra note 16, at 203 & n.186 (arguing that Chief Judge Hand
“treated [customary international law] as part of New York’s common law”).
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a foreign diplomat’s immunity, an issue addressed by customary international law. But Hand actually left open whether State law would
apply if it conflicted with international law. Indeed, Hand acknowledged that “an avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of
international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, [might] present a
federal question.”193 He found it unnecessary to reach this issue,
since New York law was consistent with international law.194 Thus,
Hand went no further than to hold that State law applies to the extent
that it is consistent with customary international law, which is just
another way to put the modern position.
More relevant is the very recent decision in Samantar v. Yousuf,195
which shows that virtually no one today embraces the view that revisionists attribute to Hand. The issue in Samantar was whether the
immunity of foreign officials was governed by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA). The executive branch’s amicus brief argued
that the immunity was not covered by the FSIA, but that foreign officials were entitled to a “common law” immunity.196 Although the
brief does not call it a federal common law immunity, it is clear that the
executive branch does not regard it as having the force of State law, as
its brief maintains that the content of this immunity is determined by
“principles adopted by the executive branch, informed by customary
international law.”197 The petitioner, for his part, argued that the
FSIA governs the immunity of foreign officials for official conduct
because customary international law entitles them to such an immunity,198 a position that Bradley and Goldsmith had advanced.199 As a
fall back, however, petitioners would have recognized a common law
immunity.200 Finally, respondents also recognized that foreign officials would be covered by a common law immunity, although they
193 See Bergman, 170 F.2d at 361.
194 See id.
195 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
196 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8,
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555).
197 See id. at 8; see also Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 5–6,
Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) (arguing that “the
Executive Branch . . . play[s] the primary role in determining the immunity of foreign
officials as an aspect of the President’s responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and recognition of foreign governments”).
198 Brief of Petitioner at 43–44, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555). They
argue that the statute should be read to incorporate this international law immunity.
Id. at 24–26, 32–34.
199 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual
Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 16 (2009).
200 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 198, at 24–34.
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would have tied it more directly to customary international law and
urged a less prominent role for the executive branch.201 Again, there
is no suggestion that the contemplated “common law” immunity
depended in any way on State law.
The Court ultimately rejected the petitioners’ argument that the
immunity of foreign officials was governed by the FSIA, holding that
the immunity of foreign officials is ordinarily “properly governed by
the common law,” as it was for foreign states before the enactment of
the FSIA.202 Although the Court did not specify the nature of this
common law, the Court’s discussion of the pre-FSIA regime leaves no
doubt that it regarded the relevant law as federal, not State, law.203
Thus, neither the Court nor any of the parties in Samantar embraced
the revisionist position that the immunity of foreign officials is governed by State law.204 The Court’s characterization of the immunity
as one under the “common law” and its description of the Executive’s
pre-FSIA role may suggest that it understood customary international
law to be applicable in this context only as filtered through the executive branch. As discussed further below,205 however, the opinion is
probably best read to leave open this and all other questions about the
nonstatutory immunity of foreign officials apart from its federal
nature.
B. The Limits of the Modern Position
Contrary to the revisionists’ claims, neither the Restatement nor
most of its defenders have maintained that all norms of customary
international law have the status of preemptive federal law applicable
in the courts in all circumstances in which they address the matter in
dispute. The Restatement recognizes that norms of customary international law sometimes lack the status of federal law in the face of certain acts of foreign states and of the President and possibly other
executive branch officials. This subpart examines these established
201 Brief for the Respondents at 34–35, 53–55, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 081555); Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–36, 38–39, 42–44, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(No. 08-1555).
202 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292.
203 See id. at 2284 (noting that, pre-FSIA, if the State Department had not
expressed a view regarding immunity, “a district court inquired ‘whether the ground
of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to
recognize’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 36 (1995))).
204 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 828 (citing Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948), with approval for this proposition).
205 See infra text accompanying notes 550–557.
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limits of the modern position’s claim that customary international law
has the force of federal law, and explains their compatibility with the
structural argument for regarding customary international law as preemptive federal law.
1.

Sabbatino and the Inapplicability of Some Customary
International Law Norms to Some Acts of Foreign States

In attacking the modern position, the revisionists describe it as
maintaining that all of customary international law has the force of
preemptive federal law always and in all contexts.206 It is true that the
Third Restatement states broadly, in its black letter, that “[i]nternational
law . . . [is] law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several States” and that “[c]ourts in the United States are bound to
give effect to international law.”207 But this seemingly unlimited view
is qualified in the comments and reporter’s notes, especially in their
discussion of Sabbatino. As noted above, revisionists often note the
irony of the Restatement’s reliance on Sabbatino, given Sabbatino’s holding that some rules of customary international law are not enforceable
in federal or State courts in certain circumstances.208 But such reliance is not so odd if the modern position does not in fact insist that all
customary international law is always enforceable as preemptive federal law. The Restatement does not deny that Sabbatino precludes the
application of some rules of customary international law in some contexts,209 which in turn shows that the Restatement’s version of the modern position is not as uncompromising as the revisionists claim.210
Sabbatino held that federal and State courts alike had to give
effect to the act of a foreign state performed within its own territory
even though it conflicted with the claimed rule of customary international law prohibiting discriminatory or uncompensated takings of the
property of foreign nationals. The Court concluded that judicial
enforcement of that rule in that context would interfere with the
Executive’s pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy interests. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the disputed and controversial character of the rule. Capital-importing states at the time
vociferously objected to the rule, and as a result the rule “touch[ed]
206 Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 846 & n.202; Young, supra note
19, at 377–78.
207 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1), (3) (1987).
208 See supra text accompanying note 181.
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 n.1.
210 Some scholarly defenders of the modern position are quite explicit in noting
that it does not insist that all customary international law is always preemptive federal
law. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 16, at 480; Neuman, supra note 9, at 376.
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. . . sharply on national nerves.”211 The holding of Sabbatino might be
generalized as precluding the application of rules of customary international law to question the validity of an act of a foreign state within
its own territory if such rules are disputed and touch sharply on
national nerves. In other words, rules of customary international law
possessing such characteristics lack the status of federal law in that
particular context.
One possible way to reconcile Sabbatino with the Restatement’s
black-letter rule that customary international law has the status of federal law is to understand the Court to have held that there was in fact
no norm of international law prohibiting the discriminatory or
uncompensated taking of foreign nationals’ property. The Court’s
reliance on the disputed nature of the asserted international law
norm might support such a reading.212 If a large enough number of
states disputed the norm, the norm might lack the necessary state
practice and opinio juris to be a rule of customary international law.
But the Court’s opinion is not susceptible to such a reading. Had the
Court denied the existence of the claimed norm, the Court would
have been taking a position contrary to the longstanding position of
the executive branch on the matter.213 Yet, in explaining why this
norm could not be applied in this context, the Court gave as one reason the interference with the Executive’s conduct of foreign relations
that would result if the courts were to disagree with the Executive’s
view.214 The Court’s reasoning here indicates that the Court was not
in fact rejecting the Executive’s view that there was a rule of customary
international law prohibiting discriminatory or uncompensated takings of foreign nationals’ property. Instead, the Court held that some
claimed rules of customary international law (namely, those that are
disputed and touch sharply on national nerves) may not be used by

211 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
212 Dean Koh appears to read Sabbatino this way. Koh, supra note 16, at 1834–35.
213 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429 & n.29.
214 Id. at 431–33. Note that the Court here did not even consider the possibility
that the role of the courts was just to apply whatever interpretation of customary international law the Executive was embracing at the moment. The Court appears to have
believed that the courts’ role, if they did reach the international law issue, was to
apply their own best judgment of what international law required. It was willing to
find the international norm inapplicable on allocation-of-powers grounds, but it was
unwilling to compromise the courts’ role as an independent judge of international
law if the question were in fact before it. Cf. infra notes 538–557 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court’s pre-FSIA approach to the immunity of foreign states and
heads of state).
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courts to invalidate the act of a foreign state within its own territory
even if they are in fact rules of international law.215
The Restatement takes a different approach to reconciling Sabbatino with its black-letter rule that “international law is law of the
United States.” Its reporter’s notes explain that the black-letter rule is
not applicable in the Sabbatino context.216 The Restatement here cites
an article by its Chief Reporter, Louis Henkin, which clarifies his
understanding of the relationship between the act-of-state doctrine
and the idea that international law is part of our law. In a case like
Sabbatino, he wrote,
the proposition that “international law is part of the law of the
United States” . . . [is] irrelevant. Effectively, it means that the
courts will apply international law in an appropriate case against the
United States, the one government which is subject to the law of the
United States. In a case like Sabbatino, however, the Government of
Cuba, acting in Cuba, obviously was not subject to the laws of the
United States. . . . International law might have been relevant if it
required the United States to respond to Cuba’s violation in a particular way; for example, if international law forbade the United
States to give effect to Cuba’s confiscations, American courts would
carry out that obligation and refuse to give them effect. But international law does not tell the United States how to react to Cuban
acts that violate international law. The United States is free to condone, acquiesce in, implement, or even applaud them.217

This analysis contains an important insight (discussed further below),
but the attempt to dissolve the apparent conflict between the act-ofstate doctrine and the idea that international law is U.S. law by reference to choice-of-law rules cannot succeed. Choice-of-law rules themselves have the status of either State or federal law. Since the Court in
Sabbatino held that the act-of-state doctrine is a matter of federal law,
presumably the doctrine’s applicability cannot turn on State choice-oflaw rules. It follows that the applicability of the doctrine must turn on
federal choice-of-law rules. What are the relevant choice-of-law rules?
Henkin appears to have had in mind territorial rules of the traditional
variety. Thus, he stressed that, because Cuba was acting within its own
territory, Cuban law would apply, and Cuban law did not incorporate
215 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
216 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 reporter’s note 1
(1987).
217 Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 175, 181 (1967) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 183 (making it clear that
Henkin viewed the applicability of act-of-state doctrine as determined by choice-of-law
principles).
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the claimed rule of international law.218 But choice-of-law rules are
not set in stone, and the traditional territorial rules are not always
followed. In most cases there is nothing to prevent the United States
from applying its own law or policy,219 which generally frowns upon
discriminatory or uncompensated takings of property,220 or from
declining to give effect to uncompensated takings by foreign states
that violate international law. It is Sabbatino itself that adopts a federal
rule barring the application of rules of international law having certain characteristics to invalidate an act of a foreign state performed
within its own territory. We might call this a federal choice-of-law
rule, but, in the end, it is a rule making certain rules of customary
international law inapplicable in our courts (State and federal) in this
particular context, a rule that is at least in tension with the broad
black-letter rule that international law is U.S. law.
In the end, the Restatement recognizes that, in light of the act-ofstate doctrine, customary international law is not enforceable in the
courts as federal law in certain circumstances. It gives an unpersuasive
explanation based on the conflict of laws, but the source of the exception is less important than the fact that the exception is recognized.
The question, then, is which norms lack this status and in what circumstances. As discussed above, Sabbatino is best read to hold that
disputed norms that touch sharply on national nerves are inapplicable
in the context of a suit challenging the act of a foreign state within its
own territory.
The conclusion that such norms are inapplicable in that context
is consistent with the allocation-of-powers rationale for according preemptive force to customary international law. As discussed above, the
structural concern is that violations of international law attributable to
the United States would interfere with the federal government’s ability to conduct the nation’s foreign relations effectively. To avoid
interference with the federal government’s ability to achieve foreign
218 See id. at 181.
219 The Constitution may limit the application of federal law if the case has no
connection with the United States. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320
(1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits
States’ power to apply their laws to disputes having few contacts with the State). But
cf. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (arguing that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment incorporates different limits than the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
220 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 230 (1897) (holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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relations goals, the courts will enforce international law to prevent violations of international law by the States. But smooth and effective
foreign relations do not require the courts to invalidate foreign acts
that violate international law. To the contrary, striking down such acts
might itself produce foreign relations problems. Thus, the allocationof-powers rationale for according preemptive force to customary international law supports Henkin’s view that this principle is relevant only
when international law is sought to be applied “against the United
States” (including the States). The rule that Henkin characterized as a
choice-of-law principle is better understood as stemming from the
constitutional structure, which compels the application of customary
international law against the United States and the States, but not
against foreign states acting within their own territory. Territorial
notions of sovereignty, which underlie traditional choice-of-law rules,
play a role in delineating the limits of the federal rule barring application of customary international law in this context. Presumably, the
reason the constitutional structure does not forbid the invalidation of
foreign state acts performed outside their territory is that, in light of
traditional notions of territorial sovereignty, the failure to give effect
to such acts will not produce undue international friction. But the
real work in the analysis is done by the constitutional structure.
A second problem with Henkin’s choice-of-law explanation of
Sabbatino’s holding is that it proves too much. The Court in Sabbatino
did not hold that customary international law can never be applied to
invalidate the acts of a foreign state within its own territory. Rather, it
was careful to limit its holding to norms of international law having
certain characteristics. The implication of the Court’s analysis is that
norms of customary international law that are not as disputed or do
not touch as sharply on national nerves might be applied to invalidate
the act of a foreign state within its own territory. Under the territorial
choice-of-law rules applied by Henkin, however, Cuban law would be
equally applicable, and U.S. law equally inapplicable, whether or not
the Cuban act of state violated clear and uncontroversial norms of
international law.221 On the other hand, the Court’s distinction can
221 Henkin did recognize that, under choice-of-law rules, the ordinarily applicable
law could be displaced if it conflicted with the forum’s public policy. According to
Henkin, the act-of-state doctrine is a special choice-of-law rule that operates to preclude courts (State and federal) from declining to give effect to the ordinarily applicable law because of a conflict with public policy. See id. at 178. Thus, perhaps Henkin
would have said that the act-of-state doctrine precluded resort to the public policy
exception only if the rule of international law that was violated was disputed and
touched sharply on national nerves. But this characterization merely brings to the
fore my earlier point that the real work in these cases is not being done by choice-of-
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be explained in separation-of-powers terms. Even though the constitutional structure does not require the application of customary international law to invalidate foreign acts of state in such contexts, the
Court could reasonably have concluded that the invalidation of foreign acts that conflict with clear and uncontroversial norms of international law would not unduly interfere with the conduct of foreign
relations by the federal political branches, and that countervailing
notions of justice warrant the invalidation of such acts.222
2.

The Paquete Habana and the Applicability of Customary
International Law to Federal Officials

That the modern position does not insist that customary international law has the force of federal law always and for all purposes is
also shown by the recognition in The Paquete Habana that the applicability of such law is subject to “controlling executive . . . act[s].”223 If
customary international law did have all of the attributes of federal law
for all purposes, then it would follow that the President would have
the duty faithfully to execute it.224 That duty, however, would be in
conflict with an acknowledgement that the President has the power to
act in contravention of such law in at least certain circumstances.
Exactly in which circumstances the President may violate customary international law has been the subject of heated debate.225 Some
adherents of the modern position maintain that the President is free
to violate such law only when speaking for the United States at the
law rules, but rather by the separation-of-powers principles that justify a distinction
between accepted, undisputed norms and controversial, disputed ones.
222 The Court does not tell us whether federal law requires the invalidation of foreign state acts that conflict with clear and uncontroversial norms of international law
or merely permits the invalidation of such acts if State law incorporates the relevant
international law norms. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425
n.23 (1964) (leaving open whether States may be more deferential to foreign states
than the act-of-state doctrine requires). Leaving it to the States to decide the applicability of undisputed norms of customary international law to the acts of foreign states
would not be inconsistent with the structural case for the modern position, although
Sosa appears to reflect a preference for treating the issue as a federal one. See infra
Part I.C. If the issue were treated as a matter of State law, Supreme Court review of
State court decisions regarding the content of customary international law would have
to be available, for the reasons discussed infra Part IV.
223 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
224 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
225 See, e.g., Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J.
INT’L L. 913 (1986); Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?
(Cont’d), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 371 (1987).
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international plane as “sole organ” of the nation’s foreign relations.226
Others defend a broader presidential power to exempt executive officials from complying with customary international law.227 Some
courts have held that cabinet-level officials have the authority to violate customary international law,228 a position that the Office of Legal
Counsel has endorsed.229 On the other hand, it is widely understood
that lower-level executive officials lack the power to violate customary
international law unless authorized by the President or perhaps a cabinet-level official.230 In The Paquete Habana itself, the Court enforced a
rule of customary international law against a lower-level executive
official.
Exempting the President from certain norms of customary international law would be consistent with the allocation-of-powers rationale for according such norms the status of federal law. The
allocation-of-powers concern is that violations of such norms would
interfere with the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign relations, and, of course, the Constitution allocates to the President
important foreign relations powers. As discussed below, Bellia and
Clark argue that the violation of certain norms of customary international law by the States would be in conflict with the federal power to
recognize foreign governments, a power that is, in turn, inferred from
the power to send and receive ambassadors. The power to receive
ambassadors is allocated exclusively to the President; the power to
send ambassadors is shared by the President and the Senate.231 To
the extent that the preemptive effect of such norms is traced to the
recognition power, therefore, it would seem to follow that the President himself is not bound and may even have the power to authorize

226 See Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 936
(1986).
227 See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 921 (1986)
(arguing that the President’s special role in the U.S. government gives him the
authority, acting alone, to place the United States in violation of customary international law).
228 See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453–55 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding
that the Attorney General had the authority to violate customary international law).
229 Auth. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Override Int’l Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. O.L.C. 163, 163–64 (1989).
230 Id. at 180; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 243–44 (2d ed. 1996).
231 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.
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violations.232 On the other hand, to the extent that a norm’s preemptive effect is traceable to the war power, one would think that the President is bound, as the Constitution allocates the war power to
Congress.233
Which norms exactly are binding on the President is beyond the
scope of this Article. The present point is that even adherents of the
modern position hold varying views on this question. What unites
them is the claim that the customary international law binds the
States.
C. Sosa and the Modern Position
Revisionist scholars and at least one revisionist federal judge234
have read the decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain as rejecting the modern position. Some defenders of the modern position, on the other
hand, have read Sosa as definitively rejecting the revisionist view.235
(There is a great deal of truth in Young’s assertion that “Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has become something of a Rorschach blot, in which each of the contending sides in
the debate over the domestic status of customary international law . . .
sees what it was predisposed to see anyway.”236) In my view, Sosa does
not definitively adopt either position, but its analysis strongly supports
the modern one.
The issue in Sosa was whether a federal cause of action for damages was available for the defendant’s alleged violations of customary
international law.237 The plaintiff had relied on § 1350 as creating a
cause of action,238 but the Court concluded that the provision was
purely jurisdictional.239 The Court proceeded to consider whether it
was appropriate for the federal courts to create a cause of action as a
232 This may explain the extraordinary degree of deference the courts accorded to
executive branch suggestions of immunity for foreign states before the enactment of
the FSIA. See infra notes 538–540 and accompanying text.
233 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
234 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Sosa thus confirmed that international-law
principles are not automatically part of domestic U.S. law and that those principles
can enter into domestic U.S. law only through an affirmative act of the political
branches.”).
235 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2241, 2254 (2004).
236 See Young, supra note 34, at 28 (footnote omitted).
237 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712, 724 (2004).
238 Id. at 713 & n.10.
239 Id. at 714.
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matter of federal common law.240 It concluded that it was appropriate
to do so if certain conditions were met. In particular, the Court held
that such a cause of action could properly extend only to norms of
customary international law that satisfy a heightened standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance.241 Bradley and Goldsmith, in their
post-Sosa article written with Professor David Moore, stress that these
limits, and the Court’s generally cautious approach to this issue, are
inconsistent with the modern claim that all customary international
law has the status of federal common law.242
But, as discussed above, the question whether customary international law has the status of federal law is distinct from the question
whether someone injured by a violation of such law has a cause of
action for damages against the individual who caused the injury. Even
if international law makes the defendant’s conduct unlawful, it does
not itself typically establish a right of the victim to collect damages
from the individual who acted unlawfully.243 That the Court limited
the cause of action for damages to norms having certain characteristics does not establish that only norms having these characteristics
have the force of federal law. In the absence of a cause of action,
norms of customary international law could have the force of federal
law and be enforceable if invoked defensively or pursuant to a right of
action created by another law, such as § 1983.244 It is not uncommon
for the Court to deny the existence of a federal right of action for
damages under federal statutes,245 yet no one claims that such statutes
lack the force of federal law.
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore briefly consider and reject the
argument that Sosa is inapposite to their critique of the modern position because the question before the Court was the existence of a private right of action for damages.246 They say that the opinion cannot
fairly be read as turning on the fact that the issue was the existence of
240 Id. at 725–28.
241 Id. at 724–25 (recognizing a federal right of action for violation of customary
international law norms that are “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” that Blackstone
had described, viz., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”).
242 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 902–07.
243 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
244 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006).
245 See, e.g., Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527,
536–37 (1989); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 578 (1979).
246 Their first response is that this objection is unavailable to those who believe the
Court embraced the modern position. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at
909. Presumably, it is still open to the rest of us.
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a private cause of action because the Court extensively discussed postErie federal common law and cited the “limits on implied rights of
action as only one of many reasons for judicial caution in allowing
claims under” § 1350.247 It is true that the Court cited five reasons to
be cautious in creating a federal right of action for violations of customary international law, but the fact that the issue before it was
whether “to create a private right of action” was prominent among
them.248 The Court wrote:
The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the
mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should be
allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.
Accordingly, even when Congress has made it clear by statute that a
rule applies to purely domestic conduct, we are reluctant to infer
intent to provide a private cause of action where the statute does
not supply one expressly.249

And, although it is true that two of the other reasons for caution given
by the Court related to “post-Erie federal common law,”250 the propriety of implying a private right of action is commonly treated as an
aspect of “post-Erie federal common law.”251
Furthermore, the Court’s final two reasons for caution, the only
two that relate specifically to the “foreign affairs” nature of the issue,
apply only to a sort of case that falls outside the allocation-of-powers
rationale for according customary international law the force of preemptive federal law252—a type of case as to which the Court in Sabbatino had already articulated limits similar to those adopted in Sosa.253
The Court’s fourth reason for caution was based on the idea that
[i]t is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits
on our own State and Federal Governments’ power, but quite
another to consider suits under rules that would go so far as to
claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits.254
247 Id.
248 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
249 Id.
250 See id. at 725–26.
251 For example, the issue is covered in the “Federal Common Law” section of
Hart and Wechsler’s casebook on federal courts and the federal system. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 690–742.
252 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28.
253 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
254 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431–32) (emphasis added).
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The Court obviously had in mind the Filartiga-type case involving an
alien challenging the act of a foreign official, a sort of case falling
outside the core rationale for treating customary international law as
preemptive federal law. It was for the same reason that the Court in
Sabbatino excluded disputed or controversial norms of customary
international law from the scope of those having the force of preemptive federal law in the context of suits challenging the conduct of foreign states within their own territory.255 This limitation dovetails with
the Court’s fifth and final reason for caution: “We have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of
the law of nations . . . .”256 The Court in Sosa accordingly placed a
limit on the judicially created federal right of action for damages for
violation of customary international law very similar to the limit that
the Court had imposed in the parallel context in Sabbatino—a limit
turning on the clarity and breadth of acceptance of the claimed
norm.257 In sum, the Court’s reasons for caution are compatible with
the modern position not just because the question before it was the
creation of a private remedy not conferred by customary international
law ex proprio vigore, but also because some of the Court’s concerns are
implicated only in contexts that are not the central concern of the
modern position.258
Although the Court in Sosa was not squarely presented with the
question of customary international law’s status as federal or State law,
its opinion tends to support the modern position. First, in explaining
that the Court’s “post-Erie understanding has identified limited
enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a
common law way,” the Court recognized that, “[f]or two centuries we
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes
255 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
256 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).
257 See id. at 724–25; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; see also William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 26 (2007),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/dodge.pdf.
258 The Court’s concern with imposing debatable rules on foreign state actors
should not have led it to restrict the right of action against Sosa, since Sosa was acting
as an agent of the United States when he performed the acts on which Alvarez’s suit
was based. This latter fact may suggest that the Sosa limitations are not limited to
damage actions alleging violations of international law attributable to foreign officials,
as in the Filartiga-type case. On the other hand, the Court nowhere asserted that
Sosa’s actions were attributable to the United States, but cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 (“And
all of this assumes that Alvarez could establish that Sosa was acting on behalf of a
government when he made the arrest, for otherwise he would need a rule broader
still.”), and some of the Court’s reasons for restricting the right of action are implicated only in the Filartiga-type case.
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the law of nations.”259 In addition, it noted that the Court in Sabbatino
had “endorsed the reasoning” of Philip Jessup, “who had argued that
Erie should not preclude the continued application of international
law in federal courts.”260
Moreover, Sosa’s willingness to create a federal common law right
of action for damages for violation of some norms of customary international law itself has implications for the debate about the status of
customary international law, and those implications favor the modern
position. Given how strict the Court has been of late in recognizing
new federal rights of action, what is most striking about Sosa is its relative receptivity to recognizing one in this context. In cases that
address the existence of a federal right of action for damages for violation of a federal statute that does not explicitly provide a right of
action, the Court’s position is flatly that it will not create one.261
Rather, it will recognize only rights of action created by Congress.
The Court’s holding in Sosa that § 1350 was “strictly jurisdictional”262—as well as its acknowledgement that the question before it
was whether to “create” a private right of action—means that the
Court did not understand the right of action for violations of customary international law to have been created by Congress.263 Yet the
Court found it proper to create a right of action for violation of certain norms of customary international law, noting that the international context made “the absence of congressional action addressing
private rights of action . . . more equivocal than its failure to provide
such a right when it creates a statute.”264
In the absence of a federal right of action, persons injured by
violations of federal statutes are relegated to remedies that State law
may provide. Thus, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,265
the Court found that an individual injured by a company’s violation of
259 Id. at 729 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900), The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815), and Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)). Since the Court was citing these
cases as supporting the propriety of recognizing a new federal common law cause of
action, this statement suggests that it understood the cited cases to be treating customary international law as federal law, or at least as more like modern-day federal law
than modern-day State law.
260 Id. at 730 n.18.
261 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (“Without [Congressional authorization], a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one,
no matter . . . how compatible with the statute.”).
262 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
263 See Dodge, supra note 257, at 20–21.
264 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
265 478 U.S. 804 (1986).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 57

customary international law as u.s. law

4-OCT-11

12:26

1551

standards set forth in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA), could sue only on a State law negligence per se theory.266 In
Sosa, the Court could have held that the right of action for damages
for violation of customary international law came from State law. If it
had understood customary international law to be a State law matter
after Erie, it presumably would have taken this course. The fact that it
did not even consider the possibility of relegating persons complaining of international law violations to their State law remedies suggests that the Court was not inclined to regard customary
international law as a State law matter. The fact that the case involved
international law made the Court more willing—not less—to recognize
a federal right of action under customary international law than
under federal statutes, presumably because it considered it less appropriate to leave the matter to State law for the reasons noted by Professor Jessup and endorsed by the Court in Sabbatino.267
Finally, it is not the case that Sosa “confirmed that internationallaw principles are not automatically part of domestic U.S. law and that
those principles can enter into domestic U.S. law only through an
affirmative act of the political branches,”268 or that Sosa’s recognition
of a right of action turned on “its reading of the specific intent of
Congress”269 or on “Congress’s intent in enacting” § 1350.270 The
Court’s holding that § 1350 is purely jurisdictional contradicts any
claim that Congress, in enacting that provision, intended to transform
any norm of customary international law into “domestic U.S. law” or
to create a right of action for damages for violation of such norms.
Rather, Congress merely intended to allow independently existing
causes of action to be maintained in federal court. The First Congress’s belief that such causes of action existed was based on its understanding of the nature and status of customary international law
within our legal system. Since the members of the Congress that
enacted § 1350 were also Founders, it is fair to say that the Sosa Court
based its willingness to recognize a federal right of action for damages
for certain violations of customary international law on the Founding
266 Id. at 807, 817; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
759–60 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
267 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730 n.18 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 421–23, 425 (1964) (citing Jessup, supra note 185) (arguing that “Erie
should not preclude the continued application of international law in federal
courts”)).
268 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
269 Young, supra note 34, at 29.
270 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 896.
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generation’s understanding of the nature and status of customary
international law, not on any “affirmative act” of Congress. In other
words, the Court in Sosa was not giving effect to the intent of Congress, but rather translating into post-Erie terms the Founders’ understanding of the nature of the law of nations as it interacted with the
“ambient law of the era.”271 That is also a fair description of what
defenders of the modern position seek to do.272
****
In sum, the constitutional structure strongly supports denying the
States the power to place the nation in breach of its obligations under
customary international law. This structural case was well understood
by the Founders, who placed the responsibility for compliance with
international law squarely in the hands of the federal government.
The Founders gave Congress the authority to legislate regarding the
law of nations, but they also contemplated that the courts would apply
such law in appropriate cases even in the absence of legislative incorporation. They regarded the state-to-state portion of the law of
nations—the portion that corresponds to modern-day customary
international law—as either preemptive of State law or as having the
status of general common law. Some Founders, in turn, understood
the general common law to be federal law, while others regarded it as
a category of law distinct from both federal and State law.
The pre-Erie cases reflect the same range of views regarding the
status of the state-to-state branch of the law of nations. Some judges
clearly understood this law to be preemptive of State law for structural
constitutional reasons. While the cases are equivocal as to whether
the State courts’ decisions regarding such law were reviewable by the
Supreme Court, even the cases calling such review into question
affirm that such law was nevertheless binding on the States. The pre271 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
272 If § 1350 is purely jurisdictional, then it is also difficult to explain how the First
Congress believed the statute fell within the bounds of Article III unless it either
understood the law of nations to be federal or embraced some theory of protective
jurisdiction. Since I accept protective jurisdiction, I do not read Sosa as necessarily
indicating that the First Congress regarded the law of nations as federal. Revisionists
who reject protective jurisdiction, see supra note 54 and accompanying text, can argue
that the First Congress overlooked Article III, but such arguments are disfavored. But
cf. Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (construing provision of First
Judiciary Act conferring jurisdiction over suits “where an alien is a party” as requiring
one of the parties to be a citizen of a State); Bellia & Clark, supra note 41, at 451
(arguing that the Framers of § 1350 understood it to apply only to suits by aliens
against U.S. citizens).
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Erie doctrinal landscape thus falls far short of supporting the revisionist claim that all of customary international law during this period was
regarded as nothing more than general common law. In any event,
the courts’ pre-Erie approach to the general common law differed dramatically from their post-Erie approach to the common law. Given
that the contending pre-Erie positions were that the state-to-state portion of the law of nations either had the force of preemptive federal
law or had an intermediate status closer to modern-day federal law
than to modern-day State law, the pre-Erie cases fail to support the
revisionists’ conclusion that customary international law should now
be regarded as having a State law status that was never in play.
After Erie, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino endorsed Philip Jessup’s view that Erie did not require that customary international law be
treated as State law, noting that “rules of international law should not
be left to divergent and perhaps parochial [S]tate interpretations.”273
Even Judge Hand’s opinion in Bergman v. De Sieyes,274 often cited by
revisionists in support of a State law status for such law, acknowledged
that a State’s violation of well-established rules of international law
might present a federal question. The recent Samantar decision
shows that no one today embraces the view that revisionists mistakenly
attribute to Judge Hand.
To be sure, not all of customary international law has the force of
preemptive federal law in all contexts. Sabbatino holds that some
norms of customary international law may not be applied to challenge
certain acts of foreign states within their own territory, and The Paquete
Habana recognizes that some customary international law is subject to
“controlling executive acts.” Adherents of the modern position do
not dispute these propositions, which are consistent with the structural constitutional case for regarding customary international law as
binding on State actors.
Finally, revisionists are wrong to claim that Sosa rejects the modern position. To the contrary, the Court’s creation of a federal common law cause of action for damages for violation of certain norms of
customary international law is more supportive of the modern position than of the revisionist position. The Court recognized that Sabbatino had endorsed Jessup’s view regarding Erie’s effect on the status
of customary international law, and, in concluding that it was appropriate to create a federal common law right of action for damages for
violation of certain norms of customary international law, it relied on
the fact that, “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic
273 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (footnote omitted).
274 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
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law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”275 Thus,
although the Court did not definitively adopt the modern position in
Sosa, it came close to doing so.
II. THE INTERMEDIATE THEORIES
Revisionists and defenders of the modern position agree that,
before Erie, customary international law was regarded as (at least) general common law.276 Federal courts reached their own conclusions
about the content of the general common law, but State courts were
not bound by federal interpretations.277 Revisionists and defenders of
the modern position likewise agree that, after Erie, the general common law no longer exists.278 If customary international law now has
the status of domestic law in this country at all, it has to be either
federal law or State law. If customary international law is now federal
law, then this law preempts any inconsistent State law, State courts are
bound by the federal courts’ views regarding the content of this law,
and the Supreme Court may review State court decisions regarding
such law. If customary international law is now purely a matter of
State law, then it does not preempt State law, and the State courts’
views about its content would (apparently) bind the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court. The Third Restatement takes the position that customary international law is generally federal law, with the
effects just noted;279 the revisionists maintain that, unless transformed
into federal law through political branch lawmaking, customary international law is, at best, State law.280 But both agree that, after Erie,
these are the only two possibilities.
More recently, scholars have argued that customary international
law can have an intermediate status between State and federal law.
Professor Ramsey has proposed that customary international law be
275 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
276 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. 1, ch. 2 introductory note (1987) (“During the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L.Ed.
865 (1842), State and federal courts respectively determined international law for
themselves as they did common law, and questions of international law could be
determined differently by the courts of various States and by the federal courts.”);
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 822–23 (noting that customary international law was generally applied as part of the “general common law” before Erie);
Koh, supra note 16, at 1830–31 (same); Young, supra note 19, at 374 & n.43, 393–94 &
n.143 (collecting articles).
277 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 823.
278 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 16, at 472; Koh, supra note 16, at 1831; Stephens,
supra note 16, at 397; Young, supra note 19, at 375.
279 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) & cmt. d.
280 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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regarded as “nonpreemptive” federal law, meaning that it can be
applied as federal law whenever it does not conflict with State law.281
Professor Young has argued that customary international law can
remain general law, to be applied in American courts in accordance
with choice-of-law rules, just as foreign law sometimes is.282 Dean
Aleinikoff has proposed that customary international law be regarded
as federal law applicable in federal courts but not applicable in State
courts.283
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore and Bellia and Clark do not
defend an intermediate status for customary international law, but
they argue that some subset of customary international law may be
treated as federal law even though not incorporated into law by one of
the forms of federal law listed in the Supremacy Clause (statutes and
treaties). Bellia and Clark set forth a structural constitutional basis for
according a subset of customary international law preemptive force.284
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore argue that customary international
law may (sometimes) be incorporated as federal law by the President
acting alone and by the courts pursuant to jurisdictional statutes.285
On closer inspection, some of these intermediate positions turn
out to be not so intermediate, and all but that of Bellia and Clark
encounter significant problems.
A. Ramsey’s Position
Professor Ramsey argues that customary international law should
be regarded as nonpreemptive federal law, a law that federal courts
may apply, but only if there is no conflicting State law.286 (Even then,
apparently the State courts need not apply this law.287) Ramsey argues
that this position is supported by the text of the Constitution as understood by the Founders.288 He also argues that his proposal would replicate the effect that customary international law possessed as pre-Erie
general law.289 On closer analysis, however, nonpreemptive federal
law appears to be another name for State law. Moreover, Ramsey’s
theory would produce acute anomalies, would be potentially very diffi281
II.A.
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 350–51; Ramsey, supra note 17, at 584; infra Part
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Young, supra note 19, at 370; infra Part II.B.
infra Part II.C.
infra Part II.D.
Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 922.
Ramsey, supra note 17, at 577, 584.
RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 350.
id. at 348–55.
Ramsey, supra note 17, at 558.
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cult to apply, and would render customary international law inapplicable where it is needed most. Ramsey’s textual and historical support
for this highly problematic approach is more equivocal than he
claims.
1. Nonpreemptive Federal Law as State Law
To modern ears, the concept of nonpreemptive federal law
sounds like a contradiction in terms. We are accustomed to thinking
of federal law as by its nature preemptive of conflicting State law.
With respect to customary international law, Ramsey reverses the relationship between State and federal law, stipulating that this federal
law applies only where there is no conflict with State law.290 In the
event of a conflict between customary international law and State law,
the courts must apply State law.291
Under this theory, the space for application of customary international law depends on how one determines whether a conflict exists.
For example, if State law recognizes a cause of action but does not
affirmatively recognize an immunity for a sitting head of state, is there
a conflict with a norm of customary international law entitling the
head of state to immunity? The answer would appear to depend on
whether the State’s law purports to be comprehensive, in the sense
that it permits all that it does not prohibit. If State law is comprehensive in this sense, then there would be a conflict between a State’s
provision of a cause of action and a norm of customary international
law providing immunity from such a cause of action, even if State law
did not specifically deny such an immunity. Presumably, a federal
court would answer the comprehensiveness question by reference to
State law. If State law tells us that State law is comprehensive, then
customary international law would not be applied at all unless the
State affirmatively incorporated it. If State law tells us that State law is
not comprehensive with respect to customary international law, then
State law effectively incorporates customary international law wholesale, subject to being overridden at retail by statute or perhaps by
State judicial decision. In either case, customary international law
would be applicable solely as State law.
Most likely, State law will be silent as to whether it is comprehensive. In such circumstances, the federal court could perhaps determine that it is appropriate to apply customary international law to the
extent that it does not directly conflict with State law. But this
approach could easily be understood as the application of interna290
291

See id. at 584.
See id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 63

customary international law as u.s. law

4-OCT-11

12:26

1557

tional law as State law. Indeed, this would appear to be a perfectly
reasonable interpretation of State law that is silent regarding international law. Since customary international law was regarded as part of
the law of England, it is proper to assume that the States received such
law into their common law upon independence, or upon becoming a
State, subject to legislative override.292 In short, if the federal courts
answer the comprehensiveness question by reference to State law, it
would seem to follow that customary international law would be applicable as a matter of State law, not federal law.
On the other hand, for the federal courts to answer the comprehensiveness question by reference to federal law would be to give customary international law the force of preemptive federal law, running
afoul of Ramsey’s insistence that such law is nonpreemptive. Ramsey
says that, when State law does not “explicitly reject” the immunity
defense, “the federal courts [could] apply a version of the Charming
Betsy rule, interpreting State law not to violate international law if
another construction of the law is possible.”293 But, if Ramsey would
apply such a rule even when State law purports to be comprehensive
and does not provide for such a rule, then he would be allowing customary international law to preempt State law. Because he insists that
customary international law is nonpreemptive, presumably he would
not allow the presumption to be applied in such circumstances. If, on
the other hand, he would allow federal courts to apply the Charming
Betsy rule only when State law does not purport to be comprehensive,
then, again, the applicability of customary law would be fully explicable on the theory that the common law, as received by the State from
England, presumptively incorporates customary international law. On
this theory, the federal courts would be applying customary international law as State law, not federal.
In any event, the States would be free to declare that their courts
will not construe State statutes or the common law to conform to customary international law, as the voters of Oklahoma recently have
done.294 Indeed, the States would presumably be free to declare that
they will construe State law to violate customary international law
whenever possible. Ramsey says that “the [Charming Betsy] presumption is not the same as preemption, so its use is not governed by Article VI.”295 But he elsewhere makes clear that State law prevails in the
292
293
Betsy,
294
295

See Young, supra note 19, at 480.
See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 578 (referring to Murray v. Schooner Charming
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Ramsey, supra note 17, at 578.
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event of a conflict.296 If State law specifies that State law is not to be
interpreted to conform to international law, then there would appear
to be a conflict between State law and customary international law
whenever the Charming Betsy presumption would otherwise be doing
any work. Thus, Ramsey’s claim that “federal courts might have the
power to interpret [S]tate law to avoid . . . conflicts [between State law
and customary international law], even while recognizing that in the
event of a conflict the [S]tate would prevail,”297 would appear to hold
true only if the State does not itself provide for a different way to
resolve such conflicts. And if State law does not provide for a different
presumption, then the Charming Betsy presumption could be understood as a State law presumption. As such, it would be fully consistent
with the revisionist view.
Customary international law appears to be doing more work in
one of Ramsey’s examples. Ramsey posits a claim under customary
international law “against a multinational corporation for complicity
in human rights violations in connection with a project in Burma.”298
Ramsey might permit a federal court to resolve this dispute on the
basis of customary international law, but only if the relevant State conflict-of-laws rules would not apply State law to this claim, but would
instead apply Burmese law, and Burmese law would not support recovery.299 The federal court could recognize the claim even if the State
courts would not recognize a claim based on international law.300 It is
not clear why Ramsey would accept the applicability of customary
international law to this case. He tells us that he would not permit the
federal court to adjudicate the claim under international law if, under
State choice-of-law rules, the State courts would apply State law.301
Presumably that is because he would regard the State choice-of-law
rule as effectively extending State law extraterritorially to this dispute.
But doesn’t a State choice-of-law rule making Burmese law applicable
to this dispute reflect the State’s determination that this dispute is
properly governed by Burmese law? If a State’s courts have determined that the dispute is properly resolved under Burmese law, the
State is not neutral with respect to the applicability of international
law; presumably, the State would regard it as proper to resolve the
dispute according to international law only if Burmese law incorporated international law. But Ramsey would permit the federal courts
296
297
298
299
300
301

See
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
See

id. at 585.
at 579.
id.
id. at 579–80.
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to apply customary international law even if Burmese law does not
incorporate it.302
Ramsey claims that the federal court would not be displacing
State choice-of-law rules because “state conflicts rules do not address
the status of international law; these rules only decide which municipal legal rules to apply.”303 But this is true only with respect to horizontal choice-of-law rules. Whether to apply a rule of municipal law
that conflicts with international law is a vertical choice-of-law question.
If a State’s courts would not apply international law to a case, that is
presumably because the State has determined that the dispute is properly resolved according to municipal law even if it conflicts with international law. Ramsey’s reverse-supremacy approach to customary
international law would appear to require a federal court to do the
same. To do otherwise would be to replace the State’s vertical choiceof-law rule with a federal one.
Ramsey also argues that a federal court that applied international
law would not be displacing the State’s refusal to recognize the international law claim because such a refusal is “just a decision by the
[S]tate that its courts are not a forum for international law claims.”304
But a decision not to provide a forum for the adjudication of the dispute would usually be framed as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or
on the ground of forum non conveniens, neither of which would have
res judicata effect.305 A court’s resolution of the dispute according to
Burmese law would have res judicata effect, and would thus bar a subsequent claim under international law. If so, a State choice-of-law rule
would appear to bear on substance and presumably have to be followed by federal courts.306
At any rate, the States would be free to characterize their choiceof-law rules as substantive. Thus, at best, federal courts would be free
to apply international law only if the States characterized their choiceof-law rules as nonsubstantive denials of a forum. But, again, the
States would retain ultimate control over the applicability of international law in federal courts, as Ramsey implicitly recognizes when he
concedes that the federal courts would not be free to apply international law if the States made it clear that their refusal to recognize an
302 Id. at 579.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See Mizokami Bros. of Ariz. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712, 716–17 (8th
Cir. 1981); cf. Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 72–73 (1963) (per
curiam) (holding that a State court dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds does
not preclude federal court’s consideration of § 1404(a) transfer).
306 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
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international law claim was based on their determination that some or
all corporations were, as a substantive matter, not subject to international law.307
Ramsey’s approach would also produce significant problems of
application. First, customary international law would presumably be
inapplicable if it conflicted with the law of any of the fifty States. (If
customary international law is nonpreemptive, then presumably it
cannot preempt the law of any of the fifty States.) Under Ramsey’s
approach, therefore, the federal courts would be required to canvass
the laws of all States whose laws could constitutionally be applied to
the dispute to determine whether they would regard their law as applicable and whether their law conflicts with customary international law.
Since, as Ramsey recognizes, the constitutional limits on the application of State law to foreign disputes are quite modest,308 the number
of States that may constitutionally apply their law to any given dispute
could be large. The analysis would appear to require the resolution of
complex choice-of-law issues under various States’ laws, as well as
issues of substantive law.
Second, if Ramsey would indeed permit a federal court to entertain an international law claim when the State courts would not (as he
claims he would), his approach would replicate the forum shopping
problem that Erie sought to eliminate. If nonpreemptive federal law
would not support “arising under” jurisdiction (a question that Ramsey leaves open309), then his approach would result in federal courts
possibly reaching a different result than State courts depending on
the “accident of diversity.”310 Ramsey acknowledges the problem, but
maintains that it is a necessary consequence of the rule adopted by the
Constitution (a claim I consider below).311
Ramsey perceives, and accepts, a second problem with his proposal: that it would produce a lack of uniformity between State and federal courts in the interpretation of customary international law.312
Ramsey argues that nonuniformity should not be regarded as a problem because “[n]on-uniformity was the rule for at least the 150-odd
years prior to Erie” and it did not create significant foreign relations
307 See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 579 n.91.
308 See id. at 573.
309 See id. at 583 n.105.
310 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
311 See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 583.
312 Id. at 582 (noting that the nonuniformity problem arises “if the federal courts
and State courts reach independent conclusions as to the substantive content of international law”).
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problems then.313 For reasons explained in Part IV, divergent State
and federal interpretations of customary international law would
indeed pose a significant foreign relations problem for the nation.
On the other hand, it seems to me that Ramsey’s approach does not
present the problem of nonuniformity between a federal court and
the courts of the State in which it sits. Ramsey’s acceptance of this
objection suggests that he envisions that federal courts will not be
bound by State court interpretations of customary international law.
But, if customary international law were nonpreemptive, then it would
seem to follow that federal courts will in fact have to follow State court
interpretations of such law. Ramsey admits that federal courts cannot
apply customary international law if the States have rejected it. It follows that, if a State incorporates customary international law in part
but rejects it in part, then federal courts may enforce only the part
that the State has incorporated. It follows further that, if the State has
incorporated a mistaken interpretation of customary international
law, the federal courts are bound to enforce that mistaken interpretation. The States could in theory decide to incorporate customary
international law as interpreted by the federal courts; this would
amount to a delegation of the interpretation of customary international law by the State to the federal courts. In this situation, there
would be no lack of uniformity. Apart from such a delegation, the
only time the federal courts would be using their independent judgment about the content of customary international law would be when
State law is silent about its content. Since, by hypothesis, there would
be no State interpretation of international law in such contexts, there
would be no lack of uniformity. In sum, lack of uniformity as between
State and federal courts is not a problem, but only because Ramsey’s
approach is, in application, indistinguishable from the revisionist view
that customary international law is State law.
On the other hand, Ramsey’s approach would produce a different sort of disuniformity: the fifty different States would each reach
their own conclusions regarding customary international law, thus
potentially producing fifty different interpretations of customary
international law. Indeed, the federal courts would themselves be
applying nonuniform interpretations of customary international law,
since they would have to follow the nonuniform interpretations of
such law by the fifty State courts. And federal and State courts alike
would confront potentially complex choice-of-law problems if different States adopted different interpretations of international law. The
Supreme Court in Sabbatino expressed concern about such
313

Id.
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nonuniformity when it wrote that “rules of international law should
not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial [S]tate
interpretations.”314
It is not true that we managed to live with such disuniformity for
150 years. As discussed in Part I, during those years, customary international law was regarded as either binding and preemptive federal
law or as general common law. To the extent it was regarded as the
latter, federal and State courts alike understood their task to be to
discover and apply a general law whose content did not depend on
their decisions, a regime that resulted in a remarkable degree of uniformity.315 By contrast, if Ramsey’s approach were adopted, the State
courts would be accorded the power to incorporate customary international law—and to require or preclude the federal courts from
applying it—in whole, in part, or not at all. The State courts would
also be recognized to have the power to modify or supplement such
law, and again the federal courts would be required to follow. Conflicting interpretations—and conflicting degrees of incorporation—
are much more likely to occur if Ramsey’s approach were adopted
than under the pre-Erie general law approach.
Finally, and most importantly, Ramsey’s approach would disallow
federal court enforcement of customary international law in precisely
the type of case that concerned the Founders the most. As many have
recounted, the Founders were most concerned about violations of
international law by the States.316 The problems caused by State violations of international law demonstrated to the Founders that responsibility for compliance with international law had to be assigned to the
federal government.317 Ramsey recognizes the structural problem
with leaving questions of international law to the States, but he argues
that the Founders addressed it, with respect to customary international law, by giving Congress the power to require States to comply
with such law.318 Unless Congress gives preemptive effect to customary international law, he argues, the States retain the power to violate
it.319 I discuss Ramsey’s basis for these conclusions below. The pre314 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). The Court
attributed this concern to Professor Philip Jessup, see id., but Jessup’s article does not
express a concern about nonuniformity, see Jessup, supra note 185, at 743. It is thus
likely that it was the Court itself that perceived that divergent State court international
law would be a problem.
315 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
316 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 86, at 144.
317 Id. at 146.
318 See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 582.
319 RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 350.
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sent point is that Ramsey’s argument that customary international law
is nonpreemptive federal law is unresponsive to the Founders’ main
concerns. Under Ramsey’s approach, the federal courts would
remain powerless in the face of State action contravening such law.
They would be able to enforce such law only if the States have been
silent, and they would be able to resolve an international law claim
differently from the State courts only in the unusual situation of a
dispute arising from conduct that took place entirely abroad—a type
of case that was hardly a central concern of the Founders. It seems
highly unlikely that these very unusual situations were what the Founders had in mind when they wrote, for example:
Under the national government . . . the laws of nations . . . will
always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in
thirteen States . . . will not always accord or be consistent . . . . The
wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only
to one national government cannot be too much commended.320

2. Ramsey’s Textual and Historical Support
Ramsey acknowledges that, under his approach, the applicability
of international law remains within the States’ control.321 He insists
that this necessarily follows from the constitutional text and the Framers’ intent.322 But neither the text nor the Framers’ intent provides
significant support for his argument.
Ramsey’s principal textual argument is that the Constitution enumerates the categories of preemptive federal law and customary international law is not among them.323 This omission is particularly
telling, he argues, because the other principal form of international
law—treaties—is listed.324 In addition, he notes that the Constitution
is not silent about customary international law: it expressly gives Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of
Nations.”325 He argues that the Offenses Clause tells us that customary international law can be preemptive federal law only if enacted
320 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 37–38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
321 See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 582.
322 See id. at 585.
323 See id. at 559–60.
324 Id. at 560; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
325 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Ramsey, supra note 17, at 560.
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into federal law by statute (or treaty).326 In other words, customary
international law is non-self-executing federal law.
But there is another possible explanation for the inclusion of
treaties but not customary international law in the Supremacy Clause.
The British rule with respect to treaties, which we would have inherited had the Constitution not established a different rule, was that
treaties do not have the force of domestic law until implemented by
statute.327 One purpose of the Supremacy Clause with respect to treaties was to reverse the British rule and give treaties the effect of
domestic law once in force.328 With respect to customary international law, the British rule was the opposite: such law was regarded as
part of the law of the land without the need for legislative implementation.329 If the Founders assumed that the British approach would
apply unless changed, then there was no need to declare that customary international law was to have the force of domestic law. Even without such a declaration, customary international law would be the law
of the land, just as it was in England.
Of course, a second effect of the Supremacy Clause with respect
to treaties was to establish that they were preemptive of State law.
Because customary international law is not listed, the text of the
Supremacy Clause does not establish that such law is likewise preemptive of State law. Ramsey argues that such law cannot be understood
to have been included in Article VI’s reference to the “laws of the
United States . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution],” since
customary international law is not made through the lawmaking procedures set forth in the Constitution.330 But, as noted above, some
Founders appear to have regarded the preemptive effect of (some of)
the law of nations as an inference from the constitutional structure,
and the Constitution is, of course, part of the supreme law of the
land.331 Moreover, the text cannot help Ramsey if, as revisionists
argue, customary international law was understood by the Founders to
be general law.332 Pre-Erie general law had some characteristics of
contemporary federal law (federal courts were not bound by State
court interpretations of the law) but lacked others (State courts could
326 See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 348–50; Ramsey, supra note 17, at 560–61.
327 See Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 86, at 614–15.
328 See generally id. at 616–19 (describing the purpose and original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause).
329 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
330 See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 559–60 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
331 See supra text accompanying note 117; see also infra text accompanying note
350.
332 See Young, supra note 19, at 374 & n.43.
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enforce their own interpretations of the law).333 If that intermediate
option is no longer available, then the status of customary international law, post-Erie, must change in one direction or the other. If the
text of the Supremacy Clause was understood to leave customary international law with that intermediate status, then that text cannot help
us choose between the two other options.
Ramsey defends his proposal as the closest available approximation of the intermediate status that customary international law possessed before Erie, but his proposal would make customary
international almost indistinguishable from State law. His attempt to
recapture customary international law’s pre-Erie status overlooks his
own insight that Erie “did not just overrule one line of cases, but overthrew an entire way of thinking about law.”334 As noted above, before
Erie, State and federal interpretations of the general common law converged because those courts believed themselves to be involved in the
common enterprise of discovering and applying a law whose content
did not depend on their decisions. With that way of thinking about
the law overthrown, relegating customary international law to the status of the present-day common law would produce far greater disuniformity than the Founders contemplated. In light of the State
courts’ new conception of their role vis-à-vis the common law, customary international law’s pre-Erie status would be more closely recaptured if it were regarded as federal law.335
The Offenses Clause similarly fails to support Ramsey’s position.
Revisionists read that clause to establish that the federal law status of
customary international law depends on legislative transformation.336
But, here again, an alternative reading is available. The Offenses
Clause can be understood instead to reflect the view that congressional action is necessary to make violations of customary international law a criminal offense. Although today it is accepted that the
Offenses Clause empowers Congress to pass civil as well as criminal
laws,337 it is clear from the clause’s use of the terms “punish” and
“Offenses” that criminal laws were the central concern of the
clause.338 Today, it is well accepted that the violation of treaties can333 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 823.
334 Ramsey, supra note 17, at 585.
335 For elaboration of this point, see supra text accompanying note 178.
336 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 2, at 325; Young, supra
note 19, at 393.
337 See J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 861–62 (2007).
338 Cf. id. at 868 (noting that the executive branch until recently interpreted the
Offenses Clause to permit proscription of criminal conduct only).
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not be made a criminal offense except pursuant to statute.339 A fortiori, the same must be true of customary international law. Since
treaties are concededly federal law even though a federal statute is
required to make violations criminal, the Constitution’s enumeration
of an express federal power to criminalize violations of customary
international law does not establish that customary international law is
non-self-executing in other respects.340
In addition to his textual analysis, Ramsey finds evidence of the
Framers’ intent in Justice Chase’s opinion in Ware v. Hylton.341 He
argues that the following language from Chase’s opinion clearly establishes that the Founders understood that customary international law
would not preempt State law:
It is admitted, that Virginia could not confiscate private debts without a violation of the modern law of nations, yet if in fact, she has so
done, the [state] law is obligatory on all citizens of Virginia, and on
her Courts of Justice; and, in my opinion, on all the Courts of the
United States. If Virginia by such conduct violated the law of
nations, she was answerable to Great Britain, and such injury could
only be redressed in the treaty of peace.342

In context, however, that language does not support the claim that
the Founders believed that State law could preempt customary international law. Justice Chase was discussing the petitioner’s argument
that a Virginia statute confiscating the property of British citizens was
invalid because it violated the law of nations.343 The relevant Virginia
law was enacted in 1777, before the Constitution was written, and even
before the Articles of Confederation were in force.344 Justice Chase
made it clear in his opinion that, in his view, Virginia at the time was a
sovereign nation.345 Thus, his statement that a statute of the Virginia
legislature would prevail over customary international law stands only
for the proposition that a nation’s legislature may preclude the application of customary international law by that nation’s courts. The
339 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 718 & n.108 (1995).
340 It is true that, in the early Republic, it was believed by some that the common
law, unaided by a statute, could be the basis of a federal criminal prosecution. Still, it
is likely that many Founders held the opposite view, a view that was later adopted by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32
(1812).
341 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
342 RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 352 (alteration in original) (citing Ware, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 229 (opinion of Chase, J.)).
343 See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 222 (opinion of Chase, J.).
344 See id. at 199–200 (statement of the case).
345 See id. at 223–24 (opinion of Chase, J.).
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equivalent proposition today would be that Congress has the power
under our Constitution to preclude the application of customary
international law in our courts, a proposition that even the Restatement
endorses.346 The structural argument for the preemptive force of customary international law relies on the place of the States in our federal Union. Chase’s analysis in Ware does not contradict that
argument.347
Indeed, Chase’s opinion in Ware suggests that the Founders
would not have agreed that the States had the power to preempt customary international law under the Constitution as eventually
adopted, or even under the Articles of Confederation. The petitioner
in Ware argued alternatively that Virginia’s violation of the law of
nations was invalid as an interference with the national government’s
exclusive power over war and peace.348 Chase rejected that argument,
but only because he believed that, before the Articles of Confedera346 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) (1987).
Ramsey also relies on similar statements by Justice Iredell in his circuit court opinion
in Ware, which was reversed by the Court on other grounds. See RAMSEY, supra note
10, at 352–53 (citing Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 265–66 (opinion of Iredell, J.)). But
Iredell, too, relied on the fact that Virginia’s law was passed before the Articles of
Confederation were in force: “[N]o one has suggested, that the act of October, 1777,
was in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution of the [S]tate; and at that time
the articles of Confederation were not in force . . . .” Ware, 3 U.S. at 266 (opinion of
Iredell, J.); cf. infra note 351. In addition, Ramsey relies on this statement from Justice Cushing’s brief opinion: “A State may make what rules it pleases; and those rules
must necessarily have place within itself. But here is a treaty, the supreme law, which
overrules all State laws upon the subject, to all intents and purposes; and that makes
the difference.” RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 353 (quoting Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282
(opinion of Cushing, J.)). It is unclear how this statement supports Ramsey’s position. Clearly Cushing could not have meant that State laws are valid unless they violate a treaty; as Ramsey recognizes, State laws that violate the Constitution and federal
statutes are also invalid. In any event, in light of the reasoning of Chase and Iredell,
the very general statement in Cushing’s opinion cannot be read to suggest that a State
statute enacted after the adoption of the Constitution would be valid and binding even if it
violated customary international law.
347 When Chase further indicated that the U.S. courts would similarly be precluded from invalidating Virginia’s act in reliance on customary international law, see
Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 229 (opinion of Chase, J.), he presumably meant that the U.S.
courts were required to resolve the validity of the Virginia confiscation pursuant to
the law applicable in Virginia at the time of the law’s enactment, and since neither the
Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution was in force at the time, there was then
no higher domestic law to require the application of customary international law.
Chase considered separately whether the laws or treaties that came into existence
afterwards retroactively required the invalidation of Virginia’s statute, and he concluded (along with all of the other Justices save Iredell) that they did. See id. at
242–43.
348 See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 219–20 (argument of counsel for the petitioner).
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tion came into force, Congress did not possess exclusive power over
war and peace.349 He recognized, however, that if the Constitution
did allocate exclusive power over war and peace to the national government, the States would have been implicitly prohibited from exercising “external sovereignty.”350 Ware thus reflects the view of at least
some Founders that State discretion to violate international law is
inconsistent with a federal structure.351 As noted above, the court in
Rutgers v. Waddington reached the same conclusion even with respect
to the weaker federal system established by the Articles of
Confederation.352
Ramsey claims that his concept of nonpreemptive federal law replicates the pre-Erie concept of general law.353 It is true that most general law—the part of it that corresponds to what we now consider the
common law—was thought to be alterable by State legislatures. But,
as discussed above, it is far from clear that the part of general law that
corresponds to today’s customary international law was also thought
to be alterable by the States. Ramsey notes that there were no nineteenth-century decisions striking down State statutes that conflicted
with customary international law,354 but he cites no cases upholding
such statutes either. The lack of cases either way suggests that the
States did not regard themselves as free to depart from that portion of
349 See id. at 231–33 (opinion of Chase, J.).
350 See id. at 232. This is, of course, a precursor to the structural argument that
Professors Bellia and Clark develop in their article. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21,
at 5–7.
351 In his opinion in Ware, Justice Iredell opined that if the Articles of Confederation had been in force in 1777:
I think there is no colour for alledging [sic] any inconsistency [of the Virginia law] with them, since Congress could have passed no act on this subject, but if they had wished for an act, must have recommended to the State
Legislatures to pass it. And the very nature of a recommendation implies,
that the party recommending cannot, but the party to whom the recommendation is made, can do the thing recommended.
Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 266 (opinion of Iredell, J.). If Iredell meant that the Virginia
law would have been valid under the regime of the Articles of Confederation even if it
had violated the law of nations, his dictum would be in tension with Rutgers, but it
would not imply that he would have considered such a law to be valid under the
Constitution, since the Constitution does give the federal government the power to
pass a law on the subject and, indeed, all of the Justices in Ware found that the Constitution itself gave legal force to a treaty on the subject. See id. at 236 (opinion of
Chase, J.); id. at 249 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 259 (opinion of Iredell, J.); id. at
281 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 282 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
352 See supra text accompanying note 117 (discussing Rutgers v. Waddington).
353 See RAMSEY, supra note 17, at 585.
354 See id. at 352.
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the law of nations. This view may in turn have been based on the
States’ understanding that international law generally was binding on
all, combined with a recognition that, if violations of international law
were permitted at all by our Constitution, they would have to be
authorized by the federal government. As we have seen, the idea that,
in a federal system, departures from international law must be a matter for the federal government, not the States, even predated the
Constitution.355
B. Young’s Position
Like Ramsey, Young proposes a solution that seeks to avoid the
problems of both the modern and revisionist positions by replicating
the pre-Erie status of customary international law as general law.356
Unlike Ramsey’s proposal, Young’s is truly intermediate in that it
would not effectively relegate customary international law to State law
status. That is because Young would recognize that, in certain circumstances, federal law may require the application of customary international law even if State law would not.357 Still, Young’s proposal tilts
heavily toward the revisionist view, as he makes it clear that the applicability of customary international law would ordinarily be determined by State law.358 Moreover, the particular mechanism that
Young proposes to determine when customary international law will
be applied in federal or State courts—the application of choice-of-law
rules359—is problematic in a number of respects.
355 See supra text accompanying note 117.
356 See Young, supra note 19, at 370.
357 See id. Indeed, Ramsey’s main criticism of Young’s proposal is that it would
effectively accord customary international law preemptive force in some circumstances. See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 567–71. Young, for his part, criticizes Ramsey
for sometimes permitting Supreme Court displacement of State court applications of
customary international law. See Young, supra note 19, at 484. This criticism seems
misplaced. First, it depends on Young’s belief that Ramsey would regard customary
international law as federal law for purposes of arising under jurisdiction, see id. at
483–84, whereas Ramsey expressly reserves judgment on that point, see Ramsey, supra
note 17, at 583 n.105. Second, since Ramsey insists that customary international law is
nonpreemptive, it would seem to follow that, even if the Supreme Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over a case “arising under” that law, it may not review or
reverse the State court’s interpretation of it. Indeed, although Young denies it, the
logic of his proposal would appear to require the conclusion that the Supreme Court
may review State court applications of international law in certain circumstances. See
infra text accompanying note 448–49. In my view, Ramsey’s position is highly problematic, and Young’s slightly less so, precisely insofar as they would deny the Supreme
Court authority to review State court interpretations of customary international law.
358 See Young, supra note 19, at 508–09.
359 See id. at 468.
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Section 1 considers Young’s criticisms of the modern position.
Section 2 considers Young’s prescriptions.
1. Young’s Criticisms of the Modern Position
Young offers a lengthy critique of the modern position, which he
describes as the view that “customary international law is always federal law and always displaces [State] law, without consideration of the
nature of the particular rule at issue or of the constellation of federal,
[S]tate, international, and private interests that might be implicated
by it.”360 He finds “the revisionist critique of the modern position fundamentally persuasive—at least in its negative project of demonstrating that the wholesale incorporation of customary international law as
federal common law is inconsistent with constitutional principle.”361
He concludes that “the modern position offends constitutional norms
of federalism, separation of powers, and democracy.”362
The critiques based on democracy, federalism, and separation of
powers are overdrawn. Revisionists often criticize international law
for its “democratic deficit.” One version of this critique stresses that
its norms often do not reflect the preferences of the majority of the
world’s people.363 Many countries that participate in its creation are
not democracies; the “dead hand” of older customary international
legal norms binds states even after those norms have changed; and
undemocratically selected elites, such as judges on international tribunals and law professors, have undue influence in the creation and
interpretation of customary international law.364 Young credits a different version of the democracy critique: the makers of customary
international law do not fairly represent the people of the United States.
Thus, quoting Professor Trimble, he notes that “at least some of the
potential lawmakers, such as foreign governments, are neither representative of the American political community nor responsive to it.”365
360 Id. at 437; see also id. at 444, 463, 509 (describing similarly the modern position). As discussed in subpart I.B, few proponents of the modern position take such
an uncompromising position.
361 Id. at 462.
362 Id.
363 See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449, 518–23 (2000); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International
Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1771–73 (2009).
364 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 363, at 1764–68.
365 Young, supra note 19, at 398–99 (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View
of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 721 (1986)); see also Bradley &
Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 2, at 857, 868 (arguing the modern position conflicts
with basic principles of American democracy).
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Young is not comforted by the “internationalist” response that the federal political branches at least participate in the international lawmaking process.366
In my view, both versions of the democracy critique are misguided. As Young recognizes, compliance with international law was
an “important desideratum” for the Framers,367 who “clearly intended
that customary international law should have application in our
courts.”368 Yet, at the time of the Founding, far fewer of the world’s
nations were democracies than today—and, to the extent that the law
of nations was thought to be “made” at all, it was made at a much
earlier time, when even fewer countries were democracies. Moreover,
in the Founders’ view, much of the law of nations was not “made” at
all, but instead had its basis in natural law or right reason.369 They
wished to see international law complied with, not because it satisfied
their conceptions of democracy, but because they feared the consequences for the nation if such law were violated.370 As discussed
above, this remains the most powerful structural argument for treating customary international law as preemptive federal law. The reality
that violations of international law risk bad consequences for the
nation in the form of adverse reactions by other nations is a fact about
the world that must be taken into account in some fashion. (Moreover, it bears recalling, in this connection, that adherents of the modern position do not claim that customary international law’s status as
federal law is immune from alteration by democratic means. The
debate concerns the default rule: does it take an act of federal political branches to prohibit States from violating such law, or to permit
them to do so?)
Young ultimately concludes that the democracy critique adds
nothing to the federalism and separation-of-powers critiques.371 In
366 See Young, supra note 19, at 399.
367 Id. at 469 n.531.
368 Id. at 390.
369 See RAMSEY, supra note 17, 344–46; Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitutional Status
of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2006). For this
reason, Young is on weak ground when he distinguishes the “old” law of nations from
the “new” international law on the ground that the former was “empirically-based,”
where as the latter is not. See Young, supra note 19, at 390–91. The “new” international law may or may not have an empirical basis, but it is clear that much of the
“old” international law did not. In any event, this distinction is orthogonal to the
Founders’ concerns. As discussed in the text, the Founders wished to see norms of
international law complied with, regardless of their provenance, because they were
concerned about the consequences of violations of such law.
370 See Stephens, supra note 16, at 400–02.
371 See Young, supra note 19, at 400.
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my view, the democracy critique is actually in tension with the federalism and separation-of-powers critiques. The latter critiques reduce
themselves to the objection that customary international law is not
made in the manner contemplated by the Constitution for making
preemptive federal law. Young relies heavily on the scholarship of
Bradford Clark, who has argued forcefully that the list of categories of
supreme federal law set forth in the Supremacy Clause is exclusive.372
As discussed above, Clark has argued that the process for making
these three forms of federal law—such as the bicameralism and presentment requirements for making federal statutes—was designed to
privilege the status quo.373 By establishing an onerous procedure for
making federal law, the Constitution makes it difficult to enact preemptive federal law.374 If so, then the separation-of-powers and federalism critiques are subject to a democracy objection. By making
change so difficult, the Constitution gives a veto power to legislators
representing a minuscule percentage of the nation’s population, thus
preventing the enactment of preemptive federal law even when a substantial majority of the population favors such legislation. From a
democracy perspective, this would appear to be problematic.
Young would no doubt respond that he is not criticizing the modern position as inconsistent with some ideal of democracy, but rather
as inconsistent with “our” democracy—that is, the version of democracy embodied in our Constitution.375 Presumably, then, Young is
also not objecting that the modern position is inconsistent with some
idealized version of separation of powers or federalism, but rather
with “our” separation of powers and federalism. It follows that one
cannot assess the modern position except by interpreting our Constitution and determining if the modern position is consistent with that
interpretation. In other words, separation of powers and federalism
are not a basis for critiquing the modern position distinct from the
claim that the modern position is inconsistent with the Constitution as
properly construed. And, if that is so, then any separation-of-powers
or federalism critique presupposes a theory of constitutional
interpretation.
Ramsey’s theory of constitutional interpretation is very much a
textualist and originalist one. I concluded above that neither the con372 See Clark, supra note 24, at 1323–24. Young relies on Clark’s scholarship
throughout his piece. See Young, supra note 19, at 371 nn.25–26, 378 n.60, 393 n.142,
402 n.192.
373 See Clark, supra note 24, at 1338–46; Young, supra note 19, at 402.
374 For a critique of this view, see Vázquez, supra note 116, at 1602–03.
375 Young criticizes the “internationalist” response to the democracy critique of
the modern position on this ground. See Young, supra note 19, at 399.
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stitutional text nor the Founders’ intent required the revisionist position favored by Ramsey. Being less of a textualist or originalist, Young
places more of an emphasis on constitutional “structure” and “principle,” as well as evolved judicial doctrine. A critique based on structure
and principle, however, seems vulnerable to the same objection as one
based on separation of powers and federalism: unless Young means to
criticize the modern position as inconsistent with some idealized version of constitutional structure or principle, he must link this critique
to some other accepted indicium of constitutional meaning. If he
bases his appeal to structure and principle on the Constitution’s text
or the Founders’ intent, his arguments are vulnerable to the same
response as Ramsey’s. Young’s critique would appear to be distinct
from Ramsey’s, then, only insofar as he relies additionally on tradition
and evolved judicial doctrine.
I considered the modern position’s conformity with pre-Erie doctrine above and concluded that there were two contending positions.376 Young stresses that, before Erie, customary international law
was treated as “general law,” but he recognizes that this regime operated very differently from that of present-day State law.377 As Young
notes, the “general law” regime produced a remarkable degree of uniformity because State and federal courts viewed themselves as
engaged in a common enterprise and thus tended to rely on each
other’s decisions and arrive at very similar results.378 Young is entirely
correct in concluding that “[t]he revisionist view that a [S]tate choosing to apply customary international norms necessarily incorporates
those norms as [S]tate law would eliminate that sort of imperative.”379
This was precisely the reason that we concluded in Part I that, as
between the modern and the revisionist positions, the operative law in
the pre-Erie period resembled the modern position more than the
revisionist position.
Of course, Young does not believe that those are our only two
choices. He proposes an intermediate status for customary interna376 Post-Erie doctrine would of course be an odd ground on which to defend a
revisionist position, since revisionism by definition seeks to overturn entrenched
doctrine.
377 See Young, supra note 19, at 466–67.
378 See id. (“Although each [S]tate had the power to interpret general law by its
own lights . . . both [S]tate and federal participants in that system viewed themselves
as participants in a common enterprise and, accordingly, put a strong emphasis on
mutual deference and uniformity.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 124, at 1554,
1562–64, 1572–75 (describing the uniformity experienced by the marine insurance
industry under the general law regime during the early nineteenth century).
379 Young, supra note 19, at 467.
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tional law intended to replicate its pre-Erie status as general law. As
discussed in greater detail in the next section, Young proposes that
customary international law continue to be treated as general law,
applicable in the courts whenever a valid choice-of-law rule calls for its
application. Except to the very limited extent that he would recognize
a role for federal choice-of-law rules, Young would recognize a State
power to depart from customary international law,380 and he would
deny the Supreme Court the power to review State court interpretations of such law, even when a federal choice-of-law rule applies.
Although formally this regime may be closer to the pre-Erie general
law regime, in operation it would suffer from the very problems that
he rightly attributes to the revisionist position. With the loss of a sense
of common enterprise, and the explicit recognition of a State power
to depart from customary international law, State courts would be far
less likely to follow federal precedents, and State courts and even legislatures may discourage or even prohibit the application of customary
international law, as the citizens of Oklahoma recently voted to do.
Thus, we are far more likely to get divergent interpretations of customary international law and even outright violations of it. Innocence
lost cannot be so easily regained.
In the end, Young’s approach is less problematic than Ramsey’s
only insofar as he is willing to accept that federal law sometimes
requires the application of customary international law. Because he is
willing to accept such a federal role in very limited circumstances,
however, his proposal is only marginally preferable to Ramsey’s.
Moreover, the particular approach that Young proposes for determining the applicability of customary international law in our courts—
which relies on choice-of-law rules—would be unhelpful, inapposite,
and difficult to apply.
2. Young’s Intermediate Status for Customary International Law
Young proposes that customary international law continue to be
regarded as general law.381 He argues at length that this status is compatible with Erie’s rejection of such status for the common law.382 The
key to his proposal’s consistency with Erie lies in his recognition that
customary international law would be applicable in the courts only
380 See, e.g., id. at 480–81 (“[T]he Charming Betsy principle would bolster a requirement that [S]tate departures from longstanding customary international norms be
indicated by clear legislation or judicial precedents . . . .”); id. at 496–97 (addressing
objection that States may depart from customary international law).
381 See id. at 468.
382 See id. at 467–74.
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insofar as an “otherwise valid” choice-of-law rule calls for its application to a particular case.383 As Young recognizes, choice-of-law rules
are themselves the creatures of either State or federal law.384 Since
the applicability of customary international law would thus be determined by State or federal law, Young’s proposal is consistent with
Erie’s statement that, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State.”385
Young stresses that the applicability of customary international
law, in both State and federal courts, will ordinarily be determined by
State choice-of-law rules386—presumably the choice-of-law rules of the
State in which the court is sitting.387 He acknowledges, however, that
federal law could play a role in some cases.388 I will first discuss the
status of customary international law insofar as Young would determine its applicability by reference to State choice-of-law rules. I shall
then discuss its status insofar as Young would permit federal law to
determine its applicability.
a. State Choice-of-Law Rules
Young proposes that customary international law be treated as
general law, to be applied by the courts when an otherwise valid
choice-of-law rule calls for its application.389 The choice-of-law rules
that Young has in mind are the rules the courts apply to resolve conflicts between the laws of different States or nations.390 An initial
problem with this proposal is the uncertainty that it would bring to
383 See id. at 468.
384 See id. at 483.
385 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Young, supra note 19, at
483. Erie’s list of possible federal sources of law is underinclusive, if only because it
excludes treaties. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating treaties are the “supreme Law of
the Land”). The point for now, however, is that Erie appears to hold that all law
applied in the courts of this country is either State or federal. This requirement
would clearly be satisfied by Young’s proposal if foreign law were regarded as incorporated into the law of the forum State whenever choice-of-law rules call for its application. See infra note 429 and accompanying text. If one resists that conceptualization,
then Erie must be understood to establish instead that all law applied in the courts
must be applied as a result of authorization by either State or federal law (since the
State and federal courts commonly apply foreign law).
386 See Young, supra note 19, at 370.
387 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
388 See Young, supra note 19, at 470.
389 See id. at 370.
390 See id. at 470.
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the question of the applicability of customary international law.391
The proposal would increase uncertainty in at least two respects: (a)
different States approach choice of law differently and (b) many of
the approaches used are themselves highly indeterminate. A more
fundamental problem is that these choice-of-law rules are inapposite,
as they address a sort of conflict that is very different from that
between customary international law and State law. Since States are
free to adopt special choice-of-law rules for a particular issue, presumably most States will end up articulating special rules to determine the
applicability of customary international law. If so, then it is unclear
what is gained by regarding these rules as choice-of-law rules, as
opposed to State rules regarding the incorporation of customary
international law as State law.
In any event, to the extent that the matter turns on State rules
(whether regarded as choice-of-law rules or rules about incorporation
of customary international law as State law), the ultimate determination of whether to apply customary international law will be made by
the States, which would be free to deviate from, or decline altogether
to apply, customary international law. The State would be able to preclude such review by making it clear that it is declining to incorporate
customary international law or (what may amount to the same thing)
that its choice-of-law rule precludes its application. Thus, except to
the extent that Young would permit the application of a federal
choice-of-law rule, Young’s proposal suffers from the same basic problem as Ramsey’s.
i. The Diversity and Indeterminacy of Existing Choice-ofLaw Approaches
An initial concern with Young’s proposal is the great uncertainty
that would be produced through a resort to State choice-of-law rules.
Dean William Prosser once described choice of law as a “dismal
swamp,”392 and matters have only gotten worse since he wrote. At one
time, most States applied more or less the same choice-of-law rules,
those set forth in the First Restatement.393 The First Restatement
approach often determined the applicable law by reference to the
location in which a key event occurred. For example, in tort cases, the
applicable law was that of the state in which the injury occurred (the
391 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal
Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 520, 532–36 (2002).
392 William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
393 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
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lex loci delicti).394 This approach sometimes produced harsh and seemingly arbitrary results, but it had the virtue of being relatively determinate. Over time, some States came to reject the First Restatement
approach in favor of some version of the interest analysis first proposed by Professor Brainerd Currie.395 Later, the Second Restatement
articulated a multifactor balancing approach whose most noteworthy
feature is the high degree of its indeterminacy.396 Today, with the
States employing seven different choice-of-law approaches,397 most of
which are themselves highly indeterminate, the choice-of-law situation
in the United States is widely regarded as being in a state of crisis.398
Because of the diversity of approaches in use in the United States, the
particular approach that will govern the applicability of customary
international law in this country under Young’s proposal will depend
on where the suit is brought. Since most of the approaches are themselves highly indeterminate anyway, the use of such rules will be unappealing to anyone who values certainty and predictability in the law.
ii. The Inappositeness of Choice-of-Law Rules
More importantly, the choice-of-law rules to which Young would
relegate the question of the applicability of customary international
law are inapposite, as they address a completely different type of
394 See id. §§ 378–390.
395 See BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 177, 183–87 (1963).
396 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971); Larry Kramer,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L.
465, 466 (1991) (“To be sure, judges make decisions based on unarticulated intuition
in fields other than choice of law, but in no other field do they seem quite so comfortable about it. Much of the blame can perhaps be attributed to the dominance of the
Second Restatement, since its undirected, multifactor analysis invites post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions about the applicable law.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of
Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2466 (1999) (“[T]he Second
Restatement . . . lists a dizzying number of factors with no hint as to their relative
weight.”).
397 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: TwentyThird Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 231 (2010).
398 See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1991) (advocating congressional action to
restore determinacy and uniformity to choice-of-law conflict); Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness
Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1839–40 (2006) (discussing the inadequacy of current
choice-of-law doctrine, particularly with regard to class action suits); Jed J. Borghei,
Note, Class Action Fairness: A Mature Solution to the 23(b)(3) Choice of Law Problem, 95
GEO. L.J. 1645, 1645–46 (2007) (arguing for a solution to choice-of-law problems that
respects federalist and nonfederalist concerns).
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choice-of-law problem. These rules were designed for horizontal
choice-of-law questions: a choice between the law of two states, both
typically addressing the legal relations of private parties. The choiceof-law issue arises because the parties’ transaction or relationship
spanned more than one state or the parties are from different states.
The choice-of-law issue is horizontal because the states whose laws are
contending for application are coequal, whether they are States of the
Union or states in the international sense.399 Neither state purports
to impose obligations on the other. If the courts of one state decline
to apply the law of the other state to the particular dispute, it is generally on the theory that the law is inapplicable because that state’s connection to the dispute is less direct or less relevant than that of the
forum state or of a third state. The forum state’s decision not to apply
another state’s law leaves that state’s law untouched in its core applications—disputes in which all of the parties are from the same state and
all of the relevant acts took place in that state’s territory. Such a decision merely declines to apply the law to peripheral cases.
A conflict between the law of a State and international law is of a
completely different character. Such a conflict is “vertical” in the
sense that one of the two laws purports to impose limits on the other.
It is the very point of international law (when it applies) to limit the
State’s freedom to, for example, entertain a suit against a diplomat or
to execute a minor.400 For a State not to apply that law is to deny the
applicability of the law not at its periphery, but at its core. Unlike a
State’s decision not to apply the law of a sister State or of a foreign
nation to a particular dispute, a State’s decision not to apply customary international law results in a violation of such law.
Being a vertical conflict, the conflict between State law and international law is analogous to that between State law and federal law.
Normally, in the case of a vertical conflict, if the “higher” law is law at
all, it will categorically prevail in the event of a conflict. This is the
result for which the Supremacy Clause provides.401 In the event of a
399 A conflict between the law of a State of the Union (say, New York) and a state
in the international sense (say, France) might appear not to be a contest between the
laws of coequal sovereigns. But, from the perspective of international law (both public and private) the law of New York is considered national (or municipal) law, as
international law does not distinguish between national law and the law of domestic
subunits. Cf. Responsibility of States, supra note 94, at 41.
400 These are two of the examples Young considers. See Young, supra note 12, at
474–81. As to whether there really is a customary international law prohibition of the
execution of minors applicable against the United States, see infra text accompanying
note 426.
401 If anything, the conflict between State law and international law is more acute
than the sort of conflict usually addressed by the Supremacy Clause. The latter type
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conflict between a law that purports to limit what a State may do and a
State law that requires or permits what is prohibited, to resolve the
conflict by recourse to a choice-of-law rule that permits the application of the second law is to deny the first law the status of a binding
law at all.402
The inappositeness of horizontal choice-of-law rules is well illustrated by consideration of the rules that were once widely applied to
resolve such conflicts and continue to be applied in some States (and
in the rest of the world).403 As noted, the choice-of-law rule that once
prevailed for tort cases was the lex loci delicti rule, under which the law
to be applied was the law of the place where the injury occurred.404 In
Young’s example of a tort claim under State law against a foreign diplomat entitled to immunity as a matter of international law where
State law does not recognize an immunity,405 the lex loci delicti
approach would require the application of the law of the place where
the tort occurred. Since international law has no defined territory,
perhaps it would never be applicable under a lex loci delicti approach.
Alternatively, one could say that the “territory” of international law is
the whole world (or at least those nations of the world bound by the
rule in question), in which case the lex loci delicti approach would not
of conflict is typically between a federal statute regulating private parties and a State
law regulating private parties. The State and federal laws are deemed to be in conflict
if they regulate the private parties differently. The Supremacy Clause would be violated
if the State court declined to apply the federal law, but the State would not be violating the federal statute by failing to apply it. In contrast, because international law
applies to state action and purports to bind the State, the State would be directly
violating international law if its courts applied a State law that conflicted with it.
402 Young recognizes that the conflict between State and federal law is a vertical
one, but he maintains that the conflict between State law and international law is
horizontal because there is no “lexical rule” such as the Supremacy Clause to specify a
hierarchy. See Young, supra note 12, at 484. But the Supremacy Clause merely sets
forth a rule to resolve the vertical conflict; it is not what makes the conflict a vertical
one. The conflict between international law and State law is vertical because international law purports to limit states, just as federal law purports to limit State law. It is
for the same reason that a conflict between the Constitution and a federal statute is a
vertical one, even though the Supremacy Clause does not specify a hierarchy as
between the two. Here, too, it is thought to be self-evident that the law that purports
to restrict the other, if it is law at all, must control. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
403 The following States adhere to the First Restatement approach for torts, contracts, or both: Alabama, Florida (contracts only), Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New
Mexico, North Carolina (torts only), Oklahoma (contracts only), Rhode Island (contracts only), South Carolina, Tennessee (contracts only), Virginia, West Virginia (torts
only), Wyoming. See Symeonides, supra note 397, at 231–32.
404 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
405 See Young, supra note 19, at 479–81.
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help us decide between the two conflicting laws, since the territory of
the international law rule (the world) would overlap with that of the
State in which the tort occurred. The latter is of course true of conflicts between State and federal law (that is, the tort occurred in both
the State and the United States), which is why territorial choice-of-law
rules are unhelpful in resolving such conflicts.
Young’s proposal is less implausible if one uses one of the modern approaches to choice of law that some States have adopted, but
these newer approaches too are addressed to horizontal conflicts and
are inapposite to vertical conflicts such as the one under discussion.
The choice-of-law revolution’s first significant incursion came in the
form of interest analysis. The one feature of Currie’s interest analysis
that is widely regarded as an advance is its identification of “false conflicts,” that is, situations in which only one of the States whose conflicting laws are contending for application has an interest in applying its
law to the particular case.406 For example, if two citizens of New York
are riding in an automobile and have an accident in Ontario, and
Ontario law denies the passenger a right to recover against the driver
for negligence while New York law permits recovery, only New York
(the State of the common domicile) has an interest in applying its law
to govern the liability of the driver to his guest.407 The purpose of
Ontario’s law is to protect hosts from the ungratefulness of their
guests, and Ontario has no interest in applying its law because the
host in this case was not from Ontario. Despite the complexities that
may arise in determining the interests underlying the contending
laws, interest analysis has been widely regarded as a success insofar as
it has facilitated the resolution of such false conflicts.408 However,
conflicts between State law and international law will never be false
conflicts. As noted above, the whole point of international law is to
constrain states. Thus, if a State law conflicts with international law,
the conflict will always be a true one.409
406 See LEA BRILMAYER & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 218–19 (5th ed.
2002); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8
(1963).
407 These were the facts of Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), in which
the New York courts first adopted interest analysis. See id. at 280.
408 But see Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277,
1300–01 (1989).
409 This is true even if the suit involves a dispute between foreign parties in which
all the events took place in a foreign country. In such a case, the relevant conflict
would be between the law of the country where the conduct took place and international law. If there is a conflict at all, it is because the law of that foreign country does
not accord with international law. Since it is the point of international law to constrain that country, the conflict will always be a true one.
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Young argues that the conflict between a State law that recognizes
a tort cause of action but is silent regarding immunity and a rule of
international law that entitles the defendant to immunity would be a
false conflict.410 But this misconceives the concept of a false conflict.
Before asking whether a conflict is true or false, one must determine
whether the laws contending for application conflict. To determine
whether they conflict, one must determine the content of the laws in
question. In the case of a State whose law recognizes a generally applicable tort cause of action but is silent as to immunity, the court first
has to decide whether the State’s law implicitly recognizes an immunity. This is a matter of interpreting the State’s domestic law. If the
State recognizes an immunity, then there is no conflict with international law and thus no choice-of-law issue to resolve. If the State
denies an immunity, then there is a conflict. Only then does one
engage in interest analysis to determine if the conflict is true or false.
Whether the conflict is true depends on whether the State’s interests
would be advanced by having its law applied to the case, which in turn
depends on such factors as whether the plaintiff is a citizen of that
State. If the plaintiff is a citizen, and if we assume that the State’s
cause of action was designed to benefit citizens,411 then the conflict
would be a true one.412
Young posits a tort committed by a diplomat in Massachusetts
injuring a Massachusetts resident.413 If Massachusetts law denied
immunity and international law conferred one, there would be a conflict. If Massachusetts denied immunity in order to protect its citizens
who are injured by diplomats, the conflict would be a true one
(because the injured party was from Massachusetts). On the other
hand, if Massachusetts law were construed to grant immunity, there
would be no conflict at all because State law and international law are
the same. What Young considers a false conflict is in fact a nonexistent conflict. The State law’s silence on the question of immunity
raises an issue of interpretation, not a choice-of-law issue. A State
410 Young says that such a conflict would not be an “actual” conflict, but presumably he is invoking Currie’s concept of a true conflict (the opposite of a false conflict),
as he cites Larry Kramer’s discussion of Currie’s false conflict analysis. See Young,
supra note 19, at 469 (citing Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 311 (1990)).
411 This is an assumption often made in interest analysis, although scholars have
criticized it. See Brilmayer, supra note 408, at 1300.
412 If the plaintiff is not from the forum State, then the relevant conflict will be
between the law of the State of the plaintiff’s domicile and international law. See supra
note 409 and accompanying text. If the law of that State grants immunity, there is no
conflict. If the law of that State denies immunity, the conflict will be a true one.
413 See Young, supra note 19, at 479.
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might resolve that question through a background rule that all that is
not explicitly prohibited is permitted. Young himself proposes that
State and federal courts resolve the issue by assuming that the States
had retained the background understanding, expressed by Blackstone
(among others), that the law of nations was part of English common
law.414 Under this approach, State law would be understood to incorporate customary international law unless the legislature has expressly
rejected it. That is certainly a reasonable solution, but it is not a
choice-of-law solution.415
Resolving true conflicts has been the bête noire of interest analysis.
Currie originally proposed always applying forum law.416 This
approach would, of course, always reject the application of international law. Most States have rejected the forum law solution.417 California has adopted Professor William Baxter’s comparative
impairment approach, under which true conflicts would be resolved
by applying the law that would be impaired most if not applied,418 a
notoriously difficult test to apply. In the case of a vertical true conflict, it would seem that the higher law would always be completely
impaired if not applied, whereas, depending on how one characterized its purpose, State law may or may not be fully impaired if not
applied insofar as it violates international law. This test would thus
seem to favor the application of international law.
Other States have adopted Dean Robert Leflar’s “better law”
approach.419 This test differs from the others in that it openly
414 See id. at 480.
415 At least, it is not a horizontal choice of law solution. It might be understood as
a vertical choice-of-law solution, but, as such, it would not depend on horizontal
choice-of-law concepts such as that of a false conflict.
416 See CURRIE, supra note 395, at 184; Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1237–38,
1242 (1963). The discussion in the remainder of this subsection assumes that the law
of the State conflicts with customary international law – in other words, in Young’s
hypothetical diplomatic immunity case, that customary international law entitles the
diplomat to immunity and that Massachusetts law does not recognize an immunity for
diplomats, either by incorporating customary international law or independently. As
noted, if the plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts, the conflict will be a true one.
417 Two States—Kentucky and Michigan—follow the forum law approach, but for
torts only. See Symeonides, supra note 397, at 231, 248 n.80.
418 See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723–26 (Cal. 1976).
419 See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267, 295–304 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1588, 1590–93 (1966). The following States
apply the “better law” approach: Arkansas (torts only), Minnesota, New Hampshire
(torts only), Rhode Island (torts only), and Wisconsin. See Symeonides, supra note
397, at 231–32.
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requires an evaluation of the substance of the contending laws. An
approach that leaves it to State courts to evaluate the merits of a rule
of international law that binds the United States (and which the federal government thus very likely agrees with, at least tacitly) is highly
problematic. The structural problem with leaving compliance with
international law to the States has already been noted. Leaving it to
State judges to assess the desirability of a given norm of customary
international law seems particularly inadvisable, as State judges would
appear to be even less qualified than State executives or legislatures to
evaluate norms of international law.
The largest number of States (though barely a majority) follows
the approach of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.420 The
Second Restatement takes a hybrid approach, designating the State
where a particular act took place as the State whose law presumptively
applies, but permitting that law to be displaced if another State’s
interest is greater.421 To guide the determination of the latter question, the Second Restatement sets forth multiple factors to be considered.422 As applied to a vertical conflict of the sort we are
considering, the initial presumption will be useless if, as discussed
above, the “territory” of international law is the world (or all states
bound by the relevant international law norm).
The analysis provided in the Second Restatement to displace the
presumptively applicable law is notoriously indeterminate. The
Restatement sets forth an unexhaustive list of seven factors to be considered.423 The upshot is that the State courts will be deciding whether
international law is to be applied based on their case-specific conclusions about whether applying such law would be reasonable. It is thus
not surprising that Young believes that “[his] approach’s heavy reli420 The following States follow the Second Restatement: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida (torts only), Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky (contracts
only), Maine, Michigan (contracts only), Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada (torts only), New Hampshire (contracts only), New Jersey (torts only), Ohio,
Oklahoma (torts only), South Dakota, Tennessee (torts only), Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, and West Virginia (contracts only). See Symeonides, supra note 397, at
231–32.
421 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. d (1971).
422 See id. § 145(2).
423 See id. § 6(2) (stating that the factors to be considered “include (a) the needs
of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c)
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states
in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied”).
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ance on choice of law rules [means] that those rules should generally
shake out in a way that conforms to our intuitive notions of when
international law ought to govern and when it should not.”424 This
would certainly be true if the court applied the Second Restatement
approach, or most versions of interest analysis, as those approaches
would essentially license courts to decide the applicable law in accordance with their intuitions about the desirability of the particular
rules of international law involved, or their more general views about
whether the matter is one that international law “ought to govern.”
For example, Young’s application of the Second Restatement test to a
conflict between a State’s law that would subject a minor to the death
penalty and a rule of customary international law that prohibits the
application of the death penalty to minors seems to reflect Young’s
own intuition that this is a matter best left to local decisionmaking.
“If, after years of moral and constitutional debate, we cannot say that
capital punishment is inconsistent with ‘evolving standards of
decency’ under the Eighth Amendment, then it would be shocking to
see the controversy resolved through the deus ex machina of international law.”425 In this particular case, Young’s intuition appears to
accord with that of the rest of the world, which recognizes that states
that have persistently objected to an evolving rule of customary international law are exempt from the rule if it does eventually develop
into customary law.426 But, if applied to a rule of customary law that
actually binds the United States, and with which the federal govern424 Young, supra note 19, at 474.
425 Id. at 477.
426 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. d (1987)
(“[I]n principle a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in
the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures.”); Curtis
A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 492, 539
(2002) (concluding that international law arguments made against the juvenile death
penalty have “significant weaknesses”, that “the United States has persistently objected
to—and thereby legally opted out of—any customary international law restriction on
the juvenile death penalty,” and that “the jus cogens challenge to the juvenile death
penalty seems unpersuasive”). But cf. Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a
United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F.
L. REV. 735, 770 (1998) (“[T]he prohibition of the juvenile death penalty is not only
customary international law, but also jus cogens, and a norm to which the renegade
United States should be bound.”); Joan F. Hartman, “Unusual” Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 655, 686 (1983) (“Mere failure to conform to the norm is not tantamount to a
substantive protest.”); Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights
Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147, 171 (1996)
(“Passive failure to bring domestic law into conformity is not sufficient, particularly
when the objecting state has had multiple opportunities to discuss the issue and make
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ment thus at least tacitly agrees, an approach that calls on State judges
to decide whether to apply the law on the basis of their judgment
about whether the rule is a good one or whether international law
“ought to govern” is highly problematic. If the applicability of international law in our courts is to be decided on this basis, the States—
and in particular State judges—would seem to be the wrong organs to
make that determination.
iii. The Likelihood of Special Choice-of-Law Rules
To the extent that Young would determine the applicability of
customary international law by reference to State choice-of-law rules,
he would leave it to rules that States are free to alter as they wish.
There is of course nothing to prevent States from changing their general approach to choice of law or from adopting a different approach
for conflicts involving international law than for the sorts of horizontal conflicts that they are most accustomed to confronting. (Dépeçage
is a familiar technique in choice of law.427) The most likely to adopt a
special choice-of-law rule for conflicts involving international law are
the States that adhere to the First Restatement’s territorial approach,
since, as we have seen, those approaches are very likely to be useless in
the case of vertical conflicts. The more modern approaches to choice
of law will be of any use only to the extent that they are indeterminate.
But these approaches too are fraught with problems and thus likely to
be displaced with special choice of law rules.
If a special choice-of-law rule were adopted, it would likely be a
flat rule declaring one or the other to be supreme unless the legislature specifically provided otherwise. That is of course the sort of rule
that the Constitution adopts to resolve the analogous conflict between
State and federal law. It is also the sort of rule that Oklahoma chose
in its recent constitutional amendment.428 In the case of vertical conflicts, this sort of rule would appear to be the only one available. A
principled objections. Therefore, . . . the analysis would . . . deny the United States
persistent objector status.” (footnote omitted)).
427 Dépeçage is defined as “[a] court’s application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 502 (9th ed. 2009). The Restatement embraces dépeçage. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(3) (“The classification and interpretation of local law concepts and terms are determined in accordance with the law
that governs the issue involved.”).
428 The Oklahoma constitutional amendment goes further than a rule of State law
superiority, as it would bar application of international law even if it does not conflict
with State law. But this rule could be conceived as a rule of State law superiority,
coupled with a stipulation that State law is comprehensive.
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rule of State law superiority would amount to a rule denying customary international law the status of law, although such a rule could be
supplemented (as a matter of State law) by a Charming Betsy presumption, under which State law will be interpreted to be consistent with
international law if ambiguous. Alternatively, the State could determine that particular rules of customary international law but not
others shall be applicable in the State, depending on the State’s views
about their desirability. The “choice of law” label seems entirely inapt
to describe an approach of this sort. A State that picks and chooses
norms of international law in this way would appear to be engaged in
a process of selective incorporation of international law.429
iv. The Role of the Federal Courts
Since customary international law would have the status of “general law” under Young’s proposal, Young concludes that cases turning
on such law would not “arise under” federal law for purposes of Article III.430 The federal courts would nevertheless have jurisdiction over
cases involving customary international law if the parties were
diverse.431 In such cases, Young says that he would permit the federal
courts to use their own judgment as to the content of customary international law, as they did before Erie.432 It would seem to follow from
429 Even in the horizontal choice-of-law context, a State’s decision that another
State’s law is applicable is often conceptualized as the first State’s incorporation of the
other State’s law as its own. See Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
(Hand, J.), aff’d sub nom. Guiness v. Miller, 299 F. 538 (2d Cir. 1924), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925); WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 20–21 (1942). This conceptualization seems even more apt in the vertical choice-of-law context, at least where, as
Young suggests, the “choice” to apply international law is left to the States.
430 See Young, supra note 19, at 468. This assumes rejection of theories of protective jurisdiction such as Professor Wechsler’s, under which Congress would be empowered to grant the federal courts “arising under” jurisdiction if it would have had the
power to displace State law with a federal rule, but without actually displacing State
law. See Wechsler, supra note 50, at 224–25. See generally Vázquez, supra note 50 (discussing various theories of protective jurisdiction). Under this theory, Congress could
confer jurisdiction over cases arising under customary international law because Congress has the power to displace State law with customary international law under the
Offenses Clause. Young rejects protective jurisdiction. See Young, supra note 49. In
any event, as discussed above, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over a case and its
power to displace a State court’s interpretation of customary international law are
separate questions. See supra text accompanying note 66.
431 Presumably such jurisdiction would also exist if a customary international law
issue arose in a claim that is ancillary to a claim that arises under a federal statute or
treaty or the Constitution.
432 See Young, supra note 19, at 471–72.
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Young’s theory, however, that the federal courts would be free to use
their own judgment about the content of customary international law
only in limited circumstances. In the absence of a federal choice-oflaw rule, the federal courts would have to apply the choice-of-law rules
of the State in which it sits. If the applicability of customary international law were a matter of State choice of law, then a federal court
would not be free to apply customary international law if the State in
which it sits has rejected the application of such law, as the citizens of
Oklahoma have done. Additionally, if the State’s “choice” to apply
customary international law were expressly made contingent on a particular interpretation of such law, the federal court would appear to
be bound by that interpretation. At the other end of the spectrum,
the federal courts would be able to apply their own interpretation of
customary international law if the State has made clear that it is incorporating or has chosen to apply the correct interpretation of such law
(and if the State courts have not yet interpreted the particular norm
involved). In my view, the federal courts could also defensibly apply
their independent judgment regarding the content of the international law norm if the State has not specified a special choice-of-law
rule for conflicts between State law and customary international law.
The rationale would be that (a) horizontal choice-of-law rules are
inapposite and (b) presumptive incorporation of customary international law as State law can be assumed, in the absence of explicit State
rejection of such law, on the theory that such law was incorporated as
English common law at the time of the Founding. Even in such circumstances, however, Young’s theory appears to require the conclusion that the States would be free to reject an interpretation of
customary international law by the federal courts, even the Supreme
Court, either by legislation or judicial decision, and once the State has
done so, the federal courts would thereafter be bound to follow the
state courts’ interpretation.433
433 Young suggests that, if a basis of jurisdiction other than “arising under” jurisdiction existed (for example, diversity), the Supreme Court could take cases to review
issues of customary international law. See id. at 500. Presumably, Young means that
the Supreme Court can review such cases when they arise in the lower federal courts,
as the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review cases from the State courts on the
basis of diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). If Young does have Supreme Court
review of State court decisions in mind, Congress would have to pass a statute authorizing such review on the basis of diversity. But if Congress were concerned enough
about customary international law to warrant such a statute, it would presumably be
concerned enough about State interpretations of customary international law to
declare such law (or perhaps certain norms of customary international law, or norms
meeting certain requirements of clarity or acceptance) to be preemptive federal law.
Congress would clearly have the power to do so under the Offenses Clause, and this
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v. Summary
Young’s proposal to employ State choice-of-law rules to determine the applicability of customary international law is problematic
because States employ a variety of different approaches to choice of
law and most of the States’ approaches are highly indeterminate.
More fundamentally, such rules are inapposite, as they address horizontal choice-of-law problems. The determinate approaches are thus
likely to be useless; the indeterminate ones less so, but only because
they essentially leave the question to the unguided discretion of the
lower courts. In any event, States would be free to adopt special
choice-of-law rules for conflicts involving international law and would
be well advised to do so, given the problems with applying horizontal
choice-of-law rules. If a State does adopt a special rule to address the
applicability of customary international law, it may as well frame the
rule as one about the incorporation of customary international law as
State law. There would appear to be nothing to gain from employing
the choice-of-law terminology, and much confusion to be avoided by
abandoning it.
The federal courts could defensibly presume that a State’s rule
regarding the applicability of customary international law is that of
the Charming Betsy: such law applies unless the legislature has specifically rejected it. But, if customary international law truly were applicable only through otherwise valid choice-of-law rules, then, to the
extent the choice-of-law question were governed by State law, the
States would retain the power to reject its application. States would be
free to adopt a rule like that approved by the citizens of Oklahoma
under which customary international law never applies, and they
could even adopt a rule under which ambiguous State laws will be
construed whenever possible so as to violate international law. Thus,
except to the limited extent that he would recognize federal choice-oflaw rules, Young’s approach suffers from the same problems as Ramsey’s. It merely uses a different vocabulary to avert violations of international law in the absence of clear State decisions to depart from
such law.
approach would give the Court power to review cases without regard to diversity while
obviating “protective jurisdiction” issues under Article III. That Young is not maintaining that the Supreme Court would be able to review a State court’s interpretation of
customary international law even in cases falling within Article III’s diversity clauses is
shown by his statement, discussed in the next subsection, that State courts would
retain ultimate authority over the interpretation of customary international law even
when federal law requires its application. See Young, supra note 19, at 509.
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b. Federal Choice-of-Law Rules
Young’s approach differs from Ramsey’s in that he would recognize certain circumstances in which the applicability of customary
international law would be determined by federal law. Young prefers
to characterize the role of federal law here as a “federal common law
constraint on State choice of law.”434 But it would appear to make no
difference whether it is characterized that way or instead as a federal
choice-of-law rule that displaces the State choice-of-law rule or,
indeed, as the federal incorporation of a particular rule of customary
international law displacing a contrary State law. However the federal
role is characterized, the result is the same: federal law requires the
application of customary international law to the dispute.
The irrelevance of the characterization is shown by Young’s
example of a case in which a court viewed federal law as (possibly)
imposing a limit on State choice of law: Chief Judge Hand’s opinion
in Bergman v. De Sieyes.435 As discussed above, Hand in Bergman stated
that New York law was applicable to the question of a foreign diplomat’s immunity, but acknowledged that “an avowed refusal to accept a
well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of it, [might] present a federal question.”436 While Young
regards the role of federal law in the situation described (and left
open) by Hand as imposing a limit on State choice of law, it could
equally (or more accurately) be characterized as “choosing” international law as the applicable law, or even as incorporating a subset of
customary international law as preemptive federal law.437 Indeed,
Hand seems to have had the last of these conceptualizations in mind,
as he wrote that a “federal question” might be presented in the circumstances he was discussing.
Young does not tell us much about the circumstances in which he
would regard it as appropriate for federal law to require application of
customary international law, but he does tell us that he regards this
outcome as appropriate only in rare circumstances.438 His concession
that federal law might sometimes limit the States’ freedom not to
choose international law comes in his discussion of a diplomat’s claim
434 Young, supra note 19, at 480.
435 See id. at 458, n.479.
436 See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948)
437 See Meltzer, supra note 391, at 531 (“[I]nstead of arguing as [Young] does that
federal interests shape choice of law rules that sometimes call for application of [customary international law] (for example, of head of state immunity), why not cut out
the middleman, and say that federal interests call for application of a substantive rule
of immunity as a matter of federal common law?”).
438 See Young, supra note 19, at 508–09.
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of immunity from a State law claim, and his analysis suggests that the
possible federal displacement of State choice-of-law rules would have
to occur on a retail basis—that is, with respect to particular rules of
international law.439 In this respect, his approach differs from the one
suggested (but not ruled upon) by Hand, which would apparently
have required compliance, as a matter of federal law, with (at least) all
“well-established” rules of international law. Young says that any judicially recognized federal rule requiring compliance with customary
international law must be “tied closely . . . to specific concerns about
preserving political branch control over foreign policy,”440 as the Sabbatino441 rule was, and he insists that State rules must apply “unless
those rules pose a significant conflict with specific federal interests,”442
which is the approach to federal common law contemplated by United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,443 a case not involving customary international law.444 Young’s treatment of Sabbatino as an outer limit, rather
than as an example of a more general principle, is questionable given
the Court’s indication that the federal common law rule that it articulated and Jessup’s view concerning the status of customary international law were both instantiations of the more general proposition
that “legal problems affecting international relations” were a federal
matter.445 Young’s insistence on application of the Kimbell Foods
framework for articulating federal common law overlooks his own
insight that the modern position, or some variant of it, might be justifiable outside that framework.446 As discussed in Part I and by Bellia
and Clark, the view that customary international law, or some subset
thereof, generally has the force of preemptive federal law can be justified as necessary to preserve federal political branch control over for-

439 See Young, supra note 34, at 29 (outlining this point more clearly and arguing
that the Supreme Court embraced this view in its decision in Sosa).
440 Young, supra note 19, at 509.
441 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
442 Young, supra note 19, at 509.
443 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore take a similar position.
See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 935–36.
444 See Young, supra note 19, at 509; see also Ernest A. Young, Historical Practice and
the Contemporary Debate over Customary International Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
31, 39–40 (2009), www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/31_Young.pdf.
445 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
446 Cf. Young, supra note 19, at 447 (“The modern position is not simply a particular application of established principles governing federal common law generally, but
rather a sui generis regime that must be justified—if it can be justified—outside that
framework.”).
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eign policy. The constitutional structure does not require the retail
incorporation of customary international law.447
Because Young would regard customary international law as “general law” even when federal law requires its application, he maintains
that, even then, the Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction to review
State court applications of such law, and hence “a [S]tate court would
retain independent interpretive authority over that law.”448 If so, then
there would be a significant difference between a federal choice-of-law
rule requiring application of customary international law and a federal incorporation of customary international law as federal law, as
clearly the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review a State
court’s interpretation of customary international law in the latter situation. But it seems to me that, precisely because there is no real difference between the two, the Supreme Court would in fact have
jurisdiction to review a State court’s interpretation of customary international law in the former situation. Perhaps the Court would lack
the power to review a State court’s interpretation of such law if the
only point of the federal choice-of-law rule was to require the States to
go through the motions of applying customary international law. But,
if the federal government had an interest in having international law
applied, its interest would presumably not be satisfied by a State
court’s application of some zany interpretation of it. The reasons that
Young cites as justifying the adoption of a federal common law choiceof-law rule—such as the “threat to the ability of the federal political
branches to conduct foreign affairs”449 that would be posed by the
court’s failure to apply international law in a given case—would be
equally impaired if the State court misapplied such law. Judge Hand
appeared to believe that federal jurisdiction would exist if federal law
required the States to give effect to “well-established” principles of
international law. I agree that the Supreme Court would possess juris447 Nor does Sosa embrace a “retail incorporation” approach. As discussed above,
the issue in Sosa was whether to recognize a private right of action, not whether customary international law had the status of federal law. (Indeed, Young himself argues
that Sosa may well have created a federal right of action for damages for violations of a
general law rule. See Young, supra note 34, at 31.) Moreover, the Court’s limitation of
the right of action to certain rules of customary international law does not reflect an
adoption of a retail approach (that is, an approach that applies to individual rules of
customary international law). The Court, rather, created a private right of action for
all rules meeting certain generally applicable requirements. See supra text accompanying note 241. The Court did suggest that it might be appropriate to consider certain case-specific factors, but only to determine whether the action should be allowed
to proceed. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
448 Young, supra note 19, at 509.
449 Id. at 480.
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diction to review a State court’s application of customary international
law in such circumstances. In other words, if federal law (however
denominated) requires application of a norm of customary international law, the norm is no longer merely “general law.”
If Young were correct about the lack of Supreme Court power to
review State court interpretations of customary international law, this
would count as a substantial point against his approach, both because
of the resulting lack of uniformity in the interpretations of international law within the United States and because of the actual violations
of international law that would occur. Because the Supreme Court
would in fact have the power to review State court applications of customary international law when federal law required its application,
Young’s approach would actually be less problematic than Ramsey’s.
This is so because, despite his denial, Young would in fact recognize
some preemptive force to customary international law. In my view, he
is right to do so, but he does not go far enough. His own structural
and doctrinal arguments would support a broader preemptive force
for such law than he would recognize.
C. Aleinikoff’s Position
Dean Aleinikoff is drawn to an intermediate status for customary
international law, but he concludes that the particular approaches
championed by Young and Ramsey fail on their own terms. He
believes that Ramsey’s thesis is internally inconsistent and that Young
“uses the apparatus of choice of law to rename well-established norms
of preemption and supremacy.”450 Aleinikoff proposes instead that
we treat customary international law as “nonpreemptive, nonfederal
law.”451 Since this characterization would seemingly regard customary
international law as even less federal than Ramsey’s approach (which
purports to treat such law as nonpreemptive federal law), one might
think that Aleinikoff’s proposal poses the same problems as Ramsey’s
and then some. But, on closer inspection, Aleinikoff’s proposal poses
problems of an entirely different sort.
For Ramsey, the “nonpreemptive” nature of customary international law meant that it could not be applied if it conflicted with State
law. In the face of such a conflict, neither State nor federal courts
would be permitted to apply it. Aleinikoff, on the other hand, views
his concept of nonpreemptive nonfederal law as being applicable in
the federal courts regardless of what State law has to say. For
Aleinikoff, customary international law is nonpreemptive only in the
450 Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 96.
451 Id. at 97.
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sense that it is not applicable in the State courts in the event of a
conflict with State law. In other words, customary international law,
according to Aleinikoff, “binds federal courts but not state courts.”452
An initial problem with this proposal is that it would reproduce
the one aspect of the pre-Erie regime that everyone had thought Erie
had completely ruled out. Under Aleinikoff’s proposal, the law
applied in the State courts would differ from that applied in the federal courts. The applicable law would thus turn on “the accident of
diversity.”453 (Aleinikoff makes clear that, under his proposal, customary international law would not be federal law for purposes of arising
under jurisdiction.454)
Aleinikoff appears to regard his regime as being one in which
customary international law, as interpreted by federal courts, would
effectively “announce the rule for the federal branches,”455 whereas
the applicability of customary international law to State actors “would
be a matter of [S]tate law as to whether and how international law . . .
ought to be incorporated.”456 But if his proposal is that customary
international law would be applicable in federal court but not in State
court (unless incorporated by State law), then it would not always
apply to federal officials, and it might sometimes apply to the actions
of State officials even when State law has not incorporated it. Imagine
a suit against a federal official seeking to enjoin conduct that allegedly
contravenes customary international law. If customary international
law were nonfederal law, such a suit would have to be brought in State
court in the absence of diversity.457 The federal official would have a
right to remove the case to federal court if he raised a federal
defense.458 Presumably his defense in the typical case would be that a
federal statute authorized his conduct. Customary international law
would then be invoked by the plaintiff to defeat the defense of justification.459 But the official would not be required to remove the case. If
452 Id. at 99.
453 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
454 See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 98.
455 See id. at 97.
456 See id. at 98.
457 Cf. Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006)) (“Any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or
the employee’s estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission
occurred.” (emphasis added)).
458 See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)
(1988)).
459 One possible problem with this argument is that customary international law,
even under the modern position, does not necessarily trump federal statutes. See
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a federal court but not a State court would apply customary international law, the officer might well prefer to stay in State court. If the
State court declined to apply customary international law and ruled in
favor of the officer, Aleinikoff would apparently not permit Supreme
Court review, as the petitioner’s claim would be that the officer violated customary international law, and such law (in Aleinikoff’s view)
is nonfederal.460
Conversely, consider an action against a State official alleging
that State conduct violates customary international law. Such an
action could be commenced in federal court if the plaintiff were from
a different State, or if the claim under customary international law
were pendent to a federal claim. Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Hoffman (Pennhurst II),461 an action seeking to enjoin such conduct would have to be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds,462
but courts have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage suits in federal court against State officials for violations of State
law.463 Moreover, the compatibility of State law with customary international law could arise in an action between private parties, and if
the parties were diverse, the issue could be adjudicated in federal
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 reporters’ note 4 (“Since
international customary law and an international agreement have equal authority in
international law, and both are law of the United States, arguably later customary law
should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or
agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect
in the face of an earlier law or agreement. But customary law is made by practice,
consent, or acquiescence of the United States, often acting through the President,
and it has been argued that the sole act of the President ought not to prevail over a
law of the United States.” (citations omitted)). But Aleinikoff would permit later-intime custom to prevail over federal statues. See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 100. In
the more common case of earlier-in-time custom, Aleinikoff is presumably contemplating its application via the Charming Betsy presumption. Cf. id. at 99.
460 If the State court were likely to apply customary international law to the case,
then the officer would presumably remove the case to federal court. If the likelihood
that the State court would apply international law were uncertain, the officer might
decide to take his chances in State court. If the State court did ultimately apply customary international law but ruled against the officer, Aleinikoff would apparently not
permit an appeal to the Supreme Court.
461 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
462 See id. at 101–02.
463 See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Pennhurst II,
465 U.S. at 111 n.21 (clarifying that Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949), held that cases seeking damages against individual officers do
not necessarily implicate relief against the sovereign); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1203 (3d ed. 1988)
(noting that Pennhurst II left open the issue of whether State officials could be sued in
federal court for damages resulting from State law violations).
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court. In addition, in a case challenging State law as a violation of a
federal statute or constitutional provision, a claim under customary
international law could be added as a pendent claim, or customary
international law could be brought in by way of the Charming Betsy
presumption to aid in the application of the relevant federal law, as
Aleinikoff proposes.464 Thus, if customary international law were
applicable in federal court even when it conflicts with State law, it
would control the validity of State action in some circumstances.
For this reason, Aleinikoff’s statement that customary international law would be “nonpreemptive” is inaccurate. Customary international law would serve to preempt State law in cases in which federal
jurisdiction could be established on the basis of diversity of citizenship
or when the customary law claim is pendent to a federal claim. Thus,
he is wrong to claim that his proposal does not “rais[e] serious federalism issues.”465 Admittedly, such issues would arise only in some
cases, probably few—but that itself is a significant problem with the
proposal, as the applicability of customary international law would
depend on the fortuity of federal jurisdiction.
At the same time, in cases outside the federal courts’ diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction (which would probably be most cases
against State actors), Aleinikoff’s proposal would relegate the enforcement of customary international law against the States to the States
themselves, which would be free to declare such law completely inapplicable, as the citizens of Oklahoma have done, and could even
adopt a reverse–Charming Betsy rule. In this respect, Aleinikoff’s proposal is open to the same objection as Ramsey’s. Aleinikoff acknowledges that some might think that his proposal “renders [customary
international law] useless where it is most needed.”466 As noted
above, the Founding generation was most concerned about violations
of international law by the States, yet Aleinikoff’s proposal is designed
to leave it to the States to determine the applicability of customary
international law to the States (although it would not quite accomplish this).467
464 See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 99.
465 See id. at 100.
466 Id. at 99.
467 To be sure, Congress could cure this problem, as well as the “accident of diversity” problem, by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts in all cases
raising claims under customary international law. As discussed above, such a statute
could be upheld, under current doctrine, even if customary international law were
not regarded as self-executing federal law. See supra text accompanying notes 45–56.
In Aleinikoff’s view (unlike Young’s and Ramsey’s) the federal courts would not be
bound by the States’ contrary interpretations of such law. Thus, a bare grant of juris-
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In response to this objection, Aleinikoff explains that “nothing in
[his] understanding of [customary international law] argues against
the existence of federal common law relating to foreign affairs.”468
And this federal common law of foreign affairs, which would be “binding on [S]tate courts,”469 could include some norms of customary
international law. In his view, “[customary international law] and federal common law cases involving foreign affairs are overlapping . . .
categories.”470 Aleinikoff does not develop a theory of federal common law to guide the courts in determining which norms of customary international law properly have that status. He tells us that “not
all” such norms do,471 but, as noted above, defenders of the modern
position do not contend otherwise. Thus, Aleinikoff’s position may
amount to a theory for making customary international law applicable
in the courts even when it lacks the force of preemptive federal law
under the modern view. If so, then, far from being an intermediate
position, it would be an expansion of the role of customary international law in the U.S. legal system beyond that entailed by the modern
position.472
If relatively few norms of customary international law would
emerge with federal common law status under Aleinikoff’s approach
to federal common law, then his proposal would be quite similar to
Young’s.473 Both Aleinikoff and Young tell us, in the end, that the
applicability of customary international law turns on State law except
when federal law requires its application. While Young envisions a
very restricted role for federal law, Aleinikoff seems open to a broader
federal role. To the extent that Aleinikoff would base the preemptive
force of some customary international law on the existence of a “federal common law of foreign relations” having its source in the constidiction over such cases would establish a regime much like the modern position. But
this result could be achieved only through congressional action. The problem under
discussion arises only when Congress has not acted, as no one doubts that Congress
could enact the modern position by legislation.
468 See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 99–100.
469 Id. at 100.
470 Id.
471 See id. at 97.
472 Aleinikoff recognizes that his proposal would go beyond the modern position
in at least one respect: he would permit later-in-time customary international norms
to trump federal statutes and treaties. See id. at 100; supra note 459.
473 Aleinikoff’s proposal would not suffer from the problems discussed above that
result from Young’s proposal to use choice-of-law rules to determine the applicability
of customary international law. On the other hand, Young’s proposal does not suffer
from the Erie problem that afflicts Aleinikoff’s proposal.
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tutional structure, his position resembles that of Professors Bellia and
Clark, which I examine next.
D. The Bellia-Clark Position
In light of the revisionists’ heavy reliance on the work of Professor Bradford Clark, the recent contribution to this debate of Professors Clark and Bellia holds special interest. Clark pioneered the
“Supremacy Clause exclusivity” critique of federal common law that
some revisionists have found compelling.474 On this view, the three
categories of federal law listed in the Supremacy Clause are the sole
categories of preemptive federal law envisioned by the Constitution.
The argument relies on constitutional structure as well as text. Clark’s
claim is that the process for making the three forms of federal law was
intentionally made difficult in order to protect the States from having
their laws displaced. Thus, Article I’s bicameralism and presentment
requirements for the making of federal statutes serve as a procedural
safeguard of federalism, as do Article II’s requirement of two-thirds
Senate consent for making treaties and Article V’s onerous requirements for amending the Constitution. The central role given to the
Senate in each situation reflects the federalism purpose underlying
these requirements, as the Founders regarded the Senate as the body
most responsive to State concerns. On this view, the trouble with federal common law—understood as “federal rules of decision whose
content cannot be traced directly by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands”475—is that the
process for making it evades the Constitution’s onerous and carefully
wrought procedures for preempting State law.476 The revisionists
apply this general critique of federal common law to the more specific
474 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1273–74 (1996) (“For the political safeguards of federalism to function effectively, the federal government must adhere closely to the detailed procedures required for the adoption of positive federal law—most notably, the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.”). For a more recent elaboration of
these arguments by Clark, see Clark, supra note 24, at 1328–46. Of the revisionists,
Young relies on this argument most heavily, see supra text accompanying note 372, but
Bradley and Goldsmith invoke it as well, albeit without attributing the argument to
Clark, see Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 868; see also RAMSEY, supra
note 17, at 289-90 (articulating a similar view). For a critique of this view, see
Monaghan, supra note 167.
475 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 607.
476 Once State law has already been preempted, the carefully wrought procedures
for making federal law will actually make it difficult to devolve power to the States. See
Vázquez, supra note 116. However, in the beginning, the procedures did operate to
protect State law from being preempted.
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argument that customary international law has the status of federal
common law.
In their recent contribution to the customary international law
debate, Bellia and Clark begin by agreeing with the revisionists that
customary international law is not, as such, made preemptive of State
law by the Supremacy Clause.477 They stress that the frequent statements in pre-Independence British sources that the law of nations was
part of the law of the land did not necessarily mean that it was superior to other parts of the law of the land.478 In fact, they point out,
parts of the law of nations, such as the law merchant, were understood
to be subject to local variation.479 Thus, the new nation’s inheritance
of that principle from England does not have implications for its place
in the hierarchy of domestic law. They also agree with the revisionists
that Article III does not give the federal courts the power to articulate
and enforce norms of customary international law as preemptive federal law.480
Bellia and Clark go on to argue, however, that a subset of the law
of nations was deemed applicable in the courts on a completely different rationale. Specifically, “history and structure demonstrate that
courts have applied certain principles derived from the law of nations
as a means of upholding the Constitution’s allocation of foreign
affairs powers to Congress and the President—in particular, the powers to recognize foreign nations and decide questions of war and
peace.”481 The portion of the law of nations that was considered judicially enforceable on this theory was the portion that gave rise to “perfect rights”—that is, rights of sovereigns whose violation was regarded
as a just cause for war.482 The sources cited by Bellia and Clark estab477 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 34–37.
478 See id. at 39.
479 See id. at 20.
480 See id. at 39.
481 Id. at 7.
482 See id. at 17. They trace the concept of “perfect rights” to Vattel and other
writers on the law of nations. See JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 173 (Thomas Nugent trans., Cambridge, Univ. Press 4th ed.
1792) (1747 & 1751); ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 106 (John C. Rolfe
trans., Clarendon Press 1933) (1612); G.F. DE MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS, FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF
EUROPE 273 (William Cobbett trans., Phila., Thomas Bradford 1795); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 127 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A.
Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 145 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883) (1758);
CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 43–108 (Joseph
H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764).
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lish that the Constitution presumptively requires adherence to these
norms in order to avoid triggering foreign conflict. “The law of
nations supplied a well-known set of default rules relating to perfect
rights that would have informed the Founders’ understanding of the
federal political branches’ recognition and war powers.”483
Bellia and Clark acknowledge that “[n]one of [the early] cases
expressly involved preemption of [S]tate law; in each, the federal
court exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and [S]tate law did not purport
to provide a conflicting rule of decision.”484 But their theory clearly
requires the conclusion that State laws in conflict with the relevant
rules of customary international law infringe the federal political
branches’ exclusive powers over recognition and war and peace and
thus may not be enforced. “Were . . . states free to disregard perfect
rights, they could trigger a war and usurp the political branches’
exclusive powers over war and peace.”485 The allocation of such powers to the federal government is, on the Bellia-Clark view, a feature of
the Constitution, and, of course, “[t]he Constitution preempts conflicting [S]tate law.”486 Thus, Bellia and Clark conclude that, in these
early cases, “[b]y reasoning that the constitutional allocation of powers required adherence to certain principles of the law of nations, the
Court laid the groundwork for its future holding [in Sabbatino] that
such principles apply in both [S]tate and federal court, and even in
the face of contrary [S]tate law.”487
Because the preemptive force of (some) customary international
law is based on an inference from the Constitution itself, the BelliaClark argument is consistent with Clark’s “Supremacy Clause exclusivity” argument. The “Supremacy Clause exclusivity” objection to federal common law has traction only to the extent that the preemptive
force of such law cannot be traced to one of the categories of federal
law listed in the Supremacy Clause. But much of what is often
regarded as (illegitimate) federal common lawmaking can be justified
as (legitimate) statutory or constitutional interpretation. Clark recognized this point in developing his original critique of federal common
law,488 and his work with Bellia on customary international law fits
comfortably within this tradition.
Bellia and Clark do not fully work through the implications of
their historical research for the modern debate about the status of
483 Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 46.
484 Id. at 75.
485 Id. at 59.
486 Id. at 75.
487 Id. at 58. Their treatment of Sabbatino is discussed below.
488 See Clark, supra note 474, at 1289.
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customary international law. They “do[ ] not attempt to resolve all
questions regarding the status of customary international law in U.S.
courts,” and they “take no position on how courts should treat numerous modern rules of customary international law unknown to the
Founders.”489 But they do not deny that their thesis would support
many features of that position. In my view, their structural argument
broadly supports the modern position.
Bellia and Clark argue only that a subset of the law of nations, as
known to the Founders and the early Court, was thought to provide a
default rule against which to measure intrusions on the federal government’s exclusive powers of recognition and war. This subset consisted of norms that created “perfect rights,” meaning norms whose
violation justified resort to war by offended nations.490 The fact that
only a subset of the law of nations was covered might be thought
inconsistent with the claim—often attributed to defenders of the
modern position—that all of modern customary international law has
the status of preemptive federal law. But, on closer inspection, the
Bellia-Clark position may be consistent with even that broad claim. As
Bellia and Clark explain, the law of nations was thought, in the Founders’ time, to include the law merchant and general commercial law,
as well as what Bellia and Clark call the law of state-to-state relations.
Although they do not say so clearly, it appears that Bellia and Clark
equate the portion of the law of nations that gave rise to “perfect
rights” with the portion of the law of nations that regulated state-tostate relations.491 When Bellia and Clark note that not all of the law of
nations was thought to have the preemptive force they claim for “perfect rights,” they appear to be excluding only the law merchant and
general commercial law—which, as they show, was always thought to
be subject to local variation.492 As already noted, these latter branches
of the old law of nations are today not regarded as public international law at all; rather, they are considered part of the conflict of laws
489 Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 90.
490 See id. at 17
491 See id. at 20, 24–26, 38, 41, 42, 56–58. They suggest that the role of the courts
was understood to be only to protect the perfect rights of foreign nations. This possible limitation on the context in which the law of state-to-state relations was regarded
as enforceable and preemptive federal law is discussed below.
492 See id. at 15, 20–22; see also H.W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND LAWS OF WAR 130, 134 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866) (citing as examples of “imperfect” duties “the ordinary duties of comity [and] of diplomatic and
commercial intercourse”). By “diplomatic . . . intercourse,” Halleck means “those of
sending and receiving diplomatic legation,” which are “at most imperfect obligations.”
See id. at 134. Today, there is no international law duty to send or receive a diplomatic legation.
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or merely domestic law. Defenders of the modern position do not
claim that these norms have the status of preemptive federal law.493
The precedents discussed by Bellia and Clark might be thought
irrelevant to the modern debate for a different reason. Their argument regarding the preemptive force of norms conferring perfect
rights appears to depend on the notion that, under the law of nations
as it then prevailed, violation of public rights was a just cause for initiating war. This is, indeed, the rationale for regarding violations of
such norms to be an intrusion into the political branches’ exclusive
war powers. Today, however, international law forbids the use of
force to resolve international disputes. The use of force is permitted
only in self-defense or if authorized by the Security Council (in which
the United States holds a veto).494 It is thus no longer the case that
the United States’ breaches of other nations’ rights under international law will justify the use of force against the United States by those
nations. Moreover, it might be argued that, given the United States’
superior military power, the use of force by other nations against the
United States is, in any event, highly unlikely today. Thus, to the
extent that the historical argument rests on the allocation of the war
power to Congress and the idea that breaches of perfect rights justified war, it may be thought to be irrelevant to modern conditions.
But Bellia and Clark do not rely solely on the federal government’s excusive power over war and peace. They also invoke the
exclusive recognition power, which is itself an inference from the allocation to the President of the power to send and receive ambassadors.495 Since territorial sovereignty is an incident of state
sovereignty, any state action that interfered with such sovereignty
would be in conflict with the federal government’s decision to recognize a foreign state as a state in the international sense. More broadly,
Bellia and Clark write:
[T]he Constitution assigns the power to send and receive ambassadors to the President and the Senate. This power cannot be under493 See also infra text accompanying notes 495–96 (noting that, to the extent that
Bellia and Clark rely on the federal government’s exclusive recognition power, their
argument would seem to extend to the state-to-state branch of the law of nations in its
entirety).
494 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. art. 51; cf. id. art. 27 (regarding the Security
Council veto).
495 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 204 cmt. a (1987) (stating that the President’s recognition power “is implied in the President’s express constitutional power to appoint Ambassadors (Article II, Section 2) and to receive
Ambassadors (Article II, Section 3), and his implied power to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States”).
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stood without reference to what it meant to recognize another
nation at the founding. Recognition implied that the United States
would respect the rights of the state in question under the law of
nations.496

On this theory, the act of recognizing a foreign state implicitly incorporates the state’s rights vis-à-vis the United States under international
law, not just those whose violation justifies the use of force. If so, then
all violations of international legal rights of recognized foreign states
would be preempted, not just those that justified war.
Additionally, it might be argued that violations of other states’
rights under international law are preempted because they threaten
forms of retaliation not involving the use of military force, to the ultimate detriment of the nation as a whole. There is an obvious structural reason to deny a single State the power to impose these costs on
the nation as whole, as the Founders recognized. Even if such violations do not threaten military invasion, they produce international
friction, which, in turn, makes it more difficult for the federal government to accomplish its foreign relations objectives through the negotiation of treaties or simply through diplomacy. This argument for
regarding State laws violating customary international law as preempted by the constitutional structure is less directly linked to an
exclusive federal power expressly in the Constitution’s text than the
“perfect rights” argument is to the war power. But the Constitution’s
allocation to the federal government of the power to send and receive
ambassadors and the power to make treaties might be thought to
imply an exclusive federal power to determine whether our relations
with other nations shall be friendly or hostile. This may be what Bellia
and Clark have in mind when they refer to the federal government’s
exclusive foreign affairs power.497
The argument that State violations of the state-to-state branch of
the law of nations are preempted because they interfere with the federal government’s exclusive power over foreign relations is essentially
the structural argument for the modern position discussed in Part I.
So understood, the allocation-of-powers rationale for regarding State
violations of customary international law to be preempted might be
thought to prove too much, as it would suggest that all State acts that
are unfriendly to foreign nations or would otherwise produce international friction are preempted. Indeed, the Bellia-Clark argument has
obvious affinities to the much-maligned dormant foreign affairs ratio496 Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 89.
497 See id. at 28–29.
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nale of Zschernig v. Miller.498 In that case, the Supreme Court found
an Oregon statute to be invalid as an unconstitutional interference
with the federal government’s excusive power to conduct foreign relations. What exactly about the State law made it invalid on this ground
the Court did not make entirely clear, and Zschernig has been criticized as overbroad by many of the same scholars who have advanced
revisionist views of the status of customary international law.499 Certainly, the broad claim that all State conduct that has an effect on
foreign relations is preempted would invalidate too much State conduct that has traditionally been regarded as proper. In today’s globalized world, almost everything that States do has at least an incidental
effect on foreign relations.500 Zschernig remains the only case to find a
State law invalid on dormant foreign relations grounds and scholars
have suggested that it would not be followed today.501
On the other hand, Zschernig has not been overruled. I have
argued elsewhere that the decision’s basic insight that some State
action is invalid because it unduly interferes with the federal government’s exclusive power to conduct foreign relations is sound.502 The
challenge is to transform that insight into workable doctrine. In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,503 the majority and dissenting opinions offered competing limiting constructions of the decision. Justice
Souter, for the majority, proposed that Zschernig be read to establish a
rule of “field preemption”504 for State conduct outside areas of traditional State regulation, but a rule of “conflict preemption” for State
conduct within such areas.505 Justice Ginsburg, for the dissenters, proposed limiting Zschernig to State laws that “reflect[ ] a State policy critical of foreign governments and involve[ ] sitting in judgment on
498 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Bellia and Clark acknowledge the relevance of Zschernig
in a footnote. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 91 n.489.
499 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 865; Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1631 (1997); Ramsey,
supra note 17, at 563–70; Young, supra note 444, at 36–37; Michael D. Ramsey, The
Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 357–65 (1999).
500 Young makes this point forcefully. See Young, supra note 19, at 420–23.
501 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 865; Ramsey, supra note 17,
at 563. But cf. Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 91 n.489 (“[T]he rationale for constitutional preemption in Zschernig is an extension of the rationale for preemption in
Sabbatino.”).
502 See Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, supra note 86, at 1268, 1318.
503 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
504 See id. at 419 n.11.
505 See id. at 419.
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them.”506 I have proposed a construction similar to Ginsburg’s, under
which State laws that single out foreign states or groups of states for
adverse treatment would be preempted.507 Any of these possible rules
would be workable doctrinal manifestations of Zschernig’s insight that
the Constitution’s structure—specifically, its allocation of the power
to conduct foreign relations exclusively to the federal government—
implicitly preempts State laws or conduct that unduly interfere with
such relations. The view that State law or conduct that violates customary international law is similarly preempted might be regarded as
an additional doctrinal manifestation of this structural principle—a
manifestation that, as Bellia and Clark have demonstrated, has a
strong historical pedigree.
Bellia and Clark clearly do not regard the structural argument for
according preemptive force to some customary international law to be
dependent on the allocation of the war power to the federal government, or the fact that international law once authorized the use of
force in response to violations, as they argue that the Supreme Court’s
act-of-state decision in Sabbatino rests on this very structural argument.
By the time Sabbatino was decided, international law no longer countenanced the use of force in response to breaches of international law
by other nations.508 Noting that “[r]ules like the act of state doctrine
have deep roots in the traditional perfect right of territorial sovereignty under the law of nations,”509 Bellia and Clark argue that Sabbatino “is best understood overall as a consequence of the Constitution’s
allocation of foreign affairs powers to the political branches of the
federal government.”510 Indeed, they regard Sabbatino as making
explicit for the first time what was implicit in the earlier cases: that
customary norms giving rise to perfect rights of foreign states preempt
State law.511
As a manifestation of the Bellia-Clark allocation-of-powers rationale for according preemptive force to (some) customary international law, Sabbatino poses serious challenges. The Court did hold
that the act-of-state doctrine has its basis in domestic separation-ofpowers principles, and it also held that this doctrine was binding on
the States. But, as Bellia and Clark note, the Court recognized that
the act-of-state doctrine was not itself a principle of international
506 See id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting HENKIN, supra note 230, at
164) (internal quotation marks omitted).
507 See Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, supra note 86, at 1321.
508 The U.N. Charter came into force in 1945. Sabbatino was decided in 1964.
509 Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 85 n.459.
510 Id. at 84.
511 See id. at 87.
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law.512 Sovereign states did not have a perfect right to have foreign
courts give unquestioning effect to all of their public acts performed
within their territory. Thus, as Bellia and Clark note, the Court in
Sabbatino “gave foreign sovereigns greater protection than they enjoyed
under customary international law at the time.”513 In this light, Sabbatino might be viewed as an allocation-of-powers decision having some
parallels to the principle that Bellia and Clark identify (namely, that
the constitutional structure prohibits State violation of customary
international law conferring perfect rights on foreign sovereigns), but
not as a manifestation of that principle. Indeed, Sabbatino would
appear to be in tension with the latter principle insofar as the Court
held that the public acts of foreign states within their own territory
may not be challenged in certain circumstances even if they violate customary international law.
Bellia and Clark claim that Sabbatino is a manifestation of the idea
that, because of its allocation of the foreign relations power to the
federal government, the Constitution preempts state law that conflicts
with certain norms of customary international law but not others.
Specifically, they argue that the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution required federal and state courts both to adhere to a rule based
on traditional notions of territorial sovereignty (the act of state doctrine), and to disregard a more recent rule of customary international
law curtailing territorial sovereignty (the proffered prohibition against
discriminatory, uncompensated takings).”514 But this reading of the
case fails to establish that the Court was requiring compliance with the
law of nations. After all, the second, more recent norm of international law (barring discriminatory or uncompensated takings) purports to be a limitation of the first, older norm of international law
(protecting the state’s territorial sovereignty). Together, they tell us
that the state’s sovereignty over its own territory does not include the
right to take the property of foreign nationals in a discriminatory fashion or without providing compensation. If the Court was insisting that
federal and State courts give effect to the public acts of foreign states
even when international law does not give the States a right to perform such acts, then it was not according preemptive force to any
existing rule of international law.
Bellia and Clark seek to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Sabbatino “highlights an important point about the interaction of perfect
512 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
513 Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 86.
514 Id. at 85–86 (footnote omitted).
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rights and the Constitution over time.”515 In their view, the act-ofstate doctrine gives preemptive force to some norms of international
law conferring rights on foreign states, unmodified by more recent
norms of international law that cut back on such rights. They write:
The Court has been willing to add to, but not subtract from, the list
of sovereignty-respecting default rules that courts are required to
apply in order to uphold the Constitution’s allocation of powers. In
The Schooner Exchange and The Paquette [sic] Habana, the Court augmented the traditional list of perfect rights with later-emerging customs favoring foreign sovereigns—namely, the immunity of foreign
warships and fishing boats. Judicial adherence to these customs
upheld the Constitution’s allocation of powers in much the same
way as judicial adherence to the original perfect rights of sovereigns.
In both cases, the rule in question avoided judicial initiation or escalation of hostilities, and thus preserved political branch control over
war and peace. In Sabbatino, however, the Court refused to depart
from a traditional rule of territorial sovereignty (historically
regarded as a perfect right), even though the Court acknowledged
that the community of nations no longer recognized absolute territorial sovereignty. The Court based this refusal on the Constitution’s allocation of powers as well. In effect, the Court held that any
decision to abandon the traditional perfect rights of recognized foreign sovereigns would foster resentment and thus should be made
by the political branches rather than the courts or the states.516

Bellia and Clark here seem to envision a one-way ratchet. New rules
of international law that expand the rights of foreign sovereigns are
automatically added to the list of international law norms that preempt inconsistent State law, but new rules that restrict such rights do
not preempt State law unless incorporated by federal statute or
treaty.517
This rule may or may not be appealing from a structural constitutional standpoint, but it does not capture the Court’s holding or rea515 Id. at 88.
516 Id. at 88–89.
517 Note that, under this theory, the preemptive force of any given norm depends
not just on the nature of the norm, but on whom one is seeking to apply it against. A
change in international law that expands the rights of foreign states vis-à-vis the
United States correspondingly restricts the rights of the United States vis-à-vis foreign
states, and vice-versa. Thus, presumably, a norm that restricts territorial sovereignty
would be enforceable against the United States (and the States), while a norm that
expands the rights of states would be enforceable only insofar as it favors foreign
states. This means that a foreign state’s right not to have its citizen’s property taken
by the United States without compensation would be enforceable, whereas the United
States’ right not to have its citizen’s property taken without compensation would not
be.
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soning in Sabbatino. First, as already noted, it is difficult to read
Sabbatino as resting on the preemptive force of any rule of international law. The Court itself denied that international law required
states to give effect to the acts of other states performed within their
own territory.518 The Court noted that a state’s courts are free to
decline to give effect to the penal laws of other states.519 Moreover, it
is well accepted that the courts of one state may refuse to give effect to
the act of another state performed within its own territory if, for example, that act contravenes the forum state’s public policy.520 Since
states are free not to give effect to the public acts of other states performed within their own territory even if those acts did not violate
international law, it cannot be said that international law gives states a
right to have their public acts enforced in other states’ courts.
Second, the Court in Sabbatino did not hold that all new rules of
international law that restrict foreign states’ preexisting rights of territorial sovereignty were inapplicable in our courts. It was careful to
limit its holding to one particular rule of international law: the one
prohibiting the taking of a foreign national’s property in a discriminatory fashion or without compensation. It held that norm not to be
enforceable in the particular context before it because the norm
touched “sharply on national nerves”521 and was at the time the subject of considerable controversy in the international legal community,
with many capital-importing states denying that it had the force of
customary law.522 The Court left open the possibility that a norm lacking these characteristics could be applied by State and federal courts
to invalidate an act of a foreign state within its own territory. Thus,
the norm’s inapplicability did not turn on its age but on other factors.
518 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
519 Id. at 413–14.
520 Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995) (“[L]ibel standards
that are contrary to U.S. libel standards would be repugnant to the public policies of
the State of Maryland and the United States. Therefore, . . . this court declines to
recognize the foreign judgment.”); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585
N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (“The protection to free speech and the press
embodied in that amendment would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign
libel judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but
considered antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”); PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 24.44 (5th ed. 2010) (“[T]he public policy defense serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition [of
a foreign judgment]”).
521 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
522 See id. at 434–35.
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As discussed in Part I, Sabbatino is best read as holding that norms
of international law that do not meet certain standards of clarity or
breadth of acceptance lack the force of preemptive federal law insofar
as they are sought to be applied to certain acts of foreign sovereigns.
The norm that had been invoked to invalidate Cuba’s act in Sabbatino
fell in this category and hence, as a matter of federal law, could not be
applied to invalidate Cuba’s act. On this view of Sabbatino, a norm of
international law purporting to limit a foreign state’s territorial sovereignty would be cognizable in U.S. courts if it met the Court’s standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance, and both federal and State
courts would be either permitted or required to apply it to invalidate
the foreign state’s act.
This seems to me to be the correct reading of Sabbatino, but only
half of it is supported by the allocation-of-powers rationale for according preemptive force to customary international law. The requirement that foreign acts of state be given effect even if they clash with
noncognizable norms of international law is supported by the BelliaClark allocation-of-powers principle523; the (possible) permissibility of
invalidating foreign acts of state that clash with cognizable norms of
international law is not. It is hard to imagine that the political
branches’ ability to conduct foreign relations will be significantly hampered by the courts’ refusal to invalidate a foreign act on this
ground.524 This part of the Court’s analysis appears to be grounded
instead on countervailing concerns about justice or the rule of law.
But the Court’s analysis here is compatible with the allocation-of-powers
rationale that drives the rest of its analysis, the idea being that the
political branches’ ability to conduct foreign relations will not be
unduly undermined by a failure to give effect to foreign state acts that
violate clear and broadly accepted norms of customary international
law, just as it is not unduly undermined by failure to give effect to
foreign state acts performed outside their territory. Consequently, the

523 As discussed above, though, Sabbatino does not hold that any particular norm
of international law has the force of preemptive federal law. See supra text accompanying notes 514–22.
524 This would be true, at least, where international law does not prohibit the
United States from acquiescing in another state’s violation of international law. For
discussion of exceptions to this general rule, see Monica Hakimi, State Bystander
Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 342–44 (2010). For a proposal that international
law more broadly prohibit third states from actively supporting another state’s violations of international law, see Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State
Obligations and the Enforcement of International Law, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author).
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courts are free to apply such norms to advance the norms’ substantive
goals.
But the allocation-of-powers rationale would support the conclusion that norms of customary international law—even newly developed ones, and possibly even disputed ones—are applicable and
preemptive insofar as they restrict the freedom of action of the United
States or the States. Such violations do risk international friction and
hence would complicate the federal government’s ability to achieve
foreign relations goals. If the preemptive force of these norms stems
from the allocation of the foreign relations power to the federal government, then clearly these norms can be rendered inapplicable by
statute or treaty. The allocation-of-powers rationale might support,
but does not necessarily require, the conclusion that the norm is also
inapplicable if it clashes with an act of the Executive. Bellia and Clark
leave this question for another day.525 As discussed above, there is
doctrinal support for some presidential power to override customary
international law. But the allocation-of-powers argument tells us that,
in the absence of authorization from the relevant combinations of the
political branches, all State officials are bound.
E. The Bradley-Goldsmith-Moore Position
It might seem odd to include Bradley and Goldsmith among
those proposing an intermediate position, as they spearheaded the
revisionist movement. But their post-Sosa contribution to the debate,
with coauthor David Moore, builds on the suggestion in their original
critique of the modern position that it might be proper for the courts
to apply customary international law as federal law even without an act
of federal lawmaking (of the sort envisioned by the Supremacy
Clause) that purports to accord it such status. Responding to scholars
who claimed that Sosa embraced the modern position, they contend
that Sosa refutes the claim “that all of [customary international law],
‘whatever [it] requires,’ is automatically incorporated wholesale into
post-Erie federal common law.”526 But that, of course, leaves open the
possibility that some customary international law has the status of federal law in the absence of incorporation by federal statute or treaty.
Their post-Sosa article elaborates on the circumstances in which this
might be the case.
525 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 21, at 75.
526 See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 902 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Brilmayer, supra note 88, at 324). As discussed in Part I, Sosa does
not refute that proposition. See supra text accompanying notes 234–72.
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This subpart considers the circumstances in which Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore would accept political branch authorization short
of federal statute or treaty to treat customary international law as federal law. Although they insist that the circumstances in which this is
proper are few and limited, their rationale for accepting these techniques would appear to extend more broadly.
Some of their examples of permissible applications of customary
international law fall in the category of express or implicit incorporation by statute or treaty. For example, they rightly note that all treaties implicitly incorporate the norms of customary international law
regarding treaty interpretation, as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.527 Although these
examples are consistent with the revisionist position, others are in tension with it.
First, they recognize that the statute conferring federal jurisdiction over interstate disputes can properly be read to authorize the
elaboration of federal common law drawn from customary international law. In the case of interstate disputes, there are “uniquely federal interests derived from the Constitution [that] demand a federal
rule,”528 and, in crafting these rules, the Court properly draws upon
customary international law because these disputes “are directly analogous to disputes between nations.”529 In distinguishing this rationale
for treating some customary international law as federal law from the
modern position, Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore stress that, even
before Erie, the interstate jurisdiction clause was understood to
authorize federal courts to apply federal judge-made rules without legislative authorization, whereas “[f]or over 200 years, courts have not
perceived a structural need to apply [customary international law] as
federal common law” more generally.530 They argue that the absence
of a “long historical pedigree” renders the claim of structural necessity
for regarding customary international law as federal law less plausible
527 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. As Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore note, this treaty is
binding on the United States to the extent it reflects customary law, as the United
States is not a party to it. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 921–22.
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore seem to doubt the propriety of applying the customary international law of treaties to determine whether a treaty exists in the first place.
To be sure, it is a stretch to say that the law concerning the existence of a treaty is
relevant because it is incorporated into the treaty, when the very question is whether
there even is a treaty. On the other hand, such law could easily be understood to be
incorporated into the Constitution’s provisions addressing the making of treaties.
528 Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 915.
529 See id. at 916.
530 See id. at 917.
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in the latter case.531 This argument overlooks the lengthy period
before Erie in which the federal courts had jurisdiction in virtually all
cases implicating customary international law and enforced their own
best understanding of what that law required. Although the States
were understood to have the power to depart from general commercial law, it was not clear that they were understood to have the power
to override the state-to-state portion of the law of nations, and revisionists have not identified examples of the States doing so.532 Given
these features of the judicial treatment of customary international law
before Erie, the “structural necessity” of treating customary international law as federal law as opposed to general law was not apparent
until Erie interred the general law. Indeed, the long history of treating customary international law as something very different from
today’s State law provides its own lengthy pedigree for its status as
federal law.
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore also accept the federal laws conferring federal jurisdiction over admiralty cases as a source of authority for the articulation of a federal law of admiralty, “a traditional
component of the law of nations that was important to the prosperity
of the infant United States.”533 Here, too, they distinguish the
broader claim that customary international law should be treated as
federal law, noting that the Constitution’s express reference to admiralty is “in notable contrast with the treatment of the law of nations
more generally.”534 But the contrast is not very sharp if one considers
that the Constitution’s reference to admiralty comes in a jurisdictional
provision and that the Founders also conferred jurisdiction on the
federal courts over the categories of cases most likely to implicate the
law of nations as a means of advancing their “well-documented desire
to ensure that [S]tates complied with international law.”535 The grant
of federal jurisdiction could be expected to achieve this goal given
their understanding that the law of nations would be judicially
enforceable, at a minimum, as general law regardless of State or federal incorporation. Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore are willing to recognize that admiralty law has the status of federal law today even
though, as they note, it was clearly held not to be federal law before
Erie.536 For the reasons discussed by Bellia and Clark, the structural
531
532
533
534
535
536

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 918.
supra text accompanying notes 479–87, 491.
Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 33, at 918.
id.
id. at 883.
id. at 892.
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and historical case for treating the state-to-state branch of the law of
nations as federal law is, if anything, stronger.537
Finally, and perhaps most illuminatingly, Bradley, Goldsmith, and
Moore are willing to accept the federal status of some norms of customary international law if “incorporated” into U.S. law by the executive branch.538 As an example, they offer the norms regarding
immunity for foreign states and heads of state. Before Erie, the courts
applied these norms of customary international law as general law
without authorization. At around the time that Erie was decided, the
Supreme Court indicated that the courts were to regard case-specific
executive branch statements regarding immunity as binding, and, in
cases in which the executive branch had not expressed an opinion,
the courts were to apply the principles of customary international law
on immunity that the executive branch had accepted.539 In 1976,
Congress codified the international law concerning the immunity of
foreign states in the FSIA, but the Act is unclear regarding its applicability to heads of state or foreign officials generally.540 According to
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore, of the courts that read the FSIA not
to cover the immunity of heads of state, “some recognize [the] immunity only in the face of an explicit suggestion of immunity by the Executive,” whereas “[o]thers rely on the lack of an executive branch
suggestion simply as a factor weighing against immunity.”541 All, however, look for executive branch authorization “at least to some
degree.”542
It is surprising that scholars who object to free-wheeling federal
common lawmaking would be so receptive to the incorporation of customary international law into federal law by the executive branch acting alone. After all, the main objection to federal common
lawmaking is that it evades the carefully wrought procedures set forth

537 See also Bederman, supra note 64, at 348 (“To suggest . . . that originalist
grounds for exceptionalism in admiralty as ‘law of the land’ are stronger than the
constitutional basis for disputes arising under the law of nations seems wholly extravagant. Put another way, there seems to be no sensible originalist argument for according [the general maritime law] greater jurisprudential status than [customary
international law].”).
538 See id. at 935–36.
539 See id. at 922–23.
540 See id. The Court has since held that the FSIA does not address the immunity
of foreign state officials. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
541 Id. at 924.
542 Id.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 119

customary international law as u.s. law

4-OCT-11

12:26

1613

in the Constitution for making preemptive federal law.543 As
explained above, the claim is that the hurdles that must be overcome
to make federal law were put in place to protect the States from having their laws displaced too easily. From this perspective, “lawmaking”
by the executive branch acting alone should be similarly problematic,
as it does not satisfy the bicameralism requirement for federal statutes
or the requirement of Senate consent to treaties.544 To attribute the
preemptive force of these norms to ad hoc executive branch decisionmaking seems more offensive to rule-of-law values than a more generally applicable structural argument for preemption, as a retail
executive incorporation regime would transform the federal courts
into the federal Executive’s errand boys.545
Executive branch incorporation of customary international law
with respect to the subset of customary international law that relates
to the immunity of foreign states and officials (including heads of
state) might perhaps be defended as an exercise of the President’s
constitutional authority to send and receive ambassadors, which has
been construed to give the President the power to recognize foreign
states and governments as well. This recognition power has been
acknowledged as the source of the President’s power to enter into
executive agreements that have the force of preemptive federal law
without the consent of the Senate.546 But revisionists have criticized
these decisions, too, as incompatible with the aspects of the constitu-

543 See Clark, supra note 474; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE
L. REV. 327 (1992).
544 See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV.
1573, 1597–1607 (2007).
545 Justice Douglas used the “errand boy” language in his concurrence in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in the result). A majority of the Court in that case rejected the Bernstein
exception, under which the applicability of the act-of-state doctrine would turn on the
Executive’s case-by-case determination that adjudicating the case under international
law would not harm the nation’s foreign relations interests. See id. at 772–73; id. at
773 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 776–77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Bernstein exception takes its name from Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), mandate amended by 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954), and Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1947).
546 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
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tional structure that they assert are offended by according federal status to customary international law.547
An alternative explanation of the immunity decisions would be to
read them as assuming that customary international law has the force
of federal law for structural reasons, but that the courts are to hew
closely to the executive branch’s positions out of deference to its superior expertise and responsibilities in this area. The proper scope and
contexts of judicial deference to the Executive on questions of customary international law are beyond the scope of this Article. The
Court does not accord nearly as much deference to the Executive in
other contexts. For example, in the context of the act-of-state doctrine, the Court has refused to treat the views of the Executive regarding the content of international law as binding.548 But perhaps a
more deferential approach is warranted for the immunity issue
because it bears upon jurisdiction rather than the merits, or because
immunity is more closely tied to the President’s recognition power.549
The recent Samantar decision may suggest that the Court favors
an executive incorporation approach with respect to immunity issues.
As discussed above, the executive branch there argued that foreign
officials were entitled to a “common law” immunity whose contours
were to be determined by reference to “[p]rinciples adopted by the
Executive Branch, informed by customary international law.”550 The
Court agreed that the immunity of foreign officials was “governed by
the common law.”551 Although it did not discuss the content or status
of this immunity, it did describe the pre-FSIA regime as one in which
the courts followed the executive branch’s case-specific suggestions of
immunity and, if the executive branch declined to express its views on
the case, “a district court inquired ‘whether the ground of immunity is
one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to
547 See Young, supra note 19, at 415–17, 432; see also Clark, supra note 544, at
1647–48 (arguing that the Court’s modern reliance on Belmont and Pink to support
an expansive view of sole executive agreements is mistaken).
548 See supra note 214.
549 The greater deference that the courts gave to the executive branch on questions of immunity in the pre-FSIA era may also have stemmed from the unsettled
nature of the relevant international law at the time, which was moving from a rule of
absolute immunity to one of restrictive immunity. See Yelin, supra note 85. As discussed below, it is appropriate for the courts to follow the executive branch’s views
with respect to norms of international law that are unsettled or evolving, as the executive branch speaks for the nation on the international plane regarding how such law
should develop. See infra text following note 608.
550 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra
note 196, at 8.
551 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010).
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recognize.’”552 The prominent role given to the executive branch in
the pre-FSIA regime, as the Court described it, may suggest that the
courts apply customary international law in this context as filtered
through the executive branch. If so, the question would remain
whether the contemplated filtering role is peculiar to the immunity
context, given its close link to the recognition power, or is more
broadly applicable. Very likely, the Court did not mean to express any
view about the nature of the executive branch’s role regarding the
immunity enjoyed by foreign officials,553 much less about its role
regarding other areas of customary international law. Since the issue
before them was merely whether the FSIA applied, and since the Justices who joined or concurred in Justice Stevens’s opinion had previously expressed varying views concerning the domestic status of
customary international law,554 the opinion is best read to leave all of
these questions open.555
552 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 36 (1945)).
553 But cf. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 197, at 6 (citing
Samantar for the proposition that, when the State Department has taken a position
regarding the immunity of a foreign official in the particular case, “the court should
accept and defer to the determination that Defendant is not immune from suit”).
554 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (Souter, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court, with Part IV joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part with Rehnquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J., joining).
555 It might perhaps be argued that the Court’s references to a “common law” of
immunity rather than a customary international law of immunity shows that it was not
contemplating the judicial enforcement of customary international law at all, even as
filtered through the executive branch, but was instead recognizing an executive
branch power to make law, untethered to customary international law, based on the
President’s authority to conduct foreign relations. This reading seems implausible.
The executive branch does not have the power to immunize a private party from suit,
no matter how greatly it would advance the nation’s foreign relations. Presumably,
the executive branch is, at the very least, required to defend its suggestion of immunity by reference to international law as it exists or as the executive branch would like
it to evolve. And, in fact, the State Department does explain its suggestions of immunity by reference to international law. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser to the Dep’t of State, to Tony West, Assistant Att’y Gen., Re: Yousuf v.
Samantar, Civil Action No 01-13760 (E.D. Va.) (Feb. 11, 2011), reprinted in Statement
of Interest of the United States of America, supra note 197, exhibit 1. If a link to
international law is required, then it would appear that the common law that the
courts are enforcing is (at least) customary international law as filtered through the
executive branch. Indeed, the opinion in Samantar appears to use the term “common
law” as a synonym for customary international law, perhaps reflecting the “settled”
view that customary international law is federal common law. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct.
at 2289 (“[O]ne of the primary purposes of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, which Congress recognized as consistent with extant
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In any event, the executive incorporation regime, as applied by
the Supreme Court in pre-FSIA immunity cases, is closer to the modern position than to the revisionist one. Adherents of the modern
position recognize that the executive branch speaks for the United
States at the international plane regarding the content of customary
international law and that the courts generally defer to the executive
branch when interpreting such law, especially when the law is in flux.
The executive incorporation thesis thus appears to differ from the
modern position only insofar as it would altogether disable the courts
from disagreeing with the executive branch’s position regarding the
content of customary international law.556 The difference appears to
be between absolute and significant deference to the Executive. An
across-the-board rule of absolute deference would appear to conflict
with the Supreme Court’s approach to the application of customary
international law in other contexts and, thus, presumably does not
apply outside the context of immunity for foreign officials (if even
then).557 But the more significant point, for present purposes, is that
the two approaches are far closer to each other than to the approach
that revisionists had attributed to Judge Hand with approval, under
which the issue would be governed by State law.
****
In sum, the intermediate positions are problematic to the extent
that they leave the question of the applicability and interpretation of
customary international law to the States, which they would all do to
some extent. Ramsey’s position is not intermediate at all, as he would
apparently regard customary international law as always nonpreemptive unless incorporated by statute or treaty, whereas Bradley and
Goldsmith’s original critique left room for the application of such law
international law. We have observed that a related purpose was ‘codification of international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment,’ and have examined the relevant common law and international practice when interpreting the Act. Because of this
relationship between the Act and the common law that it codified, petitioner argues that
we should construe the FSIA consistently with the common law regarding individual
immunity, which—in petitioner’s view—was coextensive with the law of state immunity and always immunized a foreign official for acts taken on behalf of the foreign
state.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Permanent Mission of India to
United Nations v. City of N.Y., 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007))).
556 Perhaps the thesis would also disable the courts from applying a norm of customary international law on which the executive branch has not yet taken a position,
but this situation is highly unlikely to arise.
557 For example, in Sabbatino, the Court preferred to declare customary international law inapplicable to a whole category of cases than to adopt a rule of absolute
deference. See supra note 214.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 123

4-OCT-11

customary international law as u.s. law

12:26

1617

as federal law if incorporated by the executive branch. Young,
Aleinikoff, and Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore would, to varying
degrees allow customary international law norms not incorporated by
treaty or statute to be treated as federal law in certain circumstances,
but (except for Aleinikoff, who is not clear on this point) would
accord it such force only in very limited circumstances. In addition,
the specific proposals of Ramsey, Young, and Aleinikoff pose significant problems of application. Bellia and Clark offer a persuasive
structural argument for according the force of preemptive federal law
to some categories of customary international law, but fail to appreciate the full implications of their own argument.
III. THE MODERN POSITION, REDUX
Parts I and II showed that the modern position is more faithful to
the constitutional structure, the Founders’ intent, and pre-Erie doctrine than is the revisionist position. But my defense of the modern
position so far has assumed that customary international law has
remained static over that period. This Part considers another prong
of the revisionist argument: that the modern position should be abandoned because the customary international law of today differs in relevant respects from the state-to-state portion of the law of nations as
known to the Founders. Revisionists note two important differences.
First, customary international law today relies to a lesser extent on
consistent state practice. Second, modern customary international
law extensively addresses how a state may behave toward its own
nationals. I conclude that the first difference might warrant a generally applicable limitation for the application of customary international law along the lines of the limitation articulated in Sabbatino and
Sosa, but it does not justify a wholesale rejection of the modern position. This limitation should also assuage concerns deriving from the
second difference between historic and modern customary international law.
A. The New Ways of Making Customary International Law
The revisionists’ challenge to the federal status of customary
international law has usually been coupled with an attack on the
“new” forms of international law.558 The traditional view was that customary international law was formed over a long period of time
558 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 855, 869–70; Young,
supra note 19, at 389. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note
9, at 319.
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through consistent state practice coupled with opinio juris, that is, the
understanding that the practice was being undertaken out of a sense
of legal obligation. Revisionists have noted that, in recent years, the
requirements for creating customary international law have been considerably eased.559 The length of time necessary to form a new rule
has become shorter, to the point that today it is sometimes recognized
that custom can form instantly.560 Relatedly, they note, the requirement of consistent state practice has given way to an understanding
that custom can develop through statements or declarations of states
not necessarily coinciding with state practice, such as their votes on
nonbinding U.N. resolutions.561 As a result of the recognition of
these new and easier ways of producing international law, the possibility of claiming the existence of many new norms of customary international law has grown enormously, thus increasing significantly the
potential preemptive effect of this law.562
One possible response to this concern is to point out that these
developments are controversial even within the international legal
community.563 However, this response merely brings to the fore the
problem of the indeterminacy of much customary international
law.564 The fact that international jurists cannot agree on what it takes
to produce a rule of customary international law is hardly comforting.
To reassess the status of customary international law because of
changes in its nature or content since the Founding is certainly legitimate. The domestic legal force of customary international law, unlike
that of treaties, is not specified in the constitutional text. The modern
position is based on an inference from the constitutional structure,
and changes in the content or nature of such law might bear on the
559 As noted above, at the time of the Founding the law of nations was regarded as
having, in part, a natural law foundation and not thought to be “made” at all. See
supra note 369 and accompanying text. To that extent, the difference between the old
and new customary international law is even starker.
560 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 n.2 (1987) (recognizing the concept of coastal state economic rights over the continental shelf as so
quickly accepted after its announcement in 1945 that it became “instant custom[ ]”);
Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 532 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1986).
561 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 9, at 839.
562 Revisionists make a point of describing the exorbitant claims that are occasionally made in the name of customary international law. See, e.g., id. at 841.
563 See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM.
J. INT’L L. 413, 435 (1983).
564 See generally, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989)
(describing such indeterminacy).
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structural analysis. For example, such changes might reasonably lead
to a reevaluation of the extent to which State violations of such law
would compromise the federal government’s achievement of the
nation’s foreign relations goals or the extent to which treating such
law as preemptive would improperly shift the balance of federal-State
power.
The revisionists’ concerns about the indeterminacy of customary
international law and the easing of the requirements for recognizing
new norms of customary international law do seem germane to the
structural argument for regarding such law as preemptive. The
greater the indeterminacy of the law, the broader the power of judges
to hold the laws of the States invalid. Although the indeterminacy of
the norms does not necessarily result in judicial lawmaking,565 such
indeterminancy could in practice lead to broader preemption. Judicial deference to the executive branch on questions about the content
of such law might alleviate such concerns, but it would raise a concern
about circumvention of the bicameralism requirement. This latter
concern is exacerbated by the possible loosening of the requirement
of state practice. The executive branch is the nation’s primary voice
on the international stage regarding the content of customary international law.566 According preemptive effect to law that is “made” by
executive branch statements would appear to give the executive
branch a degree of lawmaking power that is at least in tension with the
Constitution’s carefully wrought procedures for creating preemptive
federal law.567
But these problems do not afflict all of customary international
law. Many norms are well-established and valid under standards that
virtually all international jurists would endorse.568 The fact that there
is disagreement at the margins, and that certain of the controversial
theories of international law formation are problematic in themselves,
does not justify the denial of federal status to norms of customary
international law that are well settled under uncontroversial theories.
565 See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
566 See HENKIN, supra note 230, at 42–45.
567 Cf. infra text accompanying notes 606–08 (arguing that States are required to
adhere to the executive branch’s interpretation of customary international law in
incorporating as State law international legal norms that lack the force of supreme
federal law).
568 Professor Goldsmith has come close to denying that customary international
law exists at all. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42–43 (2005). But he has recognized that, for example, the immunity of
foreign state officials exists and has the status of customary international law. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 199, at 16.
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A limitation along the lines of what the Sabbatino Court imposed for
the application of customary international law to invalidate the acts of
foreign states within their own territory seems well tailored to address
this problem. As noted, the Court held that norms that were disputed
and touched sharply on national nerves could not be applied in this
context. The Court in Sosa applied a similar standard to identify the
norms that could support a federal common law action for damages.
Although the Sabbatino limitation only applies to violations of customary international law attributable to foreign states, and the similar limitations articulated in Sosa were only found applicable to actions for
damages, and may only apply when the acts of foreign states are being
challenged, the concerns discussed in this section may justify a
broader holding that only norms of customary international law that
satisfy a heightened standard of clarity and acceptance count as preemptive federal law.569 Such a holding would be consistent with the
structural rationale for according customary international law the status of preemptive federal law. The structural argument is based on
the concern that violations will produce international friction and
thus hinder the accomplishment of foreign relations goals. Denying
preemptive force to debatable norms would not produce significant
friction, it might be claimed, precisely because the status of the norms
on the international plane is itself unclear.
Applying this heightened standard of clarity and acceptance
across the board, however, might be problematic in a different
respect. Such an approach would sometimes result in the application
of a narrow rule in circumstances in which the Executive favors a
broader rule.570 For example, the Executive may wish to enjoy a
broad immunity in the courts of other states, but, if other states favor
a narrower rule and our courts applied the narrower rule (because
the broader rule is disputed), the Executive would be on weak ground
in claiming the broader immunity when the United States or its officials are sued in the courts of other states. It may thus be preferable
in some contexts for the courts to follow the Executive’s position if the
Executive favors a disputed rule. In Sabbatino, rule-of-law concerns led
569 This may be what Chief Judge Hand had in mind when he suggested that a
State’s violation of a “well-established” principle of international law might raise a
federal question. See supra text accompanying note 193.
570 A rule is “narrow” or “broad,” as I use these terms in the text, as measured
against the extent to which they restrict the rights of sovereign states. A narrow rule
leaves states with less freedom or discretion, whereas a broader rule leaves states with
more. Thus, a rule prohibiting the taking of the property of aliens unless accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is narrower than a rule permitting such takings.
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the Court to prefer a heightened standard, but there the Executive
favored a narrower rule than what the Court believed was universally
accepted. Where the Executive favors according foreign states a narrower discretion than what well-accepted international law accords,
following the Executive’s position in cases challenging the acts of foreign states would produce rule-of-law problems and exacerbate international friction. Where the Executive prefers a rule giving sovereign
states broader rights than what well-accepted international law accords
them (as in the immunity example), then following the Executive in
cases seeking to apply the rule to foreign states would raise rule-of-law
concerns but would not produce international friction. It may thus be
appropriate for the courts to follow the Executive in the latter context
but not the former.571
A heightened standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance
would reduce the range of norms of customary international law having preemptive effect, but, in contrast to the approach favored by revisionists, well-established norms of customary international law would
continue to have preemptive effect. A noteworthy example is one that
was implicated in the Sosa case but not considered by the Supreme
Court. Mr. Alvarez-Machain claimed that Mr. Sosa’s actions violated
the rule of customary international law prohibiting the officials or
agents of one nation from exercising police power on the territory of
another nation without the latter nation’s consent, but the court of
appeals dismissed this claim. While acknowledging that “[f]ew principles in international law are as deeply rooted as the general norm
prohibiting acts of sovereignty that offend the territorial integrity of
another state,”572 the court held that the right belonged to Mexico
and thus Alvarez-Machain lacked standing to assert it.573 For reasons
that I have addressed at length elsewhere, the court’s standing hold571 In cases challenging the acts of the States, a policy of following the Executive’s
preferences where it favors a rule restricting the discretion of the States would not
produce international friction, but would raise greater federalism concerns, particularly in cases involving a State’s treatment of its own citizens. For this reason, it may
be appropriate for the courts to apply a heightened standard of clarity and breadth of
acceptance for norms restricting the discretion of the States even if the Executive
favors a disputed rule.
572 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 615 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 119 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons
Abducted in Breach of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY
407, 407 & n.2 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989)).
573 Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 615–16.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

1622

unknown

Seq: 128

notre dame law review

4-OCT-11

12:26

[vol. 86:4

ing was erroneous.574 The court’s reasoning would equally deny diplomats standing to assert diplomatic immunity, since such immunity
is, as a matter of international law, a right of the states and not of the
individual.575 But the fact that the sending state may waive the diplomat’s immunity has never been thought to mean that the diplomat
lacked standing to assert the immunity in the absence of waiver. Similarly, the fact that Mexico may consent to the exercise of police power
by U.S. agents on its soil should not deprive the victim of an unlawful
exercise of extraterritorial police power of standing to invoke the relevant rule of international law in our courts in the absence of consent.
Indeed, the court of appeals’ analysis would have the paradoxical
effect of restricting the range of domestically enforceable norms of
customary international law to a subset of such norms—those relating
to human rights—that the revisionists have expressed particular concerns about, and which for the most part did not even exist before
Erie, when all agree that customary international law was commonly
applied by the courts.576
Because Alvarez-Machain prevailed in the court of appeals on
other grounds and did not cross-petition for certiorari,577 the standing
issue was not before the Supreme Court in Sosa. Had it considered
the claim, the Court would presumably have reversed, just as it
recently reversed the court of appeals’ similar holding in United States
v. Bond578 that an individual lacks standing to enforce Tenth Amendment limitations because that Amendment protects States, not individuals.579 Had the Court reversed the standing holding in Sosa, it would
surely have agreed with the court of appeals that this norm of customary international law satisfied the heightened standard of clarity and
breadth of acceptance that it adopted in that case. The fact that Mr.
Sosa was acting at the behest of an official of the executive branch
raises the question whether there was a “controlling executive act”
precluding the enforcement of the norm, an issue beyond the scope
of this Article.580 But there should be no question that, had Sosa been
574 See Vázquez, supra note 172, at 1086–97.
575 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 32(1), opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3241, 500 U.N.T.S.
95 (“The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents . . . may be waived by the
sending State.”).
576 See Vázquez, supra note 172, at 1094–95.
577 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699 (noting that the Ninth Circuit found for AlvarezMachain on both his Alien Tort Statute and Federal Tort Claims Act claims); Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
578 581 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, No. 09-1227 (U.S. June 16, 2011).
579 Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (U.S. June 16, 2011).
580 See supra text accompanying notes 223–32.

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 129

4-OCT-11

customary international law as u.s. law

12:26

1623

acting at the behest of the State of California, or had he been an official of the State of California, his actions would have violated a norm
of international law meeting any conceivable standard of clarity and
breadth of acceptance, and would accordingly have been redressable
under the standard suggested herein. If the revisionist view were
adopted, on the other hand, California’s violation of this well-established principle of international law would not be judicially
redressable.
In sum, revisionists have raised some valid concerns stemming
from the indeterminacy of some modern customary international law
and uncertainties about the process for forming new customary law
rules, but the solution they propose is overbroad. A better-tailored
response would simply limit the range of preemptive customary international law to those norms that satisfy a heightened standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance—a standard that the Court has already
adopted in two narrow settings.581 In certain contexts, this heightened standard may have to be coupled with an executive-deference
approach. But a wholesale rejection of the modern position is
unwarranted.
B. The New Topics Addressed by Customary International Law
Some revisionists have also noted that the customary international law of today differs from the international law of the Founders’
time in that it addresses how a nation treats its own nationals.582
International law has always addressed how nations may behave
toward individuals. But, before the Second World War, international
law addressed individuals almost exclusively by limiting how one
nation could treat the citizens of another nation. After World War II,
with the broad recognition of an international law of human rights,
international law came to address more extensively the behavior of
nations toward their own citizens.
But the international law of human rights implicates the structural reasons for according preemptive force to customary international law no less than the older topics covered by customary
581 In a recent book chapter, Kenneth Randall and Chimène Keitner describe the
subset of customary international law that the Court found enforceable in Sabbatino
and Sosa as “supernorms” and they suggest that the Court has already adopted a
broader rule limiting enforcement of customary international law to this subset. See
Kenneth C. Randall & Chimène I. Keitner, Sabbatino, Sosa, and “Supernorms,” in
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 559 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). For the
reasons discussed above, I do not think it is correct to say that the Court has already
embraced this as a general limitation.
582 See, e.g., Young, supra note 19, at 368, 420.
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international law do. Even though human rights law is based on the
idea that individuals have certain rights by virtue of their humanity,
one consequence of viewing these norms as part of international law is
the recognition that one nation’s violations of these norms is the concern of the world community. A nation’s obligations under the international law of human rights are obligations toward other states, not just
toward individuals.583 Thus, the United States’ violation of these
norms is as likely to produce international friction—and thus to complicate the nation’s pursuit of foreign relations goals—as its violation
of other norms of customary international law.
The growth of human rights law does implicate a different sort of
concern relevant to the debate about the modern position. Such
norms are more likely to relate to areas that have traditionally been
regulated by the States, and in some respects may relate to matters
that have been thought to be constitutionally reserved to the States.
According preemptive effect to international human rights norms
thus risks a far broader preemption of State law than had been traditionally associated with customary international law.584 It is likely,
however, that this concern would be adequately addressed by limitations along the lines of those articulated in Sabbatino and Sosa, if
extended beyond the particular contexts of those cases. The human
rights norms that most concern the revisionists are actually highly controversial within the international legal community. For example,
revisionists frequently invoke the claimed norm prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles.585 As
noted above, if this is a norm of customary international law, it is likely
that the United States is exempt from it as a persistent objector.586 If
only norms meeting a high threshold of clarity and acceptance were
583 See RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 222
(2002) (“Human rights as a whole . . . are generally considered to generate erga omnes
or erga omnes partes obligations for states.”); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.
(Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5, 1970) (“By their very nature [the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole] are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes . . . .
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination.”). For this reason, the international law of human rights
corresponds to the state-to-state branch of the Founding era’s law of nations, not the
law merchant or general commercial law.
584 See Young, supra note 19, at 420–23 (advancing this argument forcefully).
585 See id. at 474.
586 See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
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deemed to have preemptive force, it is very likely that the human
rights norms that would preempt State law would largely duplicate
prohibitions imposed on the States by the Constitution. (Indeed, that
is currently the case with respect to the claimed norm of customary
international law prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.587)
If, contrary to my argument, the customary international law of
human rights were regarded as too different from the more traditional kind of customary international law because of its greater overlap with subjects traditionally reserved to the States, or for some other
reason, the solution would be to deny preemptive force to this subset
of customary international law, not to reject the modern position altogether. Such an approach would continue to accord preemptive force
to the more traditional sorts of customary international law, such as
the norm that was erroneously dismissed from the Sosa case before it
reached the Supreme Court. The Court’s analysis in Sosa of the
claimed human rights violation before it suggests that it agrees with
my conclusion that a heightened standard of clarity and breadth of
acceptance suffices to protect the relevant constitutional interests and
that a categorical exclusion of human rights norms from the range of
preemptive federal law is unwarranted.
IV. STATE INCORPORATION

OF

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Revisionists maintain that customary international law has the
force of law in this country only to the extent that it has been affirmatively incorporated as such. It has the force of federal law if incorporated by the federal political branches, ordinarily through federal
statute or treaty. In the absence of federal incorporation, it has the
force of State law if incorporated by the States. This Article so far has
addressed only the first part of that claim and concluded that the better answer from the perspective of constitutional history and structure
is that customary international law has the status of preemptive federal law, with some exceptions for suits challenging the conduct of
foreign states and some federal officials. I have argued further that
the revisionists’ arguments based on the differences between the customary international law of today and the state-to-state branch of the
law of nations as known to the Founders can be adequately addressed
by limiting the scope of preemptive customary international law to
norms satisfying requirements along the lines of those articulated in
Sabbatino and Sosa.
587

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–79 (2005).
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I now consider the second part of the revisionist claim: that, to
the extent a norm of customary international law lacks the force of
preemptive federal law, the States have the power to incorporate it as
State law. Contrary to the apparent assumption of the revisionists,
State incorporation of customary international law norms that do not
have the force of preemptive federal law could potentially cause a
structural problem of its own. The scope of this problem would be
broader if, as revisionists argue, customary international law does not
generally have the force of preemptive federal law. If only disputed or
unclear norms lack such status, the scope of the problem would be
narrower, but the problem would nevertheless exist. This Part identifies the structural problem and argues that the solution is either to
prohibit States from incorporating customary international law as
State law or to recognize the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
review the State courts’ interpretations of customary international law
even when such law is applicable to the case only as State law. I conclude that the latter solution is preferable and consistent with Article
III.
It is clear that federal law limits the power of States to incorporate
customary international law as State law at least in some contexts. For
example, Sabbatino holds that certain norms of customary international law may not be applied as a basis for invalidating the acts of a
foreign state performed within its own territory. The reason is that
the failure to give effect to the act of state would hinder the political
branches’ pursuit of the nation’s foreign relations interests. The
Court in Sabbatino explicitly held that the State courts, no less than the
federal courts, were prohibited from applying these norms in this context.588 The State courts’ failure to give effect to such acts of state
would be just as likely to hinder the federal government’s conduct of
foreign relations. Thus, the constitutional structure disables the
States from incorporating certain norms of customary international
law as State law against foreign states acting within their own territory.
The Court in Sosa did not directly address whether the States
were permitted to recognize a right of action for damages to enforce
norms of international law not meeting the heightened standard of
clarity and breadth of acceptance that it articulated. The Court’s analysis, however, strongly suggests a negative answer, at least with respect
to certain defendants. In limiting the federal right of action to this
subset of customary international law norms, the Court in Sosa
expressed concern about the foreign relations sensitivities of
extending the right of action to less-well-established norms and the
588

See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
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potential interference with the “discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs” that could result.589
These same structural concerns would result from the recognition
and enforcement of State law rights of action. Thus, it would appear
that a State Alien Tort Claims Act with less stringent requirements
than contemplated by Sosa would be preempted by the same structural constitutional concerns that led the Court to limit the federal
right of action.
It is true that the Court in Sosa expressed concerns about foreign
relations sensitivities in discussing claims alleging the violation of
international law by foreign officials abroad (a situation very similar to
that in Sabbatino).590 Its reasoning may not apply beyond a Filartigatype situation, where customary international law is sought to be
applied to the acts of foreign officials. But, to the extent that a State
right of action were made applicable to federal officials, the interference with federal functions would appear to be even more direct and
hence more problematic. As discussed above, customary international
law as federal law does not bind certain federal officials in certain contexts. Surely, the extent to which federal officials are bound is purely
a matter of federal law.
That leaves a State’s incorporation of customary international law
to bind its own officials. On the surface, it may seem that a State’s
incorporation of customary international law to bind itself poses no
problem from a structural constitutional standpoint.591 But a closer
examination reveals a potential problem resulting from the process
under international law for creating new rules of customary international law. The traditional rule has been that customary international
law is formed through consistent state practice performed out of a
sense of legal obligation. As noted by revisionists, newer theories have
gained some recognition under which customary international law
may be formed through the public statements of states indicating
their views about what is required by customary international law. If
States were free to incorporate customary international law as State
law in circumstances where such law lacks the status of federal law,
even if only to bind their own officials, then State courts would be
making pronouncements about what international law requires in certain contexts. Such decisions would constitute state practice and evi589 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
590 See supra text accompanying notes 254–55.
591 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 670 (“If a [S]tate court decides that the death
penalty should be forbidden in prosecutions brought under [S]tate law, such a decision is entirely that [S]tate’s business [regardless of whether it is made on the basis of
customary international law].”).
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dence of opinio juris under the traditional approaches to the
formation of customary international law. Additionally, such decisions are a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [customary international] law.”592 Under the newer approaches, State
court decisions would be even more likely to be relevant to the formation of new rules of customary international law. Such State court
pronouncements about what international law requires would thus
contribute to the formation of new rules that could, in turn, bind the
federal government.
It is well accepted that the decisions of domestic courts count as
state practice for the purpose of forming customary international law.
As explained by the International Law Association (ILA) in its Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, “[d]omestic courts . . . are organs of the State, and their
decisions should also be treated as part of the practice of the State.
For example, a determination that international law does or does not
require State immunity to be accorded in a particular case, or the
extraterritorial application of a domestic law.”593 State courts are as
much “domestic courts” for international law purposes as federal
courts. Their actions are as attributable to the nation for purposes of
state responsibility as those of federal courts.594 According to the
ILA’s Statement of Principles, “[t]he activities of provinces within a federation, or of other subordinate local authorities” may constitute state
practice “if the entity concerned acts with the authority of the (federal) State, or if the latter adopts its acts.”595 “A [federal] State’s failure to prevent the conduct in question can amount, for present
purposes, to tacit adoption . . . (whether or not the [national government] is in a position, under its constitutional law, to change the rules
in question).”596 Thus, if the U.S. Constitution were construed to permit the States to incorporate customary international law as State law,
then State pronouncements about what customary international law
requires would count as state practice. The Constitution would, in
such circumstances, be understood to delegate to the States the power
to take positions on what customary international law requires in
these contexts, and the States’ decisions would be considered to have
been tacitly adopted by the federal government, even if the federal
courts had no power to review those decisions.
592 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
593 ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 71, at 18 (footnote omitted).
594 See Responsibility of States, supra note 94, art. 4 & cmt. 6.
595 ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 71, at 16–17.
596 Id. at 17.
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Such decisions could thus contribute to the evolution of new
rules of international law that would bind the federal government
even if it disagreed with them. If a State court ruled that customary
international law imposes a particular rule, then the State court’s decision, in combination with the practice of other states, could wind up
crystallizing into a new rule of international law. The likelihood of
that happening is perhaps remote, since it would require action by
numerous other nations in conjunction with that of the State court,
and the federal government could make statements disagreeing with
the State court decision, thus diluting the impact of the State court
decision internationally. But if the rule did come into being, the State
court’s decisions in conflict with the federal view might compromise
the United States’ ability to claim persistent objector status.
A second scenario is more likely to occur: the State court might
decide that a norm of customary international law does not exist even
though the federal government believes that it does or should exist.
In this way, the State court judgment could contribute to the evisceration of an existing norm of international law. Since it takes less state
practice to vitiate a rule of international law than to establish one,597
the State’s conduct is more likely to have the feared effect. Additionally, a State court’s decision could hinder the federal government’s
efforts to establish a new rule of international law. Although the federal Executive’s position will usually be accorded more weight in this
context, “the internal uniformity or consistency which is needed for a
State’s practice to count towards the formation of a customary rule
may . . . be prejudiced.”598
The ability of States to incorporate customary international law as
State law would thus interfere with the federal government’s conduct
of foreign relations by hindering its ability to establish norms that it
champions and, potentially, by contributing toward the establishment
of norms that it does not favor, and which could ultimately bind it. In
the context of dormant foreign affairs preemption, the “one-voice”
argument has often been criticized,599 and the Court itself has distanced itself from the argument in related contexts.600 But the “onevoice” argument has particular resonance with respect to customary
international law because of the way customary international law
evolves. State court decisions regarding the requirements of custom597 See Carlos M. Vázquez, Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small
Portions, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 269, 279–80 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/955.pdf.
598 ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 71, at 18.
599 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 17, at 561–63; Young, supra note 19, at 447–50.
600 See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320–24 (1994).
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ary international law may dilute the federal government’s voice when
it speaks in favor of a particular norm, and may even contradict and
eventually bind the federal government to norms it opposes.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first would
be to deny the States the power to incorporate customary international law as State law in a manner that requires State judicial or
administrative officials to issue pronouncements about what customary international law requires. The second, more limited, approach
would permit such incorporation, but would recognize the power of
the Supreme Court to review the decisions of State courts or administrative agencies about what customary international law requires, even
when such law is relevant to the case only because it has been incorporated into State law.
Under the first approach, the Supreme Court would simply strike
down any State law incorporating customary international law in the
manner described. The standard for finding norms of customary
international law to be preemptive federal law would thus function as
a ceiling as well as a floor. In other words, States would be required to
comply with and enforce norms satisfying the standard and prohibited
from incorporating norms that do not satisfy it. To be clear, the States
would not be precluded from legislating out of a belief that legislation
is necessary to carry out international law. Thus, they would be free to
prohibit the execution of minors out of a belief that customary international law prohibits such executions, even if their belief is mistaken.
The structural problem arises when the State courts make pronouncements about the content of international law. Thus, a statute prohibiting penalties that would violate customary international law would
be invalid insofar as it is construed to apply to norms that do not meet
whatever standard is adopted for giving preemptive effect to customary international law norms, whereas a statute that prohibited the execution of minors would not be invalid, even if it was motivated by a
mistaken belief that such executions violate customary international
law. Because only public acts count as state practice for purposes of
customary international law formation,601 a State legislature’s motive
for enacting a law would not cause the same structural problem as a
State court’s decision that particular conduct violates customary international law.602
601 See ILA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 71, at 15 (“Acts do not count as
practice if they are not public.”).
602 The structural problem would perhaps arise if the legislature’s motive were
memorialized in a formal document, such as a legislative report or the statute’s preamble, but only in diluted form.
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The second approach would address the structural problem by
permitting the Supreme Court to review the State courts’ interpretations of customary international law. This approach seems preferable
to the first. The structural problem arises only if the State courts have
interpreted international law erroneously, but the State courts may
well have gotten the international law right. To be sure, the Supreme
Court may lack the expertise to decide disputed or unsettled questions of customary international law. But, in this context, the Court’s
role would be simply to follow the executive branch’s interpretation of
customary international law. The particular structural problem arises
because the State’s action will contribute to the formation of a norm
that could come to bind the federal government. Because the President speaks for the nation at the international plane concerning the
content of customary international law,603 the problem disappears if
the Executive agrees with the State court’s interpretation of what
international law requires.
A possible obstacle to Supreme Court review of State court decisions in this context would be Article III of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court clearly has jurisdiction to review the State courts’
interpretations of federal law, but in this context, by hypothesis, customary international law is being applied as State law. True, the
Supreme Court can review federal issues embedded in State law
causes of action.604 It is thus clear that the Supreme Court can review
State court decisions even if the remedy being sought in the case is
available only by virtue of State law. But in such cases there is no
doubt that the issue being reviewed is one of federal law. Here, by
hypothesis, the relevant norm lacks the status of preemptive federal
law.
But, once we take account of the structural constitutional basis
for Supreme Court review in this context, we see that the Article III
problem is illusory. Assume that Congress passed a statute preempting State laws incorporating an erroneous interpretation of customary
international law. Clearly, Supreme Court review of the State court’s
interpretation of customary international law would be consistent with
Article III under such circumstances. The same would be true if the
statute preempted State laws incorporating an interpretation of international law that differed from that espoused by the executive branch.
603 See HENKIN, supra note 230, at 43–44.
604 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308
(2005) (stating that cases arising under State law in which a federal issue is embedded
may “arise under” federal law for purposes of the original jurisdiction of the district
courts).
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My claim here is that State court interpretations of disputed or controversial norms of customary international law that differ from that of
the executive branch regarding the content of such law are problematic from the perspective of the constitutional structure. In other
words, the Constitution itself accomplishes what the federal statute
posited above would accomplish.605 The case thus “arises under” the
Constitution, which establishes that the federal Executive speaks for
the nation regarding the content of customary international law in
this context
I argued in Part II that a rule-of-law problem would arise if the
courts simply followed the Executive’s views about the content of customary international law.606 Because of its concern that the content
of the law enforced by the courts would change with each successive
administration, and that the courts would then be reduced to the
Executive’s errand boys, the Court in the act-of-state context preferred to declare whole categories of customary international law judicially unenforceable in the face of certain acts of foreign states.607 For
the same reason, I argued above that a broader exclusion of disputed
or unclear norms of customary international law from the range of
preemptive federal law might be preferable to a regime in which the
courts simply followed the Executive on a case-by-case basis.608 In the
context of State incorporation of customary international law norms
that lack the status of preemptive federal law, however, it is proper to
treat the Executive’s views as binding. If my analysis in Part III were
followed, then, by hypothesis, the problem under discussion would
arise only with respect to disputed or unsettled norms of customary
international law. The structural constitutional concern is that a
State’s pronouncement regarding the content of customary international law will inhibit the Executive’s efforts towards future crystallization of a norm or will contribute to the crystallization of a norm that
the Executive opposes. Because the Constitution allocates to the
Executive the power to take positions on customary international law
for the purpose of contributing to the possible future crystallization of
the norm, it is appropriate to treat the Executive’s views as binding in
this context. Additionally, the concerns expressed in Part III about
judicial law-making are inapplicable in this context, as the courts are
involved at all only because the States have made international law
605 True, the State statutes we are positing do not expressly incorporate any particular interpretation of international law, but the statutes as construed by the State
courts do.
606 See supra text accompanying note 545.
607 See supra note 214.
608 See supra text accompanying note 545.

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL403.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 139

customary international law as u.s. law

4-OCT-11

12:26

1633

relevant by incorporating it as State law. The states will have “made”
the law, and the federal courts would only be enforcing a constitutional limitation on their ability to do so. (As noted, judicial review in
this context may be conceived as merely the enforcement of a constitutional rule prohibiting States from incorporating into State law an
interpretation of a disputed or controversial norm of customary international law that differs from that of the Executive Branch.) Under
such circumstances, it seems unproblematic for the courts to follow
the Executive.
****
In sum, there is a potential structural problem with permitting
the States to incorporate as State law norms of customary international law that lack the force of preemptive federal law: State pronouncements about what customary international law does and does
not require may, over time and in conjunction with the statements
and practice of other states, wind up undermining norms that the federal government favors, or establishing norms that the federal government does not endorse and which could eventually bind the federal
government. The structural problem can be cured, however, by recognizing that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, States lack the
power to incorporate interpretations of disputed or evolving rules of
customary international law that differ from those espoused by the
federal government. The theory would be that the Constitution allocates to the federal government the power to speak for the nation
concerning disputed or evolving norms of customary international
law, and state court pronouncements regarding the content of such
law conflict with this constitutional allocation of power to the extent
that they differ from that of the federal government. If so, then the
Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review any state court decision interpreting such norms of customary international law to ensure
that they comport with the federal government’s views, even if the
norm is relevant to the case solely because of a State has incorporated
it as State law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the modern position concerning the
status of customary international law is more consistent with constitutional structure, original intent, and pre- and post-Erie doctrine than
the revisionist position. It has shown further that an intermediate status for customary international law is untenable, and that all of the
specific intermediate proposals that have been advanced save that of
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Bellia and Clark are highly problematic. The analysis of Bellia and
Clark, under which the preemptive force of some norms of customary
international law results from an inference from the constitutional
structure, is basically sound but, rather than being an intermediate
position, it supports the modern position.
The revisionists have raised valid concerns about the differences
between the relevant portion of the law of nations as known to the
Founders and the customary international law of today, but these concerns justify a limitation of the modern position, not its rejection. The
concerns would be met if the range of norms of customary international law having preemptive effect were restricted to those meeting a
heightened standard of clarity and breadth of acceptance.
The revisionist position is also potentially problematic insofar as
it would permit the States to incorporate as State law norms of customary international law that lack the status of preemptive federal law.
Such incorporation poses a structural problem to the extent that the
State courts’ pronouncements about the requirements of international law differ from those of the federal Executive. This problem
can be addressed either by disabling the States from incorporating
such norms as State law in a manner that produces State judicial or
administrative pronouncements about what this law requires or by recognizing the Supreme Court’s power to review the State courts’ interpretations of customary international law even when its applicability
to the case derives entirely from State law incorporation. The latter
solution is preferable and consistent with Article III.

